Imperatives of Right

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-329
Author(s):  
Andrew Israelsen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Tension ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” and his broader moral philosophy is a fraught one, with some readers insisting that the two domains are mutually supporting parts of a cohesive practical philosophy and others arguing for their conceptual and legislative independence. In this paper I investigate the reasons for this disparity and argue that both main interpretive camps are mistaken, for Kant’s Rechtslehre can neither be reconciled to his moral philosophy nor stand on its own. I argue that this failure results from Kant’s confused attempt to define the sphere of right as one that functions independently of (yet analogously to) the moral domain through the construction of non-moral yet categorical imperatives. The result is a fundamental tension in Kant’s text that can only be solved through either collapsing juridical duties into broad moral duties or denying any categorical status to duties of right.

Gewalt und Kommunikation

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Jens Bonnemann
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Normal Case ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
Philosophy Of Dialogue ◽  
The Individual

In ethics, when discussing problems of justice and a just social existence one question arises obviously: What is the normal case of the relation between I and you we start from? In moral philosophy, each position includes basic socio-anthropological convictions in that we understand the other, for example, primarily as competitor in the fight for essential resources or as a partner in communication. Thus, it is not the human being as isolated individual, or as specimen of the human species or socialised member of a historical society what needs to be understood. Instead, the individual in its relation to the other or others has been studied in phenomenology and the philosophy of dialogue of the twentieth century. In the following essay I focus on Martin Buber’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s theories of intersubjectivity which I use in order to explore the meaning of recognition and disrespect for an individual. They offer a valuable contribution to questions of practical philosophy and the socio-philosophical diagnosis of our time.

scholarly journals The 'spirit' and the 'letter' of the moral law: Text and commentary in the hermeneutics of German idealism, I

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-157
Author(s):  
Vladimir Milisavljevic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Historical Origins

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on different aspects of the hermeneutical problem in post-Kantian philosophical 'constellation'. In this domain, the problem of the relationship between the text and its commentary is theorized in terms of the antithesis between 'Spirit' and 'Letter', which clearly has religious roots. Therefore, the first part of the paper examines the historical origins of this antithesis, as well as its application in philosophical discussions which developed by the end of the 18th century about the problem of finding the 'true' interpretation to Kant's philosophy. The second part of the text, which is to be published in the next issue of this review, brings the duality of spiritual and literal interpretation into closer connection with the topics of Kant's moral philosophy.

Mathematics and the Good Life

2018 ◽  
pp. 52-78
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Feke
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Continuous Activity ◽  
Good Order ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ordered State ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This chapter demonstrates how Ptolemy's distinctly mathematical ethics emerges from his response to a contemporary debate over the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy. He first asserts that the two are independent, differentiated by the manner in which one attains virtues in each domain, whether by instruction or continuous activity. Thereafter, he diminishes the distinction by revealing how they relate. Theoretical philosophy, specifically mathematics, transforms the soul. The study of astronomical objects—the movements and configurations of heavenly bodies—reveals their constancy, good order, commensurability, and calm. Mathematicians, aided by habit, come to appreciate these qualities and transform their souls into a fine and well-ordered state. Organizing their actions in accordance with astronomical theories, they never forget their ultimate objective, the divine-like condition of the soul. The study of mathematics is crucial to obtaining this good life.

‘The Organized Selfishness of Empire’

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Sandra den Otter
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Political System ◽  
The Self ◽  
Civilizing Mission ◽  
Victorian Britain ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Welfare State

This essay examines T. H. Green’s evolving ideas on empire. Professor of moral philosophy in Oxford until his death in 1882, Green was the most prominent and respected philosophical idealist in Victorian Britain. The influence of his personal example and of his ideas has been traced by Jose Harris and other historians of the welfare state down to the 1940s. Initially enthusiastic for the civilizing mission of empire, Green came to see that any political system or relationship imposed by force, or dependent on coercion or control, was intrinsically incompatible with the ideals of citizenship, voluntarism, and solidarity that define the good community and make possible the self-realization of individuals within it. The essay opens up a new field for discussion and research: the relationship between idealist welfare thinking and imperialism. It argues that empire had a major impact on idealist notions of social welfare.

On the Significance of Duties to the Self

Duty to Self ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 19-41
Author(s):  
Paul Schofield
Keyword(s):  
Moral Emotions ◽  
The Self ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Quality ◽  
The Way

This chapter distinguishes between mere self-regarding reasons to treat oneself in particular ways, and more robust moral duties owed to oneself. While the former are a philosophical commonplace, the latter are absent from most contemporary accounts and their addition to our practical philosophy would be significant. Duties owed to the self are second-personal, in the sense of being directed at a specific person. When a person has a duty to herself, her reasons are particularly strict, they pre-empt other reasons, they require a special sort of acknowledgment of their moral quality, and they engage special moral emotions. As such, if a person accepts that she owes duties to herself, it will impact the way in which she treats herself, and the way she relates to herself, beyond the mere acknowledgment that she has self-regarding reasons.

How to Argue for Law’s Full-Blooded Normativity

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-186
Author(s):  
George Letsas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Specific Practice ◽  
Open Question ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter aims to make space for the view that law possesses full-blooded normativity in a top-down way. Here is the dialectic of the inquiry: What would have to be true of morality for the claim that some specific practice is full-bloodedly normative to be plausible? The chapter assumes that the practice of morality as a whole has full-blooded normativity in the sense that its requirements give one genuine reasons to act, irrespective of one’s subjective wants, desires, and beliefs. The focus is on what it means to say of a specific practice that it partakes of morality’s normativity. The reason is simple: it should be an open question whether this or that practice has full-blooded normativity. For if it is not possible for any particular practice to have full-blooded normativity, then the question of whether law has full-blooded normativity would make no sense from the get-go. The account put forward builds on the idea of obligations of role. A practice, has full-blooded normativity when it instantiates a distinct set of obligations, one that pertains to people in a particular capacity, such as friends, parents, doctors, or teachers. The proposition that there are distinct moral practices, which are not reducible to a single moral concern, is of course disputed territory in moral philosophy. But if this proposition is accepted, one can ask, by analogy, whether legal practice instantiates an obligation of role and, as a result, bears the attributes of full-blooded normativity. This way of proceeding perceives the relationship between law and metaethics differently: it shows that law’s claim to full-blooded normativity ultimately depends on contestable assumptions about the nature of morality as a whole.

Climate Change as a Business and Human Rights Issue: A Proposal for a Moral Typology

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Kristian Høyer TOFT
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Business And Human Rights ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Rights Issue ◽  
Forward Looking

AbstractTo explore the emerging and contested issue of business and human rights in the area of climate change, this article provides a critical discussion from the viewpoint of moral philosophy. A novel typology of businesses’ human rights duties (‘duty’ is considered synonymous with ‘responsibility’ here) is proposed. It claims that duties are both forward- and backward-looking. Cases of human rights litigation seeking remedy for climate-related harms are backward-looking, and duties should be determined on the basis of proportion of historical emissions, culpable knowledge and counter-acts to abate climate harms. Businesses’ forward-looking duties, however, depend on their power, privilege, interest and collective abilities. The typology is then assessed against the background of recent legal principles and instruments. It is concluded that moral duties of business reach beyond mere respect for human rights and national jurisdictions in the context of climate change.

Simone de Beauvoir's Notions of Appeal, Desire, and Ambiguity and their Relationship to Jean-Paul Sartre's Notions of Appeal and Desire

Hypatia ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Gothlin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Female Body ◽  
Second Sex ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The Relationship

This essay focuses on some important concepts in Beauvoir's philosophy: ambiguity, desire, and appeal (appel). Ambiguity and appeal, concepts originating in Beauvoir's moral philosophy, are in The Second Sex connected to the female body and feminine desire. This indicates the complexity of Beauvoir's image of femininity. This essay also proposes a comparative reading of Beauvoir's and Sartre's concepts of appeal, a reading that indicates differences in their views of the relationship among ethics, desire, and gender.

scholarly journals Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit

Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-350
Author(s):  
Jonny Anomaly
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Metaphysical Theory ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACTThis essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. The argument between Parfit and his opponents illuminates broader questions about the relationship between our metaphysical beliefs and our practical reasons.

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

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