scholarly journals A Laboratory Experiment for Analyzing Electors’ Strategic Behavior in a First-Past-the-Post System

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 1081
Author(s):  
Andrei Chiriță ◽  
Camelia Delcea
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Party System ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Duverger's Law

As it is well acknowledged that the electoral system is one of the fundamental rocks of our modern society, the behavior of electors engaged in a voting system is of the utmost importance. In this context, the goal of the study is to model the behavior of voters in a first-past-the-post system and to analyze its consequences on a party system. Among the assumptions of this study is Duverger’s law, which states that first-past-the-post systems favor a two-party system as the voters engage in tactical voting, choosing to vote in favor of a less preferred candidate who has better odds of winning. In order to test this assumption and to better analyze the occurrence of the strategic behavior, a laboratory experiment was created. A total of 120 persons participated in the study. An asymmetrical payoff function was created to value the voters’ preference intensity. As a result, it was observed that as voters got used to the voting system, they engaged in more tactical voting behavior in order to either maximize the gain or minimize the loss of their choice. Moreover, the iterations where voters started displaying tactical behavior featured a clustering around two main choices. The obtained results are consistent with both the empirical results of real-life elections and Duverger’s law. A further discussion regarding the change in voters’ choice completes the analysis on the strategic behavior.

Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections: A Simulation of Duverger's Law

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 393-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Endersby ◽  
Kelly B. Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
Ideological Dimension ◽  
Tactical Decisions ◽  
Duverger's Law ◽  
Public Opinion Polls ◽  
Opinion Polls

Experiments designed as an election simulation involve participants in an investigation of strategic voting. Participants assigned political preferences and informed of candidate/party positions on an ideological dimension respond to and learn the results of two public opinion polls before voting. When given two alternatives, the participants vote sincerely. Confronted with three or more alternatives, participants make tactical decisions to narrow the field. Strategic behavior quickly reduces the number of alternatives to two. Consistent with Duverger's law, candidate/party viability encourages strategic voting and the development of a two-party system. The election simulation serves as a useful tool to teach about electoral behavior and to explore topics such as strategic voting.

scholarly journals Which Matters Most: Party Strategic Exit or Voter Strategic Voting? A Laboratory Experiment

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Bol ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Simon Labbé St-Vincent
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Party System ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Respective Role

There is abundant empirical evidence that the plurality rule constrains party competition and favors two-party systems. This reduction of party system fragmentation may be due to parties deciding not to enter elections for which they are not viable and/or voters voting strategically. Yet, no prior research has attempted to estimate the respective role of parties and voters in this process. To fill this gap, we conducted a unique laboratory experiment where some subjects played the role of parties and others played the role of voters, and where the two were able to respond to each other just as in real-life elections. We find that the reduction due to party strategic exit is higher than that due to strategic voting. We conclude that parties play a key role in the effect of the plurality rule on party system fragmentation.

The Influence of Modern Party System on the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia: Institutional, Political and Psychological Aspects

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 266-273
Author(s):  
Ivan S. Palitai
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Party System ◽  
Psychological Aspects ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
The People ◽  
Voting System ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
Opinion Polls

The article is devoted to the modern Russian party system. In the first part of the article, the author shows the historical features of the parties formation in Russia and analyzes the reasons for the low turnout in the elections to the State Duma in 2016. According to the author the institutional reasons consist in the fact that the majority of modern political parties show less and less ability to produce new ideas, and the search for meanings is conducted on the basis of the existing, previously proposed sets of options. Parties reduce the topic of self-identification in party rhetoric, narrowing it down to “branded” ideas or focusing on the image of the leader. In addition, the author shows the decrease in the overall political activity of citizens after the 2011 elections, and points out that the legislation amendments led to the reduction of the election campaigns duration and changes in the voting system itself. The second part of the article is devoted to the study of the psychological aspects of the party system. The author presents the results of the investigation of images of the parties as well as the results of the population opinion polls, held by the centers of public opinion study. On the basis of this data, the author concludes that according to the public opinion the modern party system is ineffective, and the parties don’t have real political weight, which leads to the decrease of the interest in their activities and confidence in them. The author supposes that all this may be the consequence of the people’s fatigue from the same persons in politics, but at the same time the electorate’s desire to see new participants in political processes is formulated rather vaguely, since, according to the people, this might not bring any positive changes.

scholarly journals Reflections on the Relationship between the Government and Civil Society Organizations during the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Israeli Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hillel Schmid
Keyword(s):  
Health Economic ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Financial Support ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
Power Dependence ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract The paper analyzes the relations between the government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) during the COVID-19 pandemic in Israel. The paper presents the inconsistent policy of the government, which has been influenced by various interest groups and the very limited financial support allocated to CSOs during the health, economic and social crisis. The paper describes the government’s alienated attitude toward the CSOs as well as the reasons for that behavior. Special attention is devoted to the government’s misunderstanding of the mission and roles of CSOs in modern society, especially at times of crisis and national disasters. The paper also analyzes the organizational and strategic behavior of CSOs toward the government, which has also contributed to the alienated attitude of the government toward them. I argue that relations between CSOs and the government should be based on more trust, mutuality, and understanding on the part of both actors in order to change power-dependence relations, and that there is a need to establish more cross-sectoral partnerships for the benefit of citizens.

scholarly journals Who Votes More Strategically?

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 470-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW C. EGGERS ◽  
NICK VIVYAN
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Education Level ◽  
New Approach

Strategic voting is an important explanation for aggregate political phenomena, but we know little about how strategic voting varies across types of voters. Are richer voters more strategic than poorer voters? Does strategic behavior vary with age, education, gender, or political leaning? The answers may be important for assessing how well an electoral system represents different preferences in society. We introduce a new approach to measuring and comparing strategic voting across voters that can be broadly applied, given appropriate survey data. In recent British elections, we find that older voters vote more strategically than younger voters and that richer voters vote more strategically than poorer voters, even as strategic behavior varies little across the education level. The differences in strategic voting by age and income are smaller than observed differences in turnout by age and income, but they tend to exacerbate these better-known inequalities in political participation.

Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist Systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry D. Clark ◽  
Jill N. Wittrock
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Majority Control ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Duverger's Law ◽  
Electoral Law ◽  
Mixed Systems

Efforts to test Duverger’s law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.

Minimalinvasiv oder wirksam? Debattenbeitrag zur Novellierung des Bundeswahlrechts vom Oktober 2020

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-684
Author(s):  
Johannes Krause
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Vote System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Standard Size ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
System P ◽  
Voting System ◽  
The Way

Despite the 2020 reform of Germany’s national parliament voting law, the debate about a robust voting system has not ended . Träger and Jacobs have convincingly shown that Naun­dorf’s suggestion to introduce a parallel voting system creates more problems than it solves, and thus more far-reaching approaches have to be considered . One way to stop the Bunde­stag from growing is to reject the two vote-system . Comparable to the system of Thuringia’s local elections, with open lists and three votes per voter, both the standard size of the Bun­destag can be safely adhered to and at the same time a personalized proportional represen­tation can be maintained . Among other advantages, the voters would have greater influence on the personalized composition of the Bundestag . In particular, reservations on the part of the political parties could stand in the way of such a sustainable solution to the ongoing problems with the German electoral system .

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

The 2016 Electoral Reform in Mongolia: From Mixed System and Multiparty Competition to FPTP and One-Party Dominance

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Maškarinec
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
District Level ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Duverger's Law

This article tests the effects of a new electoral system that was introduced in Mongolia for the June 2016 elections. The decision to implement a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system instead of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which was first and last used in the previous elections of 2012, was due to the April 2016 ruling of the Mongolian Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the list tier as one of the mechanisms for distributing seats within MMM. Through an analysis of national- and district-level results, this article addresses the question whether electoral competition at the district level was consistent with Duverger’s law and resulted in the restoration of bipartism, which had been disrupted in 2012 due to the use of MMM.

New Perspectives on British Local Government

1973 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-138
Author(s):  
Howard A. Scarrow
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Political System ◽  
Party System ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Pressure Group ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Pressure Groups ◽  
Party Cohesion ◽  
American Party

It is both humbling and encouraging to recall notions that Americans once entertained of the British political system. Critics of F.D.R. looked enviously at the British Parliament for its reputed ability to hold the executive firmly accountable for its actions. Somewhat later, observers on both sides of the Atlantic supposed that Britain was blessed with an absence of pressure groups. Would-be reformers of the American party system further implied that British voters cast their ballots according to the content of party programs, and that party cohesion was the result of discipline imposed by a centralized party organization able to deny renomination to recalcitrant M.P.'s. Careful analyses of intra-party workings, pressure-group activity, and voting behavior have now dispelled these and other mistaken impressions, and it seems likely that the contours of our understanding of these subjects have now been established. However, additional frontiers of knowledge of the British political system remain to be charted; one of these is government at the local level.

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