scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baiyun Yuan ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Bingmei Gu ◽  
Yi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic

Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangjie Xia ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is higher enough than the manufacturer’s, and the emission reduction level of per unit product is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the cost pooling proportion provided by the retailer; (2) the new side-payment contract can coordinate the dyadic supply chain successfully due to its integrating sales promotion effort and emission reduction input, which results in system pareto optimality under decentralized individual rationality but achieves a collective rationality effect in the centralized setting; (3) when without external force’s regulation, consumers’ low-carbon awareness is to enhance consumers’ utility and decrease profits of supply chain firms.

scholarly journals Low-Carbon Supply Chain Emission Reduction Strategy Considering the Supervision of Downstream Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 2827
Author(s):  
Guohua Qu ◽  
Yanfang Wang ◽  
Ling Xu ◽  
Weihua Qu ◽  
Qiang Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Collaborative Governance ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply

In order to explore the issue of multi-party collaborative governance of energy conservation and emission reduction under the perspective of the low-carbon supply chain, the participation of downstream enterprises as an effective source of local government supervision is included in the selection of low-carbon behaviors of suppliers. First, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, suppliers and downstream enterprise groups. By calculating and copying dynamic equations, the asymptotic stability analysis of the three parties of the game is performed and the stability of the Jacobian matrix proposed by Friedman is used to analyze the local stability of the model equilibrium point and the evolutionary stability strategy of the system. Secondly, the evolution results and evolution paths of the model under different strategies are simulated by system dynamics and the influence of different parameters on the main body selection strategy of the tripartite game is analyzed. Finally, the paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from the perspectives of local government, suppliers and downstream enterprises in order to provide new ideas for the governance of China’s environmental problems from the perspective of low carbon.

scholarly journals Diverse Schemes of Cost Pooling for Carbon- Reduction Outsourcing in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 3013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinpeng Wang ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Daozhi Zhao ◽  
Michele Lundy
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Efficiency ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
External Expert ◽  
Reduction Efficiency ◽  
Important Means ◽  
Better Than

Among responses to governmental regulations for curbing carbon emissions, outsourcing carbon reduction to a specialized third-party is an important means to satisfy a variety of carbon-emission restraints. In this situation, however, designing efficient contracts for emission reducing while retaining appropriate supply-chain profit is a substantial but challenging problem. We therefore refine this from practice and consider a low-carbon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to analyze in which conditions the system should outsource its carbon reduction efforts to an external expert firm under the assumption that consumers with a sense of social responsibility prefer low carbon products. In the decarbonization expert firm embedded supply chain, we examine the respective impacts of three cost-pooling schemes for emission reduction on supply chain performances. We find that the manufacturer-undertaking contract is the worst in terms of profit and carbon reduction level among the contracts being studied, while the retailer-undertaking contract yields the best outcome in terms of the profit and performs well in carbon reduction when the contractor has cost efficiency in carbon reduction, which is even better than the joint-undertaking contract in carbon reduction when the contractor is inefficient. The study shows the diversity of contracts on outsourcing carbon reduction significantly impacts the supply chain profitability, carbon reduction efficiency and sustainability of operations.

scholarly journals Incentive Strategies for Low-Carbon Supply Chains with Asymmetric Information of Carbon Reduction Efficiency

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. 2736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinpeng Wang ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Private Information ◽  
High Efficiency ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Reduction Efficiency ◽  
Information Rent ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Impact

Information concerning carbon reduction efficiency is of great significance to supply chain operations. Considering the impact of information asymmetry on the performance of low-carbon supply chain, we therefore analyze a chain system with a single product designer and a single manufacturer. The manufacturer owns information on carbon reduction efficiency, whereas the product designer only knows that the carbon reduction efficiency of the manufacturer is either high or low. To induce the manufacturer to reveal his true private information of carbon-reduction efficiency to the product designer, we devise the pooling and separating equilibrium models to compare the impacts of these two models on supply chain performance, respectively. We find that the high-efficiency manufacturer gets his first-best choice at the equilibrium decision in the separating model, and obtains the information rent in the pooling model. The information rent increases in the efficiency difference between the two emission-reduction types. Additionally, we examine how the probability of the high (or low)-efficiency manufacturer being chosen impacts on both the profits of chain members and carbon-reduction levels. The research provides a reference for companies about how to cooperate with partner who possess private information of carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Wang ◽  
Xianxue Cheng ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Hongtao Yang ◽  
Shuhua Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
High Price ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Emission Permit ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Permit Price ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Behavior Choice

The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.

Environmental Friendliness in Low Carbon Supply Chain and Operations

2021 ◽  
pp. 2421-2430
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Management ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Management ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Friendliness ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Business Operations

Managing operations in manufacturing industry has progressed significantly over the years due to customer requirements. Globalization and environmental awareness have force firm's operations to align with the direction of environmental management. The importance of carbon emission reduction for environmental management has led firms to adopt low carbon operations practices such as energy management. The emergence of energy management and environmental friendliness principle in business operations have changed the landscape of business competition in the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, the outcomes and concept remain unclear and availability of limited studies on the specific scope of environmental friendliness have not extensively discussed. As such, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the environmental friendliness approach in operations from the perspective of manufacturing industry.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document