scholarly journals Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Duflo ◽  
Michael Greenstone ◽  
Rohini Pande ◽  
Nicholas Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Polluting Firms

Truth-telling by third-party audits and the response of polluting firms: Experimental evidence from India

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Duflo ◽  
◽  
Michael Greenstone ◽  
Rohini Pande ◽  
Nicholas Ryan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Polluting Firms

scholarly journals Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India*

2013 ◽  
Vol 128 (4) ◽  
pp. 1499-1545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Duflo ◽  
Michael Greenstone ◽  
Rohini Pande ◽  
Nicholas Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Third Party ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Industrial Plants ◽  
The Status ◽  
Indian State ◽  
Plant Emissions ◽  
Environmental Audits ◽  
Pollution Emissions ◽  
Polluting Firms ◽  
Accurate Reporting

Abstract In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically higher. Second, the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards. Third, treatment plants, in turn, reduced their pollution emissions. The results suggest reformed incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective.

scholarly journals Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Brockmeyer ◽  
Spencer Smith ◽  
Marco Hernandez ◽  
Stewart Kettle
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Costa Rica ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Randomized Experiment ◽  
Intermediate Form ◽  
Tax Enforcement ◽  
Important Intermediate ◽  
Payment Rate ◽  
Tax Filing

The majority of firms in developing countries are informal, yet even among registered firms, tax filing rates are low. We argue that non-filing of taxes among registered firms constitutes an important intermediate form of informality, which can be tackled cost-effectively. Using a randomized experiment in Costa Rica, we show that credible enforcement emails increased the tax payment rate (amount) by 3.4  p.p. (US$15) among previously non-filing firms. Emails that highlight third-party reports of a firm’s transactions further increased compliance. The effect persisted over two years, and treated firms became more likely to report transactions with other firms, facilitating future tax enforcement. (JEL H25, H26, K34, O17)

scholarly journals Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Kenju Kamei
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Everyday Lives

Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting that this behavioral finding extends to a situation where a pair of individuals jointly decides how strong a third-party punishment to impose. It also shows that this punishment behavior is robust to the size of social distance within pairs. These results lend useful insight since decisions in our everyday lives and also in courts are often made by teams.

Nationalism and Social Sanctioning Across Ethnic Lines: Experimental Evidence from the Kenya–Tanzania Border

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangick Jeon ◽  
Tim Johnson ◽  
Amanda Lea Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Ethnic Composition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Group Members

AbstractPast research shows that ethnic diversity reduces the ability to sanction norm violators, ultimately undermining cooperation. We test this directly by experimentally varying the ethnic composition of groups playing a dictator game with third-party punishment among two ethnic groups along the Kenya–Tanzania border. We also implement a structurally identical game where the endowment division is randomly determined in order to isolate a punishment motivation from the motivation to rectify income inequality. While costly income adjustment in both games is driven primarily by norm violations and inequality aversion, the ethnic composition of groups also influences sharing and sanctioning behavior in Kenya but not Tanzania, consistent with documented differences in the strength of nationalism across the two countries. However, the way in which shared ethnicity affects sanctioning in Kenya—namely, increased punishment of out-group violations against in-group members—is at odds with theories that anticipate that costly sanctioning will primarily target coethnics.

Improving Truthful Reporting of Polluting Firms by Rotating Inspectors: Experimental Evidence from a Bribery Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Peiyao Shen ◽  
Regina Betz ◽  
Andreas Ortmann ◽  
Rukai Gong
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Polluting Firms
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