scholarly journals Price and Service Competition of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Consumer Returns

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Ren ◽  
Yong He ◽  
Houfei Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Retail Industry ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Consumer Returns ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Additional Costs ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Products returned by consumers are common in the retail industry and result in additional costs to both the manufacturer and the retailer. This paper proposes dual-channel supply chain models involving consumer returns policies. Also, the price and service competition between retail channel and direct channel is considered in the models. According to the models, we analyze the optimal decisions in both centralized and decentralized scenarios. Then we design a new contract, coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, and enable both the retailer and the manufacturer to be a win-win.

scholarly journals Manufacturer's channel selection in a capital-constrained supply chain under bargaining

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Yan ◽  
Fangyu Ye
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Capital Shortage ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel

In the context of a capital-constrained supply chain, we examine how a direct channel added by a manufacturer influences the players’ optimal decisions and profits under bargaining. The capital constrained retailer adopts a type of hybrid financing scheme including bank credit and equity financing to alleviate its capital shortage. We characterize the equilibrium results under different sales channels, and examine the impacts of the bank loans ratio and bargaining power on the players’ optimal decisions. The conditions of the equilibrium channel choices are derived. We find that if the retailer’s bank loans ratio in the retail channel is beyond a certain threshold, a dual-channel structure can enhance the profits of the manufacturer and supply chain. The retailer, however, will benefit from the direct channel when its bank loans ratio in the retail channel is below a certain threshold. We further demonstrate that a dual-channel structure can reduce the degree of double marginalization of the overall supply chain. In addition, to solve the potential channel conflict, a bilateral payment mechanism is developed to achieve Pareto improvement for both players. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results of the paper.

scholarly journals A Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm for Solving Pricing and Lead Time Quotation in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Multiple Customer Classes

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Mahboobeh Honarvar ◽  
Majid Alimohammadi Ardakani ◽  
Mohammad Modarres
Keyword(s):  
Particle Swarm Optimization ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Due Date ◽  
Swarm Optimization ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

The combination of traditional retail channel with direct channel adds a new dimension of competition to manufacturers’ distribution system. In this paper, we consider a make-to-order manufacturer with two channels of sale, sale through retailers and online direct sale. The customers are classified into different classes, based on their sensitivity to price and due date. The orders of traditional retail channel customers are fulfilled in the same period of ordering. However, price and due date are quoted to the online customers based on the available capacity as well as the other orders in the pipeline. We develop two different structures of the supply chain: centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chain which are formulated as bilevel binary nonlinear models. The Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm is also developed to obtain a satisfactory near-optimal solution and compared to a genetic algorithm. Through various numerical analyses, we investigate the effects of the customers’ preference of a direct channel on the model’s variables.

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

scholarly journals The Optimal Pricing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with the Third Party Product Recovery and Sales Effort

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Limin Wang ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Recovery ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Model

The optimal pricing of dual-channel supply chain with the third party product recovery and sales effort is considered in this paper. The optimal selling pricing of direct channel and retail channel in the forward supply chain and the optimal collection pricing of retail channel and the third party in the backward supply chain are given for the general case under the centralized and decentralized model. Then, the effect of sales effort of the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy with sales effort under the centralized and decentralized model are provided and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis of four situations is carried out by numerical results.

Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retailer Direct Marketing

2014 ◽  
Vol 933 ◽  
pp. 902-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Juan Li ◽  
Ai Jun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Direct Marketing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Brand Promotion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

A two-level dual-channel supply chain model was established in which retailer had his own direct channel. Game model was constructed based on two cases of decentralized and centralized decision-making. Pricing strategies of manufacturer and retailer were studied. Impacts of different channel and different sale entities on manufacturer and retailer were examined. Results show that when channel substitution increases and market share of retailer direct channel is small, retailer should choose to give up direct channel and focus on retail channel sales and take direct channel as means of propaganda and brand promotion. When the difference of sale entities reduces, consumers can get more surplus.

scholarly journals Optimal channel decision of retailers in the dual-channel supply chain considering consumer preference for delivery lead time

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-466
Author(s):  
Y.S. Hu ◽  
L.H. Zeng ◽  
Z.L. Huang ◽  
Q. Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Preference Coefficient

Facing competition from manufacturers' online direct channels, how retailers make sales channel decisions to increase consumer stickiness has become the core concern of the industry and academia. Empirical research showed that delivery lead time is a key factor that affects consumers' preference for online channels. To analyze the impact of consumer delivery time preference on channel selection and pricing strategy of retailers, consumer delivery lead time preference function was improved from a linear function to an exponential function and consumer demand under the mixed dual-channel supply chain of manufacturer and retailer was derived. Then, the Stackelberg game models under different channel strategies of retailer were established and solved. Results show that consumer preference for delivery lead time has four implications on the channel decision of retailers under manufacturer encroachment in the dual-channel supply chain. First, the dual retail channels strategy is the optimal choice for retailers, and the profit margins that a retailer obtains from dual retail channels supply chain and single online retail channel supply chain will increase as consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient increases. Second, the optimal pricing of online retail channel and offline retail channel is positively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. By contrast, the optimal pricing of online direct channel is negatively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. Third, the optimal pricing of online retail channel is higher than that of offline retail and online direct channels. Fourth, a retailer and a manufacturer can adopt a compensation-based whole price contract to address the conflict brought about by the optimal channel choice of the retailer. This study introduces consumer delivery lead time preference into retailer channel decision making and provides a theoretical reference for retailer's mixed channel construction in practice.

Pricing Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Loss-Averse Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950027
Author(s):  
Chengli Liu ◽  
C. K. M. Lee ◽  
K. H. Leung
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Basic Product ◽  
Luxury Goods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In this paper, loss-averse consumer behavior during purchase decision-making process in the dual-channel supply chain is modeled. Loss-averse consumers prefer avoiding losses to gain utility with respect to their reference point while purchasing the product. Two product categories are classified: (1) basic product and (2) luxury goods which have lower and higher reference utility to consumers, respectively. The research objective is to determine the optimal price strategy in dual-channel supply chains and discuss the decision behind loss-averse consumers. To model consumers’ valuation of a product, prospect theory is adopted to calculate the demands of each channel. Then, the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding profits are found out in a Stackelberg game manner. The results encourage manufacturers of basic goods to engage in dual-channel strategy. Effect of “double marginalization” is reduced if consumers are loss-averse in the dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, the direct channel online contributes larger demand to the manufacturer. However, manufacturers of luxury goods are not suggested for dual-channel strategy because the demand for direct channel online is negligible and the demand for the retail channel remains unchanged. Nevertheless, retailers cannot obtain benefit from dual-channel and as a result, the profit of basic goods retailers will be reduced.

scholarly journals Price and Service Competition in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Product Customization

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Jian Wang ◽  
Huijuan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Product Customization ◽  
Customized Products ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain with product customization. One manufacturer and one retailer are involved. The online direct sales channel sells standard and customized products, and the offline retail channel sells standard products. The prices and service levels of products sold via different channels are differentiated, and the customization level which influences the customization cost and choices of customers is decided by the manufacturer. Three game models are proposed: the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the retailer Stackelberg (RS) model, and the Nash game model. The price and service decisions of the players are derived. Meanwhile, a service-cost-sharing contract is designed for the MS model. The impacts of price and service competition, service cost, and customers sensitivity to the customization level on the optimal decisions are investigated. Through the numerical analysis, we find that, among the three models, the manufacturer Stackelberg model is the most beneficial game structure for the overall supply chain but has the largest revenue gap between the two members. Second, under price competition and service competition, the manufacturer should differentiate the prices and services for direct sales standard products and customized products according to his market status. Third, the manufacturer should increase customization expenditures to construct his customization production line and provide more diversified products when consumers are more sensitive to product customization.

scholarly journals FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN PLAYERS: WITH DIRECT AND TRADITIONAL CHANNELS

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 189-195
Author(s):  
N. Arunfred ◽  
D. Kinslin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Optimum Solution ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Overall Effectiveness

We study a dual channel supply chain in perishable agricultural products. In which one channel is producer (farmer) sells the produce directly to the customer and the other channel is about transfer of produce to different channel players and reach the final customer. Consumers choose the purchase channel based on price, availability, accessibility, product quality, trust-ability and service qualities. The producer decides the price of the direct channel and the intermediaries decides both price and order quantity in the traditional method. We show that the difference in problem faced by the producers’ of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual channels in equilibrium. For the study Erode and Kanyakumari districts were chosen purposively. A sample of 80 farmers was selected randomly who are involved in both of the channels. In the case that the producer and the retailer coordination and to follow a centralized decision approach, we find that a direct channel will be an optimum solution for improving the overall effectiveness. Our results show that an increase in retailer’s service quality may increase the producer’s profit in dual channel and a larger range of consumer service sensitivity may benefit both parties in the dual channel. The results suggest that both the channel have problem and the optimum solution lies in between two channels.

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