Rushes in Large Timing Games

Econometrica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-913 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Anderson ◽  
Lones Smith ◽  
Andreas Park
Keyword(s):  
Timing Games

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

2005 ◽  
Vol 121 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidrun C. Hoppe ◽  
Ulrich Lehmann-Grube
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Timing Games

Investment Timing Games under Uncertainty

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongqiang Chu ◽  
Tien Foo Sing
Keyword(s):  
Investment Timing ◽  
Timing Games

Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hitoshi Matsushima
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Finance ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Fixed Time ◽  
Initial Time ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Contingent Claim ◽  
Leverage Ratio ◽  
Timing Games ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
A Company

AbstractThis study investigates strategic aspect of leverage-driven bubbles from the viewpoint of game theory and behavioral finance. Even if a company is unproductive, its stock price grows up according to an exogenous reinforcement pattern. During the bubble, this company raises huge funds by issuing new shares. Multiple arbitrageurs strategically decide whether to ride the bubble by continuing to purchase shares through leveraged finance.We demonstrate two models that are distinguished by whether crash-contingent claim, i. e. contractual agreement such that the purchaser of this claim receives a promised monetary amount if and only if the bubble crashes, is available. We show that the availability of this claim deters the bubble; without crash-contingent claim, the bubble emerges and persists long even if the degree of reinforcement is insufficient. Without crash-contingent claim, high leverage ratio fosters the bubble, while with crash-contingent claim, it rather deters the bubble.We formulate these models as specifications of timing game with irrational types; each player selects a time in a fixed time interval, and the player who selects the earliest time wins the game. We assume that each player is irrational with a small but positive probability. We then prove that there exists the unique Nash equilibrium; according to it, every player never selects the initial time. By regarding arbitrageurs as players, we give careful conceptualizations that are necessary to interpret timing games as models of leverage-driven bubbles.

Timing Games and Shared Memory

2005 ◽  
pp. 507-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvi Lotker ◽  
Boaz Patt-Shamir ◽  
Mark R. Tuttle
Keyword(s):  
Shared Memory ◽  
Timing Games
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