scholarly journals Tax mimicking in Spanish municipalities: expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition, or tax competition?

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Bastida ◽  
◽  
Bernardino Benito ◽  
María-Dolores Guillamón ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Tax Mimicking

scholarly journals Spatial interdependence in property taxation: the case of Polish municipalities

Equilibrium ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Małkowska ◽  
Agnieszka Telega ◽  
Michał Głuszak ◽  
Bartłomiej Marona
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Metropolitan Areas ◽  
Residential Buildings ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Spatial Spillovers ◽  
Property Taxation ◽  
Spatial Interdependence ◽  
Tax Mimicking ◽  
Business Purpose

Research background: Real estate and urban economics literature are abundant in studies discussing various types of property taxes and their characteristics. A growing area of re-search has been focused on tax equity, tax competition, and yardstick competition, where the latter two reflect the idea of tax mimicking. Recently, due to substantial developments in spatial and regional economics, more attention has been drawn to spatial effects. Empirical results are focused on spatial interaction and diffusion effects, hierarchies of place and spatial spillovers. Property tax system in Poland differs from those utilized in the majority of developed countries. As a consequence, property tax policy at the local government level (including tax competition and tax mimicking effects) in Poland can differ substantially from those found in previous research in the US and other European countries. There are few studies addressing the problem of tax competition and tax mimicking in Poland from an empirical perspective. Purpose of the article: In the article, we explore spatial interdependence in property taxation. We identify clustering or dispersion of high and low values of the tax rates within major metropolitan areas in Poland. The effects can indicate the presence of tax mimicking among municipalities in given metropolitan areas. Methods: We analyze the data from 304 municipalities in 10 metropolitan areas in Poland from the year 2007 to 2016. The data covers four property tax rates: (1) on residential buildings (2) on buildings used for business purpose (3) on land used for business purpose (4) on land for other uses. To explore the spatial distribution of rates, we used global and local spatial autocorrelation indicators (Moran’s I statistic and LISA). Findings & Value added: The results suggest the presence of spatial correlation within metropolitan areas. We also found significant differences between metropolitan areas. The results of the study fill the gap in empirical research concerning property tax interdependencies and tax mimicking in Poland.

scholarly journals Neighbour effect: applicability of tax mimicking concept to setting tariffs for water provision in Poland

Water Policy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 943-959
Author(s):  
Julita Łukomska ◽  
Paweł Swianiewicza
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Spatial Lag ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Water Provision ◽  
Tax Mimicking ◽  
Neighbour Effect

Abstract In our paper, tariff mimicking is interpreted as a specific type of yardstick competition. Local authorities compete for political capital and, in order to maintain (or increase) it, they compare their voter-sensitive policies with the policies of other local governments. The phenomenon of mimicking is related to the subject of inter-jurisdictional interactions. We try to identify the phenomenon of mimicking in local fees for water provision in Poland in the period 2013–2017. Our empirical strategy is based on two methods: spatial lag regression and a quasi-experimental design using a difference-indifferences method. In the latter method, we first identify local governments that have considerably increased their tariffs for water. Next, we compare whether their immediate neighbouring municipalities are more likely to follow the change than a ‘control group’ of similar, more distant, local governments. The results of our study confirm the existence of geographical interactions in the tariff policies of Polish local governments. Furthermore the results of our regression models confirm that ‘mimicking interactions’ are stronger in the case of tariffs for water provision than for local tax policies.

scholarly journals Local Tax Competition in Poland?

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 37-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paweł Swianiewicz ◽  
Julita Łukomska
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Political Capital ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Tax Base ◽  
Local Politicians

Abstract The concept of tax competition has been successfully applied in an analysis conducted in several European countries, but so far it has not been systematically tested either in Poland or in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are two types of competition discussed in the article: classic competition for mobile tax base and ‘yardstick competition’, in which local politicians compete for political capital being related to the comparison of tax rates with neighbouring municipalities. It is expected that in Poland the ‘yardstick competition’ is more important from the classic competition for the mobile tax base.

scholarly journals Finite–Lived Politicians and Yardstick Competition

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Emmanuelle Reulier ◽  
Yvon Rocaboy
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Yardstick Competition ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Period Problem ◽  
The Way

Abstract The introduction of finite-lived politicians within a life cycle model raises the well-known 'last period problem'. An opportunistic incumbent, who is serving his/her last term, will not be penalized for introducing higher taxes. In this and other respects, tax competition is often considered as a yardstick. Changes in the tax rate within a given jurisdiction are influenced by the tax rate changes in neighboring jurisdictions. Combining these two notions yields the conclusion that a leviathan politician in office may not be contained if the incumbent in the neighboring jurisdiction is holding office for the last time. In this paper we challenge that conclusion. We show that the efficiency of yardstick competition in restraining opportunistic political behavior depends upon the number of competing jurisdictions and the way in which these jurisdictions are spatially organized.

Tax competition and the activity of the regional tax policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
S. M. Drobyshevsky ◽  
N. S. Kostrykina ◽  
A. V. Korytin
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Tax Incentives ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Tax Legislation ◽  
Tax Exemptions ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Regional Budgets

The problem of efficiency of regional tax expenditures is an actual issue of the fiscal policy and fiscal federalism in Russia. A large fiscal autonomy allows federal subjects to realize a more active tax policy to attract new investments. One cannot claim current fiscal powers of the Russian regions to be wide. However, not all the regions use even existing tax policy instruments. Moreover, out of the regions that use them only few provide incentives to stimulate investment decisions. Others use regional tax measures to support businesses that already have strong positions in the region. And it is an open question whether such tax incentives are efficient. On the other hand, an aggressive tax competition for investors can also be wasteful for regional budgets. In this paper, we calculate indicators that characterize the depth and scope of tax exemptions provided at the regional level. The calculations are based on the open tax statistics. Through the analysis of the tax legislation as well as the economic structure of selected regions, we reveal the inducements of their higher activity: federal regional tax policy, tax competition or benefits for budget-forming companies of the region.

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