Defending Duties to the Self, Part 1

This chapter argues that a person can owe second-personal duties to herself by virtue of the fact that she occupies multiple temporal perspectives. An individual’s wellbeing at one time can conflict with her wellbeing at another time, and her ends at one moment can conflict with her ends at another moment. Because of this, a person can make demands on herself from one temporal perspective to another, pertaining to the protection of her wellbeing and ends, just as she might make demands on another person. Such demands can generate second-personal duties across time, as they can when they are issued interpersonally, and so a person can owe duties to her past and future selves, just as she owes them to others. Since duties owed to the self at a time other than the present cannot be waived, the waivability objection is answered.

On the Significance of Duties to the Self

This chapter distinguishes between mere self-regarding reasons to treat oneself in particular ways, and more robust moral duties owed to oneself. While the former are a philosophical commonplace, the latter are absent from most contemporary accounts and their addition to our practical philosophy would be significant. Duties owed to the self are second-personal, in the sense of being directed at a specific person. When a person has a duty to herself, her reasons are particularly strict, they pre-empt other reasons, they require a special sort of acknowledgment of their moral quality, and they engage special moral emotions. As such, if a person accepts that she owes duties to herself, it will impact the way in which she treats herself, and the way she relates to herself, beyond the mere acknowledgment that she has self-regarding reasons.

Defending Political Duties to the Self

This chapter argues for the existence of political duties owed to the self, which justify state coercion for the sake of the individual coerced. A person can pose a threat to her own freedom, and to her own ability to acquire what she is owed. Thus, a person’s relationship to herself raises concerns about both right and justice, thereby licensing the state to subject her to paternalistic policy, justified on liberal grounds. Paternalistic laws discussed include those outlawing tobacco, those limiting the amount of debt a person can take on, forced savings programs, and prohibitions on slavery contracts.

Might There Be Self-Directed Political Duties?

This chapter discusses difficulties with the idea that there exist duties to the self that the state may paternalistically force a person to discharge. The liberal tradition typically prizes freedom, and so views with suspicion any suggestion that a person ought to be coerced for her own sake. State coercion is permissible only to realize right and justice, which are usually thought to regulate relationships between distinct persons. Since a person’s relationship to herself is typically not thought to be one regulated by right or justice, coercion of a person for her own sake has been consistently rejected within the liberal tradition.

Defending Duties to the Self, Part 2

This chapter argues that a person can owe second-personal duties to herself at a moment, rather than merely across time. At a single moment, a person occupies multiple perspectives, associated with different practical identities. The good associated with one of her practical identities can conflict with the good associated with another practical identity, and her ends adopted from the standpoint of one identity can conflict with her ends adopted by another. Because of this, a person can make demands on herself from the perspective of one practical identity to another, pertaining to the protection of her wellbeing and ends, just as she might make demands on another person. Such demands can generate second-personal duties, which require that a person treat herself a particular way in the present. Since some duties owed to the self cannot be waived due to their relationship to the individual’s identity, the waivability objection is answered.

Troubles for Duties to the Self

This chapter lays out and then develops the “waivability objection,” which has throughout philosophy’s history been the most serious objection to duties to the self. The objection holds that a person who has a duty to herself will always be in a position to waive it, and a duty that a person can simply escape by waiving it is no duty at all. Some attempts to answer this objection, including Kant’s, are considered and rejected. The chapter concludes that this objection is formidable and that any account of duties to the self should be constructed in response to it.

Practical Philosophy After Duties to Self

This chapter considers lines of inquiry that emerge from the argument pursued throughout the book. It considers the possibility, raised by Kant, that self-duty is a necessary ground for all duty. It considers a debate between Kant and Fichte about the nature of self-consciousness, discussing ways in which the account in the book might illuminate that debate. Finally, it considers the implication of holding, as this book does, that parts of a unified whole can relate to one another second-personally, and applies this thought to debates in political philosophy about communitarianism and liberalism.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of duties to the self, situating it within our everyday thought and talk, as well as within the history of moral philosophy. Contemporary dismissals of self-duty are discussed, as are contemporary Kantian attempts to appeal to the notion without vindicating it, and it is concluded that there exists a need for a comprehensive defense of duties to the self. The chapter concludes by noting the lack of discussion of self-duty within political philosophy, and by raising the possibility of paternalistic law justified through appeal to state-enforced duties to the self.