scholarly journals A Framework for the Development of a National Crypto-Currency

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Abdullah ◽  
Rizal Mohd Nor
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Impact Assessment ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Stress Testing ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Monetary Economic ◽  
Gold Silver ◽  
Crypto Currency ◽  
Available Technology ◽  
Payment Mechanisms

This paper seeks to provide a conceptual framework as to whether a central bank or a monetary authority should issue a crypto-currency given available technology and what are the consequences of doing so. Under the fiat standard the value and purchasing power of money has experienced an exponential decay, whilst prices have increased exponentially. Typically, a central bank is responsible for monetary and financial stability, including settlement and payment mechanisms. A proposed methodology is provided that involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis to measure the comparative monetary performance, stress testing and impact assessment of a new crypto-currency that includes backing by gold, silver and a basket of commodities. The scope of the proposed framework involves a monetary economic analysis, supported by a technological investigation, under the framework of Shari’ah compliance, to explore an impact assessment of the adoption of a national crypto-currency. The significance of this study is that, it provides a framework for the development of a new national crypto-currency, which retains its’ store of value in terms of monetary performance and price stability, that would also investigate whether it’s implementation is viable.

Central Banking before the Great Recession

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Great Moderation ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Advanced Economies ◽  
The Interest Rate

The chapter describes the historical process as well as the analytical and empirical factors that, at the end of the twentieth century, led to the dominance, in advanced economies, of a central bank model based on an independent institution devoted to price stability as its overriding objective. The central bank pre-crisis model was elegant, performing, and efficient. However, it could not easily accommodate the pursuit of a traditionally important central bank objective: financial stability. Indeed, since central banks have, in essence, just one tool, that is, the interest rate, the pursuit of a financial stability objective in addition to a price stability objective could create dilemma situations. In the two decades between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, the economies of advanced economies were very stable, and this period was thus identified as Great Moderation. However, subsequent experience showed that, in this period, the crisis was incubating.

scholarly journals Developments in Monetary Policies before and after the Recent Financial Crisis and the Change in the Role of Central Banks

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zekayi Kaya ◽  
Erkan Tokucu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

During the historical process, application of the monetary policies and the roles of the central banks have changed within the framework of the developments in the world economy, problems encountered and the economic policies as a solution to these problems. The financial crises after 1990 and the recent financial crisis as the biggest experienced one after 1930s, caused an increase in the importance of the task of providing financial stability besides price stability and in this context in the function of “lender of last resort” of the central bank. The crisis required using new policy instruments in addition to interest rate instrument which was not sufficient enough in providing financial stability and the roles of the central banks in providing financial stability changed. In this study, applications of monetary policies and the changing role of the central banks will be examined. Within this framework, traditional and non-traditional instruments will be explained and the problems that can be confronted by a central bank when providing price stability besides financial stability will be remarked.

scholarly journals Have Financial Stability Concerns Changed the Priority of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey?

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekrem Erdem ◽  
Umit Bulut ◽  
Emrah Kocak
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Nominal Exchange Rate ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Cointegration Tests ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Republic Of Turkey ◽  
Monetary Policy Framework

Abstract This paper aims at analysing whether the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), designing a new monetary policy framework to achieve financial stability in the last quarter of 2010, tries to pursue financial stability by putting price stability on the back burner. To this end, a forward-looking reaction function that is extended with nominal exchange rate gap and nominal domestic credits gap is estimated for the CBRT. The paper first performs unit root and cointegration tests and finds that the variables become stationary at first differences and that there is a cointegration relationship among variables. Then, the paper conducts the Kalman filter to obtain time varying parameters. The findings show that the coefficients of all explanatory variables did not change too much after the new monetary policy framework of the CBRT in the last quarter of 2010. Therefore, this paper asserts that the CBRT continues to pursue price stability as its primary goal and tries to achieve financial stability by using macroprudential tools. Thus this paper concludes that financial stability concerns have not changed the priority of the CBRT.

A macro‐prudential perspective of financial regulation

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tristan Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Housing Prices ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Animal Spirit

PurposeIn the recent financial crisis, many observers have assigned monetary policy a central role in the crisis. Specifically, they claim that excessively easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve in the first half of the decade helped to cause a bubble in housing prices in the USA. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of monetary policy within the regulatory frameworks of financial markets.Design/methodology/approachThe authors show within a macroeconomic framework a possible trade‐off between price stability and financial stability by differentiating between a technology‐driven bubble and an animal spirit bubble. In their conclusion: if there is a trade‐off between price stability and financial stability, the central bank will have to make a choice between the two objectives. In that case, the question arises of which of the two objectives should take precedence: price stability or financial stability?FindingsFrom this analysis, the authors conclude that a central bank which uses a lexicographic ordering favoring price stability over other objectives is likely to fuel the boom inadvertently (in the case of a technology‐driven bubble) or will decide to do nothing (in the case of an animal spirit bubble) allowing a process of excessive credit creation. The latter seems to be what happened between 2003 and 2008.Practical implicationsIf one wants to reduce the likelihood of future major financial busts, it must be accepted that the central banks (especially the Fed and the ECB) cannot only be responsible for price stability. Maintaining financial stability by preventing excesses in financial markets should be an equally important objective.Originality/valueThe paper gives a new perspective on the role of monetary policy within the regulatory framework. With this macroeconomic framework, the authors are able to show possible trade‐offs between price stability and financial stability. The micro‐ and macro‐prudential approach of this paper is a useful contribution to the discussion about regulatory reforms of financial markets.

scholarly journals The Effect of the Interest Rate Corridor Implementation to Central Bank Policies

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Batuhan Tufaner ◽  
Kamil Uslu ◽  
İlyas Sözen
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
Political Effects ◽  
The Interest Rate

Central banks fulfill missions like financing governments, contributing the improvement of the financial market and implement monetary policy. Because of these important functions, instruments of the central bank has become a subject of ongoing debate over the years. The Central Bank's monetary policies instruments are important in terms of achieving the set macroeconomics targets. In recent years to become a major focus of attention of the interest rate corridor instrument has led to examine the structure of the central banks. The interest rate corridor primarily, provides flexibility advantages through interest rate to the central banks. The opinion that the central banks which have a flexible structure are more successful on ensuring the price stability and implementing macro policies with evading the political effects became stronger. In this context, in this study to examine the contributions of a flexible central bank to price stability and financial stability. In this bulletin different policy instruments of central banks are compared and critically assessed various determinants of central bank flexibility. In addition, comparing of the legislation of major central banks and various interest rate corridor implementations are examined.

scholarly journals MACROFINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CENTRAL BANKS: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS

2017 ◽  
pp. 139-157
Author(s):  
Viktor KOZJUK
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Macroeconomic Fluctuations ◽  
Price Stability

Introduction. Postcrisis tendency to enhance central bank’s macrofinancial responsibility should be related to real-financial inter-linkages rethinking but not to activistic demand management. Different approaches on how price stability and financial stability are inter-related, as well, as different institutional modalities of how to achieve them are making more complicate optimal institutional design of central bank with increased zone of responsibility. Purpose. Taking into account different macroeconomic viewpoints on the role of financial instability in macroeconomic fluctuations and institutional challenges for central bank independence the purpose of the paper is to validate that enhanced macrofinancial responsibility of central banks should be balanced by additional measures in direction to facilitate autonomous regulatory status. Results. Different views on how to enhance macroeconomic stability and what the role of central banks in new macrofinancial environment provide serious challenge for optimal designing of central bank’s macrofinancial responsibility. The problem not only relate to how price and financial stability are inter-related but also to how define the wrong way policy then price and financial stability are in non-linear relations. The difficulties in this segment may affect far reaching political consequences while assessing central bank from political economy point of view. Also it is necessary to take into account that macroprudential toolkit may overlap with monetary policy instruments providing additional regulatory distortions. Clear institutialisation of relations between price and financial stability responsibilities will help to avoid political economy type of manipulations with central bank new tasks. Priority of price stability should be kept while financial stability mandate should be clarified and tied to macroprudential regulation. In the same time more active central bank’s participance in the post-crisis economy should be based not on standard Keynesian activism but on enhanced financial responsibility balanced with protection of central bank independence in new regulatory areas. Conclusions. It the article it is stressed that enhanced macrofinancial responsibility should be based on unchanged priority of price stability mandate, increased level of central bank independence and coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies. It is shown that vulnerability of macrofinancial responsibilities to political pressure is going to increase. Political independence of central banks should protect them in the area of price stability and financial stability all together.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability: Orthodox and Heterodox Approaches

2017 ◽  
pp. 6-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Koziuk
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Financial Cycle ◽  
Stability Issues

This study argues that post-crisis discussions on central bank independence are less about a choice of a level of independence but more about a relation between the independence and the central bank mandate in financial stability. An offered hypothesis states that an increasing role of financial factors in the macroeconomic policy agenda has led to emerging of two approaches to the central bank independence. Within the orthodox approach, responsibility for the financial stability is a challenge to the accepted model: one mandate – one goal – one instrument. Interference into the financial cycle impairs transparency and distorts responsibility, while deflation bias risks get in conflict with price stability principles, adherence to which is exactly what central banks are granted independence for. In terms of the heterodox approach, a wider responsibility of central banks for financial stability requires more independence to protect the legitimacy of interference into the financial cycle and implementation of a more prudent regulatory regime. Orthodox view is contradictory in its nature, while the vulnerability of the second approach lies in quality of institutional environment. Price stability mandate is argued to remain the first priority, while the financial stability issues should be institutionalized in a clearer way to secure independence.

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