Nationalism and Social Sanctioning Across Ethnic Lines: Experimental Evidence from the Kenya–Tanzania Border

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangick Jeon ◽  
Tim Johnson ◽  
Amanda Lea Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Ethnic Composition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Group Members

AbstractPast research shows that ethnic diversity reduces the ability to sanction norm violators, ultimately undermining cooperation. We test this directly by experimentally varying the ethnic composition of groups playing a dictator game with third-party punishment among two ethnic groups along the Kenya–Tanzania border. We also implement a structurally identical game where the endowment division is randomly determined in order to isolate a punishment motivation from the motivation to rectify income inequality. While costly income adjustment in both games is driven primarily by norm violations and inequality aversion, the ethnic composition of groups also influences sharing and sanctioning behavior in Kenya but not Tanzania, consistent with documented differences in the strength of nationalism across the two countries. However, the way in which shared ethnicity affects sanctioning in Kenya—namely, increased punishment of out-group violations against in-group members—is at odds with theories that anticipate that costly sanctioning will primarily target coethnics.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making their decision as part of a group as compared to alone. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish or not to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus take more time to punish others, and to make their mind on whether to punish or not when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee de-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
The Individual

It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Participants made lower offers when making a collective vs individual decisions. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

Intergroup Bias Influences Third-Party Punishment and Compensation: In-group Relationships Attenuate Altruistic Punishment

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 1397-1408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingjie Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Bian ◽  
Yu Hu ◽  
Ya-Ting Chen ◽  
Xuzhou Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Intergroup Bias ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Intergroup Relationships ◽  
Trait Empathy ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Group Relationships ◽  
Shed Light

Intergroup relationships can impact on a third party's willingness to punish a violator, but few researchers have explored how intergroup relationships affect third-party compensation tendencies. We recruited 163 participants to observe a dictator game, and then choose either to punish the dictator or compensate the recipient, each of whom could be from the participant's in-group or out-group. Third parties often chose not to punish in-group dictators and to compensate both in-group victims and out-group victims. When out-group members transgressed against the in-group, participants punished these out-group members just as often as they compensated the in-group recipients, although they punished out-group dictators more harshly than others overall. However, when both proposer and recipient came from the out-group, participants often did not intervene. We also found that third-party punishment and compensation were related to individual differences in participants' trait empathy and Machiavellianism. Our findings shed light on the modulating effect of intergroup relationships on third-party altruistic decisions.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making a collective rather than an individual decision. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Associational Involvement in Dutch Municipalities and Neighbourhoods: Does Ethnic Diversity Influence Bonding and Bridging Involvement?

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Savelkoul ◽  
Maurice Gesthuizen ◽  
Peer Scheepers
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Voluntary Associations ◽  
Ethnic Composition ◽  
Interethnic Contact ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Bonding And Bridging ◽  
Using Data

We test whether ethnic diversity in Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities drives down associational involvement and build on earlier research in two important ways. First, we explicitly take into account the ethnic composition of local voluntary associations, distinguishing involvement in bonding (only in-group members) and bridging (with out-group members) associations. Second, we aim to explain relationships between ethnic diversity and associational involvement, testing two competing sets of predictions derived from conflict and contact theories. Using data from the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (2013), ethnic diversity turns out to hardly affect associational involvement negatively. Only for leisure associations, living in ethnically more diverse municipalities substantially decreases the likelihood to be involved in bonding associations, whereas higher levels of neighbourhood ethnic diversity increase the likelihood to be involved in bridging associations. Moreover, ethnic diversity indirectly affects associational involvement via interethnic contact. Higher levels of ethnic diversity increase interethnic contact which, in turn, is negatively related to involvement in bonding associations. Whereas higher levels of ethnic diversity in neighbourhoods increase perceptions of ethnic threat, these perceptions decrease with higher levels of ethnic diversity in the municipality. Perceptions of ethnic threat do not, however, affect associational involvement. Our results shed more light on the direct and indirect relationships between ethnic diversity and bonding and bridging associational involvement.

scholarly journals Exposure to economic inequality at the age of 8 enhances prosocial behavior in adult life

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Branas-Garza ◽  
Pedro Caldentey ◽  
Antonio M. Espin ◽  
Teresa García ◽  
Ana Hernandez
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
University Students ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Adult Life ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Childhood And Adolescence ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Open Question

Children as young as 3-4 years old are already concerned about inequality and 18 declare that equality is a norm that should be followed. At the age of 3 to 8, they develop a strong preference for equality, which is typically reflected in both “envy” and “compassion”, that is, aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality, respectively. Further studies suggest that inequality aversion does not continue increasing after that age, but rather exhibits an inverse-U shape relation with age in childhood and adolescence, with a peak at 8 years old. Since children are particularly 24 sensitive to inequality at the age of 8, it is an open question how exposure to real economic inequality at this age modulates prosocial behavior in adult life. Here, we link generosity in dictator game experiments conducted among Spanish university students (n > 400) with existing macro-level data on income inequality within the region they lived as children. The data show that individuals who were exposed to higher levels of inequality at the age of 8 are more generous in adult life. Interestingly, exposure at older ages has no impact on generosity. Our results extend previous findings on the development of egalitarianism by showing long-lasting effects of childhood inequality experiences in adult life. If prosocial behavior is (partly) developed as a reaction to an unequal environment, then inequality might be counteracted in the 34 future.

Children’s Group Biases In Third-Party Punishment Are Guided By Norms-Focused Behaviors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Luz Gonzalez-Gadea ◽  
Antonella Dominguez ◽  
Agustin Petroni
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Trajectories ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Controlled Processes ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Shed Light

Children tend to punish norm transgressions, even when they are mere external observers—a phenomenon known as third-party punishment. This behavior is influenced by group biases, as children unevenly punish in-group and out-group members.Two opposing hypotheses have been proposed to explain group biases during third-party punishment: the Norms-Focused Hypothesis predicts that individuals punish more harshly selfishness by in-group than by out-group members; contrarily, the Mere Preferences Hypothesis predicts that people are more lenient to selfishness by in-group than by out-group members. Here, we tested these hypotheses in children between six and 11 years of age (N=124) and explored the mechanisms underlying group biases during the development of third-party punishment. Our results supported the Norms-Focused Hypothesis: children preferentially punished unfair sharing from in-group members evidencing in-group policing bias, and they were also more willing to punish selfishness directed at in-group members than out-group members, showing in-group favoritism bias. We observed different developmental trajectories and mechanisms associated with these biases: while in-group policing remained stable over childhood as automatic as well as more effortful and controlled processes, in-group favoritism increases with age and was manifested only in the context of more controlled processes. These results shed light on the mechanisms underlying the development of third-party decisions and could be used to plan strategies and interventions to manipulate group biases in children.

scholarly journals The Bridging Activity of Multiracial Congregations

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 204
Author(s):  
Edward Polson ◽  
Rachel Gillespie
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
Ethnic Composition ◽  
Religious Congregations ◽  
Bridging Social Capital ◽  
Service Programs ◽  
Multiracial Congregations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Racial Ethnic

The growing diversity of U.S. communities has led scholars to explore how racial/ethnic diversity effects social capital, civic engagement, and social trust. Less is known about the relationship between diversity and the work of community-based organizations (CBOs). In this study, we examine how the racial/ethnic composition of one ubiquitous type of CBO, religious congregations, is related to measures of organizational bridging social capital. Analyzing data collected through a census of congregations in one Midwestern county, we explore the relationship between racial/ethnic diversity and the bridging activity of religious congregations. We find that multiracial congregations are more likely to be involved with externally focused service programs, tend to support a larger number of programs, and report more interorganizational collaborators than other congregations. Our findings suggest that multiracial congregations can provide a valuable resource for increasingly diverse communities and civil society.

Pentecostalism as an Informal Political Institution: Experimental Evidence from Ghana

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-787 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. McCauley
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Informal Institution ◽  
Resource Endowment ◽  
The Status ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
New Form ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Cultural Leaders

AbstractInformal institutions continue to govern political exchange in Africa, but the traditional, ethnic-based form of “big man rule” is now threatened by an alternative informal institution — charismatic Pentecostalism. This study evaluates the status of Pentecostalism empirically, in a micro-level experiment in Ghana. Using data from a variant of the dictator game, in which participants divide a resource endowment with randomly assigned partners as well as cultural leaders, the study provides evidence of Pentecostal exclusivity, excessive allegiance to leaders, and a shift away from ethnic-based patronage to Pentecostal patronage. As Pentecostalism continues to expand, these findings suggest a modification in the exchange of resources for loyalty in Africa, and grounds for viewing the movement as a new form of big man rule in the region.

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