scholarly journals Did Carneades Forget the Principle of Suspension of Judgement? -Focused on the Criticism of Sextus Empiricus about Carneades and the Re-criticism of the Criticism of Sextus Empiricus-

2018 ◽  
Vol null (28) ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
KyucheolPark
Keyword(s):  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Keats, Sextus Empiricus, and Medicine

Romanticism ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-176
Author(s):  
Li Ou
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Values ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Indirect Influence ◽  
Medical Background ◽  
The Common ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

This essay discusses Keats's affinity with Pyrrhonian scepticism as recorded by Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of Scepticism in the following aspects: the investigative, non-dogmatic attitude towards the truth, the ability to set out oppositions and to realise the equipollence in opposed accounts of the truth, suspension of judgement, and the goal of tranquility. It also speculates on the implication of the common medical background Sextus and Keats shared by linking the ethical values of ancient scepticism to the humanitarian concerns of medicine that might have shaped Keats's scepticism. Although the connection between Keats, Sextus, and medicine is speculative, Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy – carefully studied by Keats – mentions Sextus, from which we can assume Keats's exposure to Sextan scepticism. The Renaissance revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides us with stronger evidence about its indirect influence on Keats through Montaigne and Shakespeare as its important inheritors.

Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaul Tor
Keyword(s):  
Belief System ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.

scholarly journals Is the Pyrrhonist happy, again? On ἀταραξία and πάθος in Sextus Empiricus.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 618-636
Author(s):  
Denis Maslov
Keyword(s):  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The Third ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

The article tackles the question whether the Pyrrhonian skeptic can be happy having “pathe” in his life. Thus, the consistency of Pyrrhonian skepticism is discussed. In the first section, I consider the notions of ataraxia and tarache. The source of unhappiness is considered by Sextus to be beliefs about the good and the evil, which give rise to intense longing that creates anxiety. Sceptical suspension of judgement extirpates beliefs and therefore this anxiety. In the second section, the notion of pathe is analyzed in comparison with the Stoics. Pathe, such as hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are inevitably and involuntarily present in the life and they create a certain kind of distress. Because of their unreasonable and necessary nature, pathe cannot be disposed of but are nevertheless moderate and hence bearable. The question is, therefore, whether pathe can cause distress directly or through compelling people to form beliefs, which is examined in the third section. Sextus clearly distinguishes between these things as being dependent (beliefs) and independent (pathe) from us. A presupposition that beliefs are exclusively in our power was widely held at the time. On that ground, I argue that pathe do not originate anxiety for they cannot compel us to form beliefs. In addition, such conditions do not cause great agitation and therefore they cannot be a source of unhappiness. Those who hold something for good or true are burdened with a double distress – mental suffering from beliefs and from pathos. Thus, the skeptical life is better off than the dogmatic one. In the last section, I try to show on example of mental pathe, which are not bodily (the search for truth, love for people, the ethos of the community), that even they do not compel the sceptic to form beliefs.

Ancient Skepticism

Classics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bett
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Exact Nature ◽  
Direct Influence ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Greco Roman ◽  
Major Figure ◽  
Roman Antiquity ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Theoretical Reflection

While ideas that can loosely be called skeptical may be found from very early in Greek philosophy, skepticism as an organized method of thinking in Greco-Roman antiquity appears in the post-Aristotelian period. There are two distinct traditions or movements of skeptical thought: Pyrrhonian and Academic. The hallmark of ancient Greco-Roman skepticism, in both traditions, is suspension of judgement, brought about by the juxtaposition of equally persuasive opposing views on any given question. In the Pyrrhonist version, but not the Academic, this is claimed to have a practical benefit: ataraxia or tranquility. In both traditions, however, skepticism is understood not merely as a topic of theoretical reflection, but as something to be lived. The Pyrrhonian tradition claimed inspiration from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 bce), who is usually considered the first Greek skeptic. However, the exact nature of Pyrrho’s thinking is very hard to reconstruct, given the scarcity of the evidence. Pyrrho’s direct influence seems to have been short-lived. But shortly after Pyrrho another skeptical movement arose in the Academy, the school founded by Plato. The first head of the Academy to take the school in a skeptical direction was Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5–241/0 bce). Whether Pyrrho was an influence on him is a disputed question. But some aspects of Socrates’ activity, as Plato portrays him, might seem to encourage skepticism, and Arcesilaus is said to have acknowledged this influence. The skeptical Academy lasted for roughly two centuries, its other major figure being Carneades of Cyrene (214–129/8 bce). By the early 1st century bce the skepticism of the Academy seems to have moderated considerably, and it was at this point that the Academy itself, as an institution, came to an end. But in reaction to this softening of the skeptical attitude came a new skeptical movement led by Aenesidemus of Cnossos (dates uncertain, but active in the early first century bce), repudiating the Academy and instead identifying itself with Pyrrho. This later Pyrrhonian movement continued for roughly three centuries. We know the names of a few Pyrrhonists. But the only complete Pyrrhonist works we have are the extensive surviving writings of Sextus Empiricus (probably late 2nd or early 3rd century ce). Because Oxford Bibliographies for Pyrrho of Elis and The Academy already exist, this bibliography is somewhat weighted toward the later Pyrrhonist tradition stemming from Aenesidemus.

Pyrrhonism and the Value of Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-587
Author(s):  
Stéphane Marchand
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Political Position ◽  
Real Nature ◽  
Political Effect ◽  
The Law ◽  
Lack Of Commitment ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.

Sextus Empiricus

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bett
Keyword(s):  
Physical World ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Cause And Effect ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Advanced Students ◽  
Motion Time ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Sextus Empiricus' Against the Physicists examines numerous topics central to ancient Greek inquiries into the nature of the physical world, covering subjects such as god, cause and effect, whole and part, bodies, place, motion, time, number, coming into being and perishing and is the most extensive surviving treatment of these topics by an ancient Greek sceptic. Sextus scrutinizes the theories of non-sceptical thinkers and generates suspension of judgement through the assembly of equally powerful opposing arguments. Richard Bett's edition provides crucial background information about the text and elucidation of difficult passages. His accurate and readable translation is supported by substantial interpretative aids, including a glossary and a list of parallel passages relating Against the Physicists to other works by Sextus. This is an indispensable edition for advanced students and scholars studying this important work by an influential philosopher.

Sextus Empiricus on Religious Dogmatism

2020 ◽  
pp. 239-280
Author(s):  
Máté Veres
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Religious Cult ◽  
Providence Of God ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

I present a reading of Sextus Empiricus’ two major discussions of philosophical theology (PH 3. 3–12 and M 9. 14–191) on which they offer divergent but compatible strategies for suspension of judgement about specific theological tenets. In Section 1, I focus on PH 3. 12 and M 9. 49 in order to make the case that the two discussions follow the same philosophical agenda. In Section 2, I argue that Pyrrhonists can participate in religious cult without compromising their suspensive stance. In Section 3, I analyse the argument of PH 3 with an eye to the dogmatic proposals concerning the conception, existence, and providence of god that it targets. In Section 4, I turn to M 9 to show that Sextus relies on dogmatic material to make the case for suspension not only concerning divine existence but also concerning the natural or conventional origin of the concept of god.

ZUM VERHALTNIS VON ATARAXIE UND WAHRHEITSSUCHE BEI SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

2020 ◽  
pp. 149-169
Author(s):  
Denis Maslov
Keyword(s):  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Core Components ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

This paper concentrates on the relation between two core components in Sextus Empiricus: tranquility and the search for the truth. Against the view of M. Gabriel, who denied the consistency of these elements, I argue that these components can be practiced consistently. I argue that a non-dogmatic concept of investigation could be used by the sceptic to seek the truth and remain tranquil. Positing something as good and evil by nature is revealed as the proper source of anxiety since it causes an intensive longing for the item deemed good. The sceptic refuses to hold the truth for the good through suspension of judgement; as a result, he becomes able to seek the just on the grounds of an internal inclincation.

Hume is the Enemy of Pyrrho

Philosophy ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Dominic K. Dimech
Keyword(s):  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Abstract I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt.

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