scholarly journals An Optimal Control Model of the Low-Carbon Supply Chain: Joint Emission Reduction, Pricing Strategies, and New Coordination Contract Design

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 106273-106283
Author(s):  
Hui Yu ◽  
Shizhen Bai ◽  
Dongyan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Coordination Contract

scholarly journals Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Wang ◽  
Xianxue Cheng ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Hongtao Yang ◽  
Shuhua Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
High Price ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Emission Permit ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Permit Price ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Behavior Choice

The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.

Environmental Friendliness in Low Carbon Supply Chain and Operations

2021 ◽  
pp. 2421-2430
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Management ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Management ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Friendliness ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Business Operations

Managing operations in manufacturing industry has progressed significantly over the years due to customer requirements. Globalization and environmental awareness have force firm's operations to align with the direction of environmental management. The importance of carbon emission reduction for environmental management has led firms to adopt low carbon operations practices such as energy management. The emergence of energy management and environmental friendliness principle in business operations have changed the landscape of business competition in the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, the outcomes and concept remain unclear and availability of limited studies on the specific scope of environmental friendliness have not extensively discussed. As such, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the environmental friendliness approach in operations from the perspective of manufacturing industry.

Carbon Emission Reduction and Pricing Strategies of Supply Chain under Various Demand Forecasting Scenarios

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (01) ◽  
pp. 1740005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juanjuan Qin ◽  
Liguo Ren ◽  
Liangjie Xia
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Demand Forecasting ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction

This study incorporates consumer’s low carbon awareness (CLA) and demand forecasting into supply chains that adopt the cap-and-trade system. Three demand forecasting scenarios are discussed, namely, information sharing, full information sharing, and retailer-only forecasting. Strategies for pricing and reduction of equilibrium of carbon emission are derived. We also compare the decisions and profits in the three cases and present numerical analysis.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baiyun Yuan ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Bingmei Gu ◽  
Yi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic

Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.

scholarly journals Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Linming Qi ◽  
Lu Liu ◽  
Liwen Jiang ◽  
Zicheng Wang ◽  
Weiliang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Reduction Effort

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.

scholarly journals Low-Carbon Supply Chain Emission Reduction Strategy Considering the Supervision of Downstream Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 2827
Author(s):  
Guohua Qu ◽  
Yanfang Wang ◽  
Ling Xu ◽  
Weihua Qu ◽  
Qiang Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Collaborative Governance ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply

In order to explore the issue of multi-party collaborative governance of energy conservation and emission reduction under the perspective of the low-carbon supply chain, the participation of downstream enterprises as an effective source of local government supervision is included in the selection of low-carbon behaviors of suppliers. First, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, suppliers and downstream enterprise groups. By calculating and copying dynamic equations, the asymptotic stability analysis of the three parties of the game is performed and the stability of the Jacobian matrix proposed by Friedman is used to analyze the local stability of the model equilibrium point and the evolutionary stability strategy of the system. Secondly, the evolution results and evolution paths of the model under different strategies are simulated by system dynamics and the influence of different parameters on the main body selection strategy of the tripartite game is analyzed. Finally, the paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from the perspectives of local government, suppliers and downstream enterprises in order to provide new ideas for the governance of China’s environmental problems from the perspective of low carbon.

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