scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Peer-Induced Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 5071 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yadong Shu ◽  
Ying Dai ◽  
Zujun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Asymmetrical Information ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness ◽  
The Cost

The importance of behavioral factors in the process of decision making is widely recognized in literature and practice. The aim of this paper is to examine the influence of collectors’ multiple fairness concerns on pricing decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), which consists of one manufacturer, one retailer, and two collectors. Specifically, the collectors are concerned with both distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness. By considering fairness concerns and selecting Nash bargain solution as the reference point of fairness distribution, this paper studies the equilibrium solution of Stackelberg game models in the CLSC with symmetrical and asymmetrical information of fairness concerns, respectively. The results show that in the former case, distributional fairness is always at the cost of sacrificing the manufacturer’s profits, which is a means of gaining more benefits for the collectors. In the latter case, the profits of both the manufacturer and the collectors turn into a loss. No matter in which case, the collector who is concerned with both distributional and peer-induced fairness is always in a passive position. Generally speaking, whether the decision maker concerns fairness and whether it can be perceived by the CLSC members both impact the members’ decision making. Additionally, the utilities of both the manufacturer and the collectors receive Pareto improvement under the proposed incentive contract.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Competitive Fairness-Concerned Collectors

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yadong Shu ◽  
Ying Dai ◽  
Zujun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Competitive Strength ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Utility System ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

Based on the Shapley value fairness concern framework, a fairness concern utility system is established for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one manufacturer, one retailer, and two competitive collectors. Under the five models (one centralized and four decentralized), the influence of competitive strength and fairness concern degree of collectors on the pricing decisions is analyzed. The following conclusions can be obtained: (1) When the manufacturer considers the fairness concern of the collectors, fairness concern is a way for the collectors to obtain more profit. Whether the manufacturer “proactively” considers the fairness concern of the collectors is an approach to benefiting the collectors but only in the case of “active” consideration, there is less self-loss to the manufacturer. (2) When the collectors’ fairness concern cannot be considered by the manufacturer, the equilibrium recycling price sets lower for the purpose of achieving more profit by the collectors. At this point, the profit of the collectors and the manufacturer is the lowest, and so is the return rate of the CLSC. (3) When the collectors do not care about whether they are being fairly treated but the manufacturer “actively” takes the fairness of the collectors into consideration, the collectors get “unexpected” attention from the manufacturer, which makes the performance of the collectors more positive than it is when their fairness concerns are taken into account. The profit increased by the collectors is more than that lost by the manufacturer, so the profit of the CLSC is the largest. Additionally, our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision in the case where the collectors consider fairness concern.

Procedural fairness concerns in supply chain with retailer promotional effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tengfei Nie ◽  
Hualin Liu ◽  
Yilun Dong ◽  
Shaofu Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Fair Process ◽  
Slotting Allowances ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness

Purpose The existing literature has a lack of modeling of procedural fairness concerns in the supply chain level. This paper aims to investigate how procedural fairness concerns affect channel decisions, performance and coordination. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who have procedural fairness concerns in a classic Stackelberg game setting. The model is set in sales promotional environment. According to the existing literature, engagement is used to depict fair process. Some findings are made through analyzing respective decisions of the supplier and the retailer under the influence of procedural fairness concerns. Findings The results show that the channel efficiency can be improved when the retailer exhibits procedural fairness concerns, but if the aversion to unfair process exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer cannot benefit from it. Besides, the retailer profits more when he cares about distributional fairness, although the whole channel surplus can be improved by procedural fairness concerns. Originality/value This is the first paper to study the influences of procedural fairness concerns on supply chain decisions and channel performance. Finally, a mechanism combining a wholesale price contract with slotting allowances is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Pricing of brand extensions based on perceptions of brand equity

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Arsenos ◽  
Dimitrios Charamis ◽  
Alexandros Garefalakis
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Brand Equity ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Brand Extensions ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Quantitative Research Methods ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Consumer Perspective ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Marketing Actions

The paper explores the role of brand equity when pricing hypothetical brand extensions. Companies tend to use different pricing techniques for their products, and their pricing decisions are based on many factors, including image and category fit of the product with the existing image and products of the company. Brand extensions are usually investigated from a consumer perspective, focusing on the extension attitude, however, it is essential to understand the corporate decision-making process regarding pricing. Exploring this matter using quantitative research methods, the study provides empirical evidence that companies that have invested heavily in marketing actions in the past and have built strong brand equity over-time, show flexibility in the mark-up during the cost decision-making process of a hypothetical brand extensions. Variations in mark-up percentages are also observed when there is a difference in image and category fit of the extension to the original brand. However, companies characterized by greater brand equity exhibited greater flexibility in the mark-up percentages, even for low fit extensions.

scholarly journals Joint Capacity Investment, Collecting and Pricing Decisions in a Capacity Constraint Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 8725
Author(s):  
Jian Wang ◽  
Wenxuan Shao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Capacity Investment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is considered. The capacity of the manufacturer is limited, the manufacturer can increase capacity by investing in capacity, and there are different cooperation contracts among the supply chain members. This paper pushes collecting activities upstream, assumes that the collecting activity can be completed by the supplier, and accepts that there is cooperation between the members, which increases supplier involvement. Dynamic game models among CLSC members are formulated. The optimal decisions of pricing, capacity investment, and collecting channels of the CLSC members are obtained, and the impacts of some important factors, for example, the capacity investment cost coefficient and the cost-sharing factors, on optimal decisions are investigated. The results reveal that the supplier collecting mode performs better in some scenarios; therefore, the management enlightenment desired by the supplier can be obtained. Additionally, the coordination between the manufacturer and the supplier sometimes fails to increase the closed-loop supply chain’s sustainability, which is a finding quite different from some current research results.

Global Decision-Making (DRAFT)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Ronen ◽  
Joseph S Pliskin ◽  
Shimeon Pass
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
Cost Utilization ◽  
The Cost

The global decision-making methodology is a simple and effective tool for decision-making. It bypasses the need to determine the cost of service or cost of product as well as the product’s or service’s profit. Global decision-making methodology works well for pricing decisions, make-or-buy decisions, termination of services, bid pricing, determining service mix, and investment decisions. The methodology consists of three stages and provides practical tools for decision-making such as the measurement profile and the cost-utilization diagram. The methodology takes into consideration economic benefits as well as strategic benefits and intangible ones. It is simple to use, intuitive, and clear to communicate.

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