scholarly journals Religious Values in Liberal Democracy

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 682
Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Private Organizations ◽  
Specific Interpretation ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion ◽  
The Stability

Religious values neither wholly threaten nor wholly reinforce the stability of liberal democracy. This depends upon how they may be interpreted and applied. The recent influence of Christian nationalists, who would promote a specific interpretation of Christianity as the only legitimate basis for public policy, and of those who would elevate religious liberty above all other rights, does not promote pluralism. Although people should be able to live out their religious commitments, it is the state, not individuals or private organizations, that must draw the line between the free exercise of religion and the civil rights of those who may be adversely affected by the religious exercise of others. First, religious rights may threaten other rights, particularly when reinforced with public funds. Second, religion makes valuable contributions to pluralism when it protects the conscientious beliefs and practices of individuals and of minority religious groups. Finally, concerning LGBT civil rights, individual religious believers should be accommodated as much as possible, but their organizations should be required to arrange for others without objections to provide services that are sought. Religion’s greatest contribution occurs when it is allied with movements that enhance individual rights, including but not limited to the free exercise of religion.

The First Amendment, Varieties of Neutrality, and Same-Sex Marriage

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-377
Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Sexual Orientation ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion

AbstractThis article compares the difficulty in achieving a public stance of neutrality toward sexual orientation with the difficulty in achieving neutrality toward religious belief. Strict separation treats religion as a private commitment, with firm limits on government cooperation with religion and strong protection for free exercise. Formal neutrality discounts religion as a basis either for conferring special benefits or for withholding generally available benefits. Positive neutrality attends to the practical effects of public policy, sometimes requiring an abandonment of nonestablishment in favor of policies that allow for greater protection for free exercise of religion. I argue that none of these forms of neutrality establishes impartiality regarding either religious belief or same-sex marriage. First, Michael McConnell's “disestablishment” approach to sexual orientation and same-sex marriage instantiates are neither neutrality nor civic equality. Second, while formal neutrality may render an establishment more inclusive, it may exclude those whose beliefs and practices are not deemed in accordance with public purposes. Third, although positive neutrality may remove burdens from same-sex couples whose conscientious convictions may impel them to marry, it may still favor some kinds of practices over others.

Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 652-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Way ◽  
Barbara J. Burt
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Marginal Groups ◽  
Free Exercise Clause ◽  
Judicial Opinions ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion ◽  
The Universe

This article offers a measure of judicial legitimation of marginal religious groups in litigation involving the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment. Throughout the greater part of history, marginal religious faiths have found the path to acceptance filled with legal obstacles. Pfeffer (1974) noted that legitimation of marginal groups occurs either when the secular norms change or when such groups change their religious doctrines. The Pfeffer thesis is generally consistent with the sect-church continuum defined by sociologists of religion. In the research reported below, we examined an alternative thesis, namely that official legitimation by the judiciary of marginal religions is a function of their marginality. We compared the results of the universe of all reported state and federal judicial opinions from 1946 through 1956 and 1970 through 1980. We found substantial increases in the percentage of successfully litigated free exercise claims, and furthermore, that success in litigating these claims is closely associated with those factors that distinguish these groups as marginal.

Exploring the role of identity fusion and group identification in predicting parochialism amongst Indonesian Islamic groups

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Michael Kavanagh ◽  
Susilo Wibisono ◽  
Rohan Kapitány ◽  
Whinda Yustisia ◽  
Idhamsyah Eka Putra ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Group Identification ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
Identity Fusion ◽  
Beliefs And Practice ◽  
Fusion Theory

Indonesia is the most populous Islamic country and as such is host to a diverse range of Islamic beliefs and practices. Here we examine how the diversity of beliefs and practices among Indonesian Muslims relates to group bonding and parochialism. In particular, we examine the predictive power of two distinct types of group alignment, group identification and identity fusion, among individuals from three Sunni politico-religious groups - a fundamentalist group (PKS), a moderate group (NU), and a control sample of politically unaffiliated citizens. Fundamentalists were more fused to targets than moderates or citizens, but contrary to fusion theory, we found across all groups, that group identification (not fusion) better predicted parochialism, including willingness to carry out extreme pro-group actions. We discuss how religious beliefs and practice impact parochial attitudes, as well as the implications for theoretical models linking fusion to extreme behaviour.

The “Separation” of Religion and Polities: The Paradoxes of Spinoza

1988 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hillel G. Fradkin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Religion And Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
American Founding ◽  
Founding Fathers

Benedict Spinoza is the first philosophical proponent of liberal democracy. In his Theologico-Political Tractate he calls for the liberation of philosophy from theology and for the subordination of religion to politics. Though Spinoza may have not influenced the American Founding Fathers directly, both the clarity and the paradoxes of his arguments are perhaps the best guide to understanding better the present-day conflicts over religion and politics in the United States. Spinoza's insistence on the prerogative of the political sovereign to exercise absolute authority in the sphere of moral action necessarily complicates religious values. But the “inconveniences” resulting from liberal democracy are justified in terms of justice.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

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