Balance sheet: the Iraq War and U.S. national security

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (06) ◽  
pp. 47-3435-47-3435
1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Halford L. Hoskins

The Suez Canal has been regarded at times and uncritically as one of Egypt's great assets. It is so considered by many of the political leaders of Egypt, as their attitude on Canal issues bears witness. In the sense that the Suez waterway, both as a project and as an achievement, has brought the land of Egypt prominently into the world scene during the past century, it has been a factor in the trend of development of that country second in importance only to the Nile River itself. This is no indication, however, that the Canal has had a beneficent influence on Egyptian life. Actually, a careful estimate of the changes it has wrought, both economic and political, leads inescapably to the conclusion that, with respect to tangible effects, the waterway thus far has worked to the distinct disadvantage of Egypt. It is impossible to bring the intangible balance sheet to totals, but it is safe to say that an Egyptian patriot more concerned with his country's national security and a balanced budget than with its prominence in world affairs might well deplore the fact that the Canal ever progressed beyond the stage of discussion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Evan Davis

Professor Tucker has an especially topical theme this time, and the result is impressive. The prolific editor of military-related reference volumes provides an overview of the tumultuous first fifteen years of the century and helpful grounding in where events may go from here. Given that the series arrives at the end of a dramatic election cycle in which national security is a major concern, this is a product every library with a military or history reference collection should consider buying.


The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 239-259
Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

This chapter offers a comparison of George W. Bush's decision-making process in the Iraq War with that of Lyndon B. Johnson's in the Vietnam War. In both Vietnam and Iraq, the United States had to fight an insurgent campaign that was supported by powerful regional adversaries determined to bring down a US-backed government. In both Vietnam and Iraq, America's superior military technology had limited effectiveness against an enemy who relied on simple but lethal weapons and could blend into the general population. In both Vietnam and Iraq, gaining the trust of that population was vital to the success of the overall mission yet proved frustratingly elusive. And in deciding what to do in response, the national security decision-making apparatus in both the Johnson and Bush administrations ultimately produced a consensus behind the president's decision, either to surge US troops to restore deteriorating security and political stability (in 1965 and 2007) or to begin the process of de-escalation and eventually withdrawal (1968). There were key differences, too, which the chapter also explores, but the similarities are uncanny.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter focuses on the Iraq war of 2003–2011 and the troubles in the Middle East. George W. Bush’s advisers, led by Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, had been considering an attack on Iraq well before 9/11. At the same time, many experts within the government pointed to the lack of any evidence for Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed against the United States. The threats to US national security were outlined to Bush in a briefing just prior to his inauguration; these threats came primarily from al-Qaeda’s terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The chapter first considers the US decision to invade Iraq before discussing the war, taking into account the US’s Operation Iraqi Freedom and the war’s costs to the US and to Iraq. It also examines the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and concludes with an assessment of the ‘Arab Spring’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariane M. Tabatabai ◽  
Annie Tracy Samuel

The 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War stands as the pivotal event for Iran's national security strategy, especially as it pertains to the country's controversial nuclear program. The “imposed war,” as it is known to Iranians, caused Iran to view itself as isolated and on the defensive, striving for self-reliance and survival in what it continues to perceive as an unjust international order. The war has shaped both Iran's strategic outlook generally and its nuclear policies specifically. It was a decisive factor in determining the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear activities, as well as in Iran's approach to the international negotiations surrounding those activities, which in 2015 produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Both during those talks and after the implementation of the deal began, Iranian decisionmakers regularly invoked the history and lessons of the war to construe their decisionmaking process and define their bottom lines. Yet the war and its implications for Iran's strategic culture and nuclear thinking remain understudied and misunderstood. If the implementation of the deal and a longer-term resolution of the conflict over Iran's nuclear program are to succeed, the history of the Iran-Iraq War and the vital lessons that Iran has drawn from it must be appreciated.


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