scholarly journals Optimal decisions for a dual-channel supply chain under information asymmetry

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 1023-1040 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingyong Lai ◽  
◽  
Hongzhao Yang ◽  
Erbao Cao ◽  
Duo Qiu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

Equilibrium Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Retailer's Greening Cost Information Asymmetry

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Rofin T. M. ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of information asymmetry of retailer's greening cost on the performance of both the manufacturer and the retailer. The study considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising of a manufacturer and a retailer committed to green operations. The authors have employed sequential game theoretic model to derive the closed form expressions corresponding to the two cases under consideration, that is: (1) complete information and (2) asymmetric information. They have found that the sharing of greening cost information by the retailer can make both the manufacturer and the retailer better off in terms of profit. They have also found that the greening cost information sharing is all the more important when the greening cost efficiency is weak. The study helps retail managers to make a decision on whether to conceal or reveal the greening cost information with the upstream manufacturer.

scholarly journals Optimal contract design for dual-channel supply chains under information asymmetry

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 1087-1097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Honglin Yang ◽  
Erbao Cao ◽  
Kevin Jiang Lu ◽  
Guoqing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Information Value ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Asymmetric Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Cost Information

Purpose The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value. Design/methodology/approach The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis. Findings First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information. Originality/value The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

scholarly journals Price and Service Competition of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Consumer Returns

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Ren ◽  
Yong He ◽  
Houfei Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Retail Industry ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Consumer Returns ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Additional Costs ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Products returned by consumers are common in the retail industry and result in additional costs to both the manufacturer and the retailer. This paper proposes dual-channel supply chain models involving consumer returns policies. Also, the price and service competition between retail channel and direct channel is considered in the models. According to the models, we analyze the optimal decisions in both centralized and decentralized scenarios. Then we design a new contract, coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, and enable both the retailer and the manufacturer to be a win-win.

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