scholarly journals The Effect of the Interest Rate Corridor Implementation to Central Bank Policies

Author(s):  
Mustafa Batuhan Tufaner ◽  
Kamil Uslu ◽  
İlyas Sözen

Central banks fulfill missions like financing governments, contributing the improvement of the financial market and implement monetary policy. Because of these important functions, instruments of the central bank has become a subject of ongoing debate over the years. The Central Bank's monetary policies instruments are important in terms of achieving the set macroeconomics targets. In recent years to become a major focus of attention of the interest rate corridor instrument has led to examine the structure of the central banks. The interest rate corridor primarily, provides flexibility advantages through interest rate to the central banks. The opinion that the central banks which have a flexible structure are more successful on ensuring the price stability and implementing macro policies with evading the political effects became stronger. In this context, in this study to examine the contributions of a flexible central bank to price stability and financial stability. In this bulletin different policy instruments of central banks are compared and critically assessed various determinants of central bank flexibility. In addition, comparing of the legislation of major central banks and various interest rate corridor implementations are examined.

Author(s):  
Zekayi Kaya ◽  
Erkan Tokucu

During the historical process, application of the monetary policies and the roles of the central banks have changed within the framework of the developments in the world economy, problems encountered and the economic policies as a solution to these problems. The financial crises after 1990 and the recent financial crisis as the biggest experienced one after 1930s, caused an increase in the importance of the task of providing financial stability besides price stability and in this context in the function of “lender of last resort” of the central bank. The crisis required using new policy instruments in addition to interest rate instrument which was not sufficient enough in providing financial stability and the roles of the central banks in providing financial stability changed. In this study, applications of monetary policies and the changing role of the central banks will be examined. Within this framework, traditional and non-traditional instruments will be explained and the problems that can be confronted by a central bank when providing price stability besides financial stability will be remarked.


Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki

The chapter describes the historical process as well as the analytical and empirical factors that, at the end of the twentieth century, led to the dominance, in advanced economies, of a central bank model based on an independent institution devoted to price stability as its overriding objective. The central bank pre-crisis model was elegant, performing, and efficient. However, it could not easily accommodate the pursuit of a traditionally important central bank objective: financial stability. Indeed, since central banks have, in essence, just one tool, that is, the interest rate, the pursuit of a financial stability objective in addition to a price stability objective could create dilemma situations. In the two decades between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, the economies of advanced economies were very stable, and this period was thus identified as Great Moderation. However, subsequent experience showed that, in this period, the crisis was incubating.


2017 ◽  
pp. 139-157
Author(s):  
Viktor KOZJUK

Introduction. Postcrisis tendency to enhance central bank’s macrofinancial responsibility should be related to real-financial inter-linkages rethinking but not to activistic demand management. Different approaches on how price stability and financial stability are inter-related, as well, as different institutional modalities of how to achieve them are making more complicate optimal institutional design of central bank with increased zone of responsibility. Purpose. Taking into account different macroeconomic viewpoints on the role of financial instability in macroeconomic fluctuations and institutional challenges for central bank independence the purpose of the paper is to validate that enhanced macrofinancial responsibility of central banks should be balanced by additional measures in direction to facilitate autonomous regulatory status. Results. Different views on how to enhance macroeconomic stability and what the role of central banks in new macrofinancial environment provide serious challenge for optimal designing of central bank’s macrofinancial responsibility. The problem not only relate to how price and financial stability are inter-related but also to how define the wrong way policy then price and financial stability are in non-linear relations. The difficulties in this segment may affect far reaching political consequences while assessing central bank from political economy point of view. Also it is necessary to take into account that macroprudential toolkit may overlap with monetary policy instruments providing additional regulatory distortions. Clear institutialisation of relations between price and financial stability responsibilities will help to avoid political economy type of manipulations with central bank new tasks. Priority of price stability should be kept while financial stability mandate should be clarified and tied to macroprudential regulation. In the same time more active central bank’s participance in the post-crisis economy should be based not on standard Keynesian activism but on enhanced financial responsibility balanced with protection of central bank independence in new regulatory areas. Conclusions. It the article it is stressed that enhanced macrofinancial responsibility should be based on unchanged priority of price stability mandate, increased level of central bank independence and coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies. It is shown that vulnerability of macrofinancial responsibilities to political pressure is going to increase. Political independence of central banks should protect them in the area of price stability and financial stability all together.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-212

The last financial crisis in 2008 has weakened the Euro-zone countries. Most of them were deeply affected, and their economic growths have not returned to their pre-crisis rates. Moreover, the inflation rate is still very low despite the European Central Bank’s interventions. Twelve years later, a health crisis occurred. The ECB have reacted to this event by using monetary tools. We can cite for example the famous temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) to save the Euro-zone countries from a systemic disaster. The current interest rate is negative, and it seems to raise some questions about the efficiency of policies and the threat to economic, monetary, and financial stability. Negative interest rate may also generate the next crisis. This paper is dedicated to recommendations based on the role of Central Banks in the health crisis management and, more generally, environmental crisis management instead of evaluating the impacts of the monetary policies on Eurozone countries because it is too early to measure with acuity the COVID-19 effects.


Author(s):  
Hichem Hamza ◽  
Khoutem Ben Jedidia

The digitization of payment and the development of private digital currencies have constrained central banks to examine the issuance of their own central bank digital currency (CBDC) in order to face the competition of the new peer-to-peer payment system and the decline of cash use. This chapter addresses the topic of CBDC and places the discussion within the context of dual banking intermediation and financial stability. The design of CBDC in term of accessibility, anonymity, interest rate, and payment mechanism depends on the cryptocurrency use and money characteristics regarding the use of cash and deposit. The CBDC Sharia compliant, free of interest or PLS-based, fulfilling money value stability might be a solution. The effects of CBDC on banking intermediation and financial stability depend importantly on the CBDC design and switch significance of banks deposit to CBDC but remain an open question given the pros and cons arguments. In a dual banking system, Islamic banks could limit the disintermediation effect and maintain financial stability under Sharia compliance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 68-80
Author(s):  
Nataliia Sheludko

The paper considers the monetary policy of leading world central banks that were used to overcome the global financial and economic crisis in 2008–2009. Advanced developed countries managed to overcome this crisis, primarily through monetary mechanisms. For this purpose, a non-traditional monetary policy was invented and applied for the first time. It included the following: quantitative easing with a corresponding rapid growth of central bank liabilities; de facto maintaining a plurality of their objectives, including ensuring financial stability and reducing unemployment; and expanded participation of central banks in financing governments' budget deficits. The measures taken helped to overcome the recession in developed countries and promoted the transition to a trajectory of economic growth. The current practice of monetary policy normalization, initiated in the United States, involves a gradual increase in the key interest rate and a curtailment of central bank balances. However, in many developed countries (EU), the practice of non-traditional monetary policy is still persistent and is an important factor for determining the trends of the global economy. In general, the results of this policy can be evaluated differently, but it is important for Ukraine to conclude on the relevance of monetary policy to stimulate economic development. Global volatility, increasingly determined by trade wars and other forms of protectionism in global economies, poses challenges (primarily in terms of maintaining/enhancing export and production capacity). For the economy of Ukraine, which is vulnerable to external shocks, these factors, combined with internal centres of instability, form a bunch of complicated tasks, in particular in terms of the cessation of further loss of investment potential, which should be addressed rationally by the monetary policy instruments.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Taking stock of the past fifteen years in monetary policy leads to some conclusions and suggestions for reform. Contrary to the claims of some observers, price stability remains an unassailable goal of central banks. Reforms are needed in their governance, however. In particular, legislation ought to include more directives to make clear the conditional relationship between government and the central bank. Unconventional central bank policies are no longer so unconventional. While they should be included in the toolkit of policy instruments, they should be used with more care. Some central banks have overreached and have confused the need to put a floor on economic downturns with the need for economic growth to rise to levels deemed normal. Data dependence as a policy stance reflects one of the biggest failures of central banking. After more than a decade of explaining the forward-looking nature of monetary policy, a backward-looking perspective seems to dominate policy discussions.


Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki

The central banking model prevailing before the Great Recession suffered six hits during the crisis. First, new financial stability responsibilities created dilemmas in the use of the interest rate. Second, quantitative easing blurred the borders between monetary and fiscal policy. Third, the action to support banks and, in the euro-area, peripheral sovereigns created moral hazard. Fourth, the ECB had to take on itself the task of preserving the euro. Fifth, the ECB had to participate in the so-called troika. Sixth, both the Fed and the ECB had to adopt a more global perspective. This chapter concludes that these hits have not basically jeopardized the pre-crisis central bank model. Still, four of the six hits to the pre-crisis central bank model identified above have a good probability of requiring changes in the pre-crisis model, thus some incremental adaptations to that model are proposed.


Author(s):  
Mădălina Doroftei ◽  
Alexandru Pătruți

Abstract The Central bank independence was viewed in the last decades as an essential prerequisite for ensuring good monetary policies. However, the global crisis of 2009 has shown that this concept was of little practical importance. The European Central Bank, which was built as one of the most independent central banks in the world, and the Federal Reserve System, a not so independent central bank from the point of view of legal independence, reacted in almost the same manner to the looming crises. Both of them used unconventional monetary policies, for which there was little theoretical support, to safeguard their economies. Quantitative easing, forward guidance and negative interest rate are now considered common instruments in the monetary authority’s arsenal. Moreover, central banks now have an extended goal, i.e. to provide financial stability. This means that they are expected to take action to prevent future economic crises by using monetary policy as a counter-cycle instrument. Given this important modification regarding the expected actions which must come from the monetary authorities, we argue that central bank independence becomes irrelevant in times of economic downturn, when they will use whatever means necessary to ensure financial stability. Political short run need will surpass long run stability as a priority for monetary decision makers.


Author(s):  
Marius Apostoaie

This study is focused upon the involvement of the central banks regarding the fulfillment of the two main objectives: price  stability and financial stability. These two key concepts are part of an old and ongoing debate that the current turmoil has revived, and that is whether monetary policy should aim, or not, at ensuring financial stability in parallel to its main objective of price stability. On both sides there are solid and well known arguments. In the beginning of the study I have  considered a literature review with regard to price and financial stability issues. After that I have tried to shed some light (from a theoretical point of view) on the nature and dynamics of the fundamental interlinkages between the two aspects and there implications on the central banks and the economy. Finally I outline some general conclusions that have emerged in the present study.


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