Keats, Sextus Empiricus, and Medicine

Romanticism ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-176
Author(s):  
Li Ou
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Values ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Indirect Influence ◽  
Medical Background ◽  
The Common ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

This essay discusses Keats's affinity with Pyrrhonian scepticism as recorded by Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of Scepticism in the following aspects: the investigative, non-dogmatic attitude towards the truth, the ability to set out oppositions and to realise the equipollence in opposed accounts of the truth, suspension of judgement, and the goal of tranquility. It also speculates on the implication of the common medical background Sextus and Keats shared by linking the ethical values of ancient scepticism to the humanitarian concerns of medicine that might have shaped Keats's scepticism. Although the connection between Keats, Sextus, and medicine is speculative, Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy – carefully studied by Keats – mentions Sextus, from which we can assume Keats's exposure to Sextan scepticism. The Renaissance revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides us with stronger evidence about its indirect influence on Keats through Montaigne and Shakespeare as its important inheritors.

Pyrrhonism and the Value of Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-587
Author(s):  
Stéphane Marchand
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Political Position ◽  
Real Nature ◽  
Political Effect ◽  
The Law ◽  
Lack Of Commitment ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.

scholarly journals THE IDEALISM OF DIALOGUE AND THE ECONOMY OF THE COMMONS

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-27
Author(s):  
Fernando Suárez Müller ◽  
Christian Felber
Keyword(s):  
Economic Model ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Governmental Organization ◽  
Cooperative Action ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
The Commons ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact

This paper explores the possibility of an economic system different from both capitalism and communism, that is based on the major ethical values that constitute the principles of human dialogue, the so-called Idealism of Dialogue. This implies an economic model based on cooperativism. An economy modelled in this way envisions the Common Good of society. This is more than the sum of the interests of individuals and it can be measured by looking at the intended impact on society of actions taken by organizations. If the impact of these organizations is oriented towards cooperative action they can be characterized as developing the Common Good. If they block cooperative action they can be seen to be serving private interests. This paper shows how a group of Austrian entrepreneurs has started a network of enterprises that functions both as a kind of cooperative and as a non-governmental organization (Gemeinwohl-Ökonomie). They promote the ideals of Greek oỉkonomía and at the same time consider their own efforts to be the accomplishment of the main principles of Enlightenment which are liberty, equality and fraternity. 

scholarly journals Reflections in classical philosophy concerning the superiority of spiritual power vs. physical vigor, by Xenophanes: Frag. 2D = 2W

2020 ◽  
pp. 8
Author(s):  
Konstantina I. Gongaki ◽  
Yannis S. Georgiou ◽  
Lilly Sofia Schmidt Gongaki
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Spiritual Life ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Spiritual Values ◽  
Spiritual Power ◽  
The Real ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The City

Xenophanes of Colophon (570-475 BC), a Pre-Socratic philosopher of the Eleatic School, faced life with his outspoken spirit, criticizing any values of his time considered obsolete, such as the anthropomorphic representation of the gods. He was the first philosopher who challenged the sporting value to the spiritual one. Revolutionary and innovative, in his second elegy expresses his preference for spiritual power, and he stands ironical towards the Greeks who give the physical rhyme excessive importance. According to Xenophanes, the athletic victory is simply due to the speed of the feet and does not affect the spiritual life of the city, while, on the contrary, the one who affects the ethical values of society is the one who produces thoughts and is interested in the common good. Obviously, Xenophanes feels unjust, and reacts to the great mismatch that exists between the real athletes' offer and the great honors that the society ascribes to them. Characteristically, Euripides will be influenced by Xenophanes’ ideas, while Isokrates, as well as other wise and intellectuals of the Classical Ages, will highlight the superiority of spiritual values as compared to athletic offerings, arguing that the greatest spiritual value is wisdom and the resulting benefit.

Relativity against dogmatism in Sextus Empiricus

2020 ◽  
pp. 226-245
Author(s):  
Matthew Duncombe
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Sextus often tells us that relativity underpins Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Some scholarship focuses on the role of relativity in overarching Pyrrhonist sceptical strategies. Much less scholarship addresses relativity in Sextus’ criticism of particular dogmatic concepts. This chapter argues that Sextus invokes conceptual relativity—a version of constitutive relativity—in his treatment of three dogmatic concepts: signs, causes, and demonstration. However, as a Pyrrhonist, Sextus would likely resist committing himself to a certain concept of relativity, even a conceptual one. This chapter argues that Sextus employs conceptual relativity dialectically against his dogmatic opponents. First, the chapter sets up the two readings of Sextus’ view of relativity. The chapter then presents direct and indirect evidence that the conceptual view is present in Sextus.

The Role of Families, Schools, and Colleges

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-181
Author(s):  
Deborah L. Rhode
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Service Learning ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Admission Criteria ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Moral Compass ◽  
Intrinsic Motivations ◽  
The Common

This chapter explores the challenges for families and schools in channeling ambitions in more productive directions. Today’s adolescents confront a world of growing pressures, which are also increasing mental health challenges. Parents’ vicarious ambitions can compound the problems if they push children to focus too much on extrinsic markers of success at the expense of intrinsic motivations to learn and ethical values. Both schools and families should help students to develop persistence, resilience, a strong moral compass, and commitment to the common good. Opportunities for service learning, internships and mentorships can encourage constructive ambitions. So too, parents and colleges must better control the preoccupation with prestige that has hijacked admission processes and encouraged gaming the system. Educators should also modify admission criteria such as legacy, donor, and athletic preferences that advantage already advantaged applicants.

Greek and Latin Biography

Classics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei V. Zadorojnyi
Keyword(s):  
Life Story ◽  
Evidence Base ◽  
Common Denominator ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Greco Roman ◽  
Literary Landscapes ◽  
Autobiographical Texts ◽  
The Common ◽  
Historical Individual

The ancient Greek and Roman civilizations spawned and recycled many stories about heroes, tyrants, sages, and other (predominantly male) celebrities. Yet, a holistic reading of Greco-Roman biography is tricky. The common denominator of Greek and Latin texts that must or may be considered biographical is narrative focused on the life of a noteworthy historical or quasi-historical individual. So the boundaries of the evidence base are blurred and negotiable, even around the core of the best-known mainstream authors such as Plutarch and Suetonius. Alongside the extant or attested works that present full-scale accounts of lives of statesmen and intellectuals, the ancient biographical outlook can be gauged from historiography, apophthegmatic anecdotes, encomia and lampoons, novelized history, and so on. Since no theory of life writing was developed in Greco-Roman criticism as far as we can tell, it is fair to think of ancient biography as an “inductive genre”: that is, a pattern suggested by the available material itself but also generating further interpretative configurations. Biography is thus a heuristic concept for unlocking a layered meshwork of political, sociocultural, and ethical values through a significant—or, better, a significantly “emplotted” and potentially paradigmatic—life story that acts out those values before the insiders of the Greek, Roman, and Greco-Roman ideological and literary landscapes. Scholarship is now used to appreciating ancient biography on its own, however fuzzy, terms rather than treating it as a lighter and implicitly inferior form of historiography. While the questions of source criticism and historicity continue to be vital, there is an ever-growing flow of studies focusing on the specific writerly and readerly aspects of ancient biography, with its propensity toward ethopoetic moralism and anecdotal montage. Similarly, autobiographical texts should be regarded both as historical documents and as textual artifacts of self-legitimization and authority.

Pyrrho (c.365–c.275 BC)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Brunschwig
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Documentary Evidence ◽  
Patron Saint ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Greek Philosopher ◽  
Extensive Documentation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

The Greek philosopher Pyrrho of Elis gave his name first to the most influential version of ancient scepticism (Pyrrhonism), and later to scepticism as such (pyrrhonism). Like Socrates, he wrote nothing, despite which – or thanks to which – he too became one of the great figures of philosophy. Although he has vanished behind his own legend, he must have helped nurture that legend: his unique personality palpably exercised an unequalled fascination on his acquaintances, and through them, on many others. We possess, thanks especially to Sextus Empiricus, extensive documentation of what can be called ‘Neo-Pyrrhonian’ scepticism, because from the time of Aenesidemus (first century bc) it invoked Pyrrho as its patron saint. But Pyrrho’s own thought is hard to recover. The documentary evidence for him is mainly anecdotal, and the principal doxography is more or less directly dependent on his leading disciple Timon of Phlius, who managed to present himself as Pyrrho’s mere ‘spokesman’, but who was in fact perhaps rather more than that. The main question, which is still unanswered, is whether Pyrrho was primarily or even solely a moralist, the champion of an ethical outlook based on indifference and insensibility, or whether he had already explicitly set up the weaponry of the sceptical critique of knowledge which underlies the epistemological watchword ‘suspension of judgment’.

Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaul Tor
Keyword(s):  
Belief System ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.

The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term, 1834

1923 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-278
Author(s):  
W. S. Holdsworth
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law System ◽  
Indirect Influence ◽  
General Rules ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Law System ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
New System

The old system of pleading has passed so completely into the limbo of things forgotten that the title of this paper is not intelligible without an explanation. I must, therefore, remind the reader that, in pursuance of the Second Report of the Common Law Procedure Commissioners, which was issued in 1830, the Judges made some new general rules as to pleading in the Hilary Term of 1834 which, on the whole, tended to aggravate the existing evils of the common law system of special pleading, by making special pleading compulsory where it had before been only optional. Something was done to alleviate these evils by the Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852, 1854, and 1860; but they were not wholly eliminated till the new system of procedure and pleading introduced by the Judicature Acts. The result was that right down to the Judicature Acts the system of pleading was the old system; and, subject to the modifications introduced by the Common Law Procedure Acts, the old system aggravated by the new pleading rules of the Hilary Term, 1834. Now it seems to me that there are certain developments in common law doctrine in the nineteenth century which may in part, at least, be traced to the indirect influence of these new pleading rules. But it is obvious that before I can even state my thesis I must explain some of the characteristics of the old system of special pleading, and the effect of these new pleading rules. I shall therefore divide this paper into these three parts, and deal firstly with certain characteristics of the old system of special pleading; secondly, with the new pleading rules of the Hilary Term, 1834; and thirdly, with the question of their effect on the development of the substantive law.

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