The effect of term limits on patterns of interest group contributions in state legislatures, 2006–2010

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Norberg ◽  
Matthew Newton
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER FOUIRNAIES ◽  
ANDREW B. HALL

A classic question about democratic elections is how much they are able to influence politician behavior by forcing them to anticipate future reelection attempts, especially in contexts where voters are not paying close attention and are not well informed. We compile a new dataset containing roughly 780,000 bills, combined with more than 16 million roll-call voting records for roughly 6,000 legislators serving in U.S. state legislatures with term limits. Using an individual-level difference-in-differences design, we find that legislators who can no longer seek reelection sponsor fewer bills, are less productive on committees, and are absent for more floor votes, on average. Building a new dataset of roll-call votes and interest-group ratings, we find little evidence that legislators who cannot run for reelection systematically shift their ideological platforms. In sum, elections appear to influence how legislators allocate their effort in important ways even in low-salience environments but may have less influence on ideological positioning.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-541
Author(s):  
Stephanie L. DeMora ◽  
Loren Collingwood ◽  
Adriana Ninci

In recent years scholarship has drawn attention to the role of large multi-issue interest groups in policy networks and in public policy diffusion. This paper develops this field of study by demonstrating empirically the leverage of the ‘sustained organisational influence’ theory of policy diffusion. Specifically, it focuses on the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in diffusing the Stand Your Ground policy across US state legislatures. By comparing ALEC’s template policy to bills introduced and legislation subsequently enacted within state legislatures, we demonstrate that ALEC has positioned itself as a ‘super interest group’, exerting sustained organisational influence across an expanding number of states. In doing so, this paper moves theory beyond the typical advocacy coalition framework that implicitly assumes policymaking occurs discretely among specialists on an issue-by-issue basis. It also highlights the democratic implications of the role of super interest groups in shaping policy behind the scenes.


1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 271 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Carey ◽  
Richard G. Niemi ◽  
Lynda W. Powell

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 305-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priscilla L. Southwell ◽  
Eric A. Lindgren ◽  
Ryan A. Smith

This research examines the roll call voting record of state legislators in Arkansas, California, Michigan, and Missouri in order to assess if there are any substantive differences between those legislators who are nearing retirement due to term limits (“last term” legislators) and those legislators who are at an earlier stage of their legislative careers. These are the only four states in the United States that have lifetime term limits in full effect. Binomial logit analysis of key roll call votes suggests that these “last term” legislators stand apart from their other colleagues on certain issues. This characteristic arises from the increased tendency of last-term legislators to defy the party leadership, albeit on a limited number of bills. This “independent streak” of last-term legislators is even more pronounced among Republican legislators, although this effect is not present in the state of California. Therefore, term limits appear to have a modest, but potentially significant effect on the policy preferences of legislators.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 275-287
Author(s):  
Stanley M. Caress

This study seeks to determine if term limits increase the likelihood of women being elected to legislative seats. Using a simple comparison of growth rates, we found that, during the initial period of term limit implementation (1991 to 2009), the increase of females elected to state legislatures with term limits was approximately the same as to those without term limits. Additionally, a comparison of the growth rate of females elected to the non-term-limited United States House of Representatives with those of the state legislatures during this same time period shows that the U.S. House actually had a greater increase than state legislatures both with and without term limits. Moreover, in California, which has a full-time, professional state legislature with electoral dynamics similar to the U.S. House, the proportion of women elected to the state’s non-term limited U.S. House delegation from 1990 to 2009 exceeded the proportion of women elected to its term-limited state legislature. These comparisons all suggest that term limits do not facilitate the election of female candidates to legislative seats.


2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Carey ◽  
Richard Niemi ◽  
Lynda Powell

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN M. CAREY ◽  
RICHARD G. NIEMI ◽  
LYNDA W. POWELL ◽  
GARY F. MONCRIEF

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