scholarly journals Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Henrik Steg
Keyword(s):  
Timing Games ◽  
Stochastic Timing

scholarly journals RETRACTED: Population-Level Transcription Cycles Derive from Stochastic Timing of Single-Cell Transcription

Cell ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 138 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatjana Degenhardt ◽  
Katja N. Rybakova ◽  
Aleksandra Tomaszewska ◽  
Martijn J. Moné ◽  
Hans V. Westerhoff ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Single Cell ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Stochastic Timing

Rushes in Large Timing Games

Econometrica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-913 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Anderson ◽  
Lones Smith ◽  
Andreas Park
Keyword(s):  
Timing Games

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

2005 ◽  
Vol 121 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidrun C. Hoppe ◽  
Ulrich Lehmann-Grube
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Timing Games

Reasoning About ‘When’ Instead of ‘What’: Collusive Equilibria with Stochastic Timing in Repeated Oligopoly

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Grana ◽  
James Bono ◽  
David Wolpert
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Price Change ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Poisson Processes ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Current State ◽  
The World ◽  
Stochastic Timing

AbstractWe analyze a continuous time game of Bertrand competition with private monitoring that includes asynchronous signals and asynchronous actions. Unlike existing models where firms observe a signal that is imperfectly correlated with demand parameters and firms’ prices, we assume firms observe demand and prices perfectly but at times governed by independent Poisson processes. The signals only reveal information at the instant they are observed and do not contain information about past actions or states of demand. This implies that any firm’s price change will go undetected for some time or may never be detected. Firms are also allowed to engage in costless but unverifiable cheap talk. The model focuses on the strategic considerations that arise when firms reason about then timing of the signals rather than the content. We show that standard Nash reversion arguments can enforce collusion and truthful communication when signals are asynchronous and signals only reveal information about the current state of the world and do not reveal information about past states or actions. Through comparative statics, we disentangle how parameters that govern the timing of events and signals interact to either facilitate or preclude collusion. Finally, we extend the model to show that firms may collude not only to avoid Nash reversion but to prevent opposing firms from believing demand has dropped and thus lowering their price.

Population-Level Transcription Cycles Derive from Stochastic Timing of Single-Cell Transcription

2009 ◽  
Vol 138 (33) ◽  
pp. 489-501
Author(s):  
Tatjana Degenhardt ◽  
Katja N. Rybakova ◽  
Aleksandra Tomaszewska ◽  
Martijn J. Moné ◽  
Hans V. Westerhoff ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Single Cell ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Stochastic Timing

Investment Timing Games under Uncertainty

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongqiang Chu ◽  
Tien Foo Sing
Keyword(s):  
Investment Timing ◽  
Timing Games

scholarly journals Stochastic timing in gene expression for simple regulatory strategies

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 1069-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alma Dal Co ◽  
Marco Cosentino Lagomarsino ◽  
Michele Caselle ◽  
Matteo Osella
Keyword(s):  
Gene Expression ◽  
Regulatory Strategies ◽  
Stochastic Timing
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