While recent conceptualizations of empathy have highlighted its motivated nature (eg. (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014; Zaki, 2014) little work has yet explored the specific motivations that influence one’s propensity to empathize. Commonly-used self-report metrics of empathy include items that lean heavily, if not entirely, towards ‘virtuous’ motives (e.g. concern, sympathy, caring, helping), and empathy has been explicitly linked to these motivations in many writings. However, the definition of empathy is silent to its virtuosity; and while rarely indexed, several less virtuous motivations for empathy can be readily identified: to influence, to manage, to mediate, to manipulate. Towards a more thorough investigation of the various motives underlying empathy, the present paper introduces the Motivation to Empathize scale, which was specifically designed to parse one’s propensity to consider the feelings of another into both virtuous (e.g. caring/compassionate/loving) and nonvirtuous (e.g. selfish, manipulative, sinister) motives. The paper outlines initial steps taken towards scale development and item reduction, and provides preliminary evidence of scale reliability and construct validity. Specifically, factor analytic techniques separated empathic motivations into two (high-alpha) factors, with all virtuous motives loading on latent factor one, and all nonvirtuous motives loading on latent factor two. Thus, virtuous and nonvirtuous motives to empathize appear to constitute distinct, and statistically separable, measures of the propensity to empathize. Virtuous, but not non-virtuous motives, correlated with the empathic concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), and each motivation type showed distinct relationships with the Compassion and Politeness aspects of Agreeableness (ie. big-five personality traits). In total, these results suggest that both virtuous and nonvirtuous motives may predict the manifestation of empathy, and that future work would do well to consider these varied motivations when considering the nature of the empathic construct.