modal ontology
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2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 517-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

AbstractThe problem of the relation and difference between things and objects is one of the most decisive issues for the conception of the real. These words are usually used interchangeably – and not only in their everyday usage. There are some contemporary philosophical positions that consider almost “everything” as an object; on the other hand, there are proponents of a strict separation of objects and things. How did it happen that the concept of thing (res) and object (obiectum) not only began to theoretically “compete” with each other but also sometimes came to represent differently conceived realities, and even occasionally came to represent an identical conception of reality? This article, on the one hand, discusses the philosophical strategies that reveal the difference between objects and things and enable such a conception of reality which takes into account the Kantian distinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit. On the other, it reconstructs Giorgio Agamben’s project of modal ontology. Agamben’s take on the question What is real? is oriented toward the modus of being and could be traced back to the recognition of the difference between objects and things as well as the “restoration of the life of things themselves.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.


Author(s):  
Ivette Fred-Rivera ◽  
Jessica Leech

The themes of ontology and modality are introduced. The introduction sketches two major strands of metaphysics from the last fifty years or so in which ontology and modality have been combined in particularly important ways, namely, in the worlds approach to modality, and the revival of essentialism. Also introduced are questions of modal ontology—whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently—and questions concerning the interaction of modal ontology and modal epistemology—what consequences do one’s views on modality and ontology have for a modal epistemology? Within this framework, the rest of the chapters of the book are introduced.


What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed this question on a number of fronts, through the development of a Fregean approach to ontology, an essentialist theory of modality, and in his work on neo-logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of new essays engages with these themes in Hale’s work in order to make further progress in our understanding of ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Some essays directly address questions in modal metaphysics, drawing on ontological concerns. Others raise questions in modal epistemology and its links to matters of ontology, such as the challenge to give an epistemology of essence. There are also several essays engaging with questions of what might be called ‘modal ontology’: the study of whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently. Such issues can be raised and addressed directly, but they also have an important bearing on the kinds of semantic commitments engendered in logic and mathematics, e.g., to the existence of sets, or numbers, or properties, and so on. It is thus explored in some chapters to what extent one’s ontology—and indeed, one’s ontology of necessary beings—interacts with other plausible assumptions and commitments.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (7) ◽  
pp. 843-852
Author(s):  
Karolina Enquist Källgren
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marwan Rashed

AbstractThis article explores the intimate connection between Avicenna's “flying man” argument and the theory of modes in the school of Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbā’ī (d. 933). It shows that Avicenna borrows arguments developed originally by Abū Hāšim in order to demonstrate that a definite mode belongs to the living being as a whole (ǧumla). He argues for the incorporeality of soul on the basis of this departure from Aristotelian and Neoplatonic psychology and modal ontology. Here one sees Avicenna's subtle engagement with a thinker to whose writings he reacted critically, yet whom he very likely saw as one of the greatest metaphysicians to write in Arabic.


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