Term Limits in State Legislatures

Author(s):  
John Carey ◽  
Richard Niemi ◽  
Lynda Powell
1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 271 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Carey ◽  
Richard G. Niemi ◽  
Lynda W. Powell

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 305-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priscilla L. Southwell ◽  
Eric A. Lindgren ◽  
Ryan A. Smith

This research examines the roll call voting record of state legislators in Arkansas, California, Michigan, and Missouri in order to assess if there are any substantive differences between those legislators who are nearing retirement due to term limits (“last term” legislators) and those legislators who are at an earlier stage of their legislative careers. These are the only four states in the United States that have lifetime term limits in full effect. Binomial logit analysis of key roll call votes suggests that these “last term” legislators stand apart from their other colleagues on certain issues. This characteristic arises from the increased tendency of last-term legislators to defy the party leadership, albeit on a limited number of bills. This “independent streak” of last-term legislators is even more pronounced among Republican legislators, although this effect is not present in the state of California. Therefore, term limits appear to have a modest, but potentially significant effect on the policy preferences of legislators.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 275-287
Author(s):  
Stanley M. Caress

This study seeks to determine if term limits increase the likelihood of women being elected to legislative seats. Using a simple comparison of growth rates, we found that, during the initial period of term limit implementation (1991 to 2009), the increase of females elected to state legislatures with term limits was approximately the same as to those without term limits. Additionally, a comparison of the growth rate of females elected to the non-term-limited United States House of Representatives with those of the state legislatures during this same time period shows that the U.S. House actually had a greater increase than state legislatures both with and without term limits. Moreover, in California, which has a full-time, professional state legislature with electoral dynamics similar to the U.S. House, the proportion of women elected to the state’s non-term limited U.S. House delegation from 1990 to 2009 exceeded the proportion of women elected to its term-limited state legislature. These comparisons all suggest that term limits do not facilitate the election of female candidates to legislative seats.


2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN M. CAREY ◽  
RICHARD G. NIEMI ◽  
LYNDA W. POWELL ◽  
GARY F. MONCRIEF

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 1501-1538
Author(s):  
Yasushi Asako ◽  
Tetsuya Matsubayashi ◽  
Michiko Ueda

Abstract What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.


2004 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY F. MONCRIEF ◽  
RICHARD G. NIEMI ◽  
LYNDA W. POWELL

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