scholarly journals The geopolitical change in the east sea (from the post-cold war until now)

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Sen Van Vo ◽  
Trung The Nguyen

After Vietnam War and especially the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1991), a “geopolitical vacuum” has appeared in the East Sea. However, the East Sea has not become a geopolitical dispute of the world after a long time. In recent years, after the settlement of hot spots in the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia,... and the rise of China, there has been an increase in the East Sea’s geopolitical status. The U.S. has declared its interest in this region. The geopolitics of the East Sea has attracted the attention of many countries all over the world. At the same time, it has also had great influence on the strength, the status and the foreign policy of countries like the U.S., China, Japan, India, Russia and the ASEAN community. When controlling the East Sea, China can break the “siege” of the U.S. and other countries near the East Sea, control the second busiest sea lane in the world, enhance its power and political status. This means that Japan, Russia and India will be surpassed by China in the “Eurasian chessboard”. Thus, there would be so many changes in the complexion of the world. The U.S. concern stems from the rise of China, the freedom of navigation, the U.S. allies and the U.S. unique status. ASEAN Community fears “the claims” of China - a major power trying to extend its power from “regional” to "worldwide". It can be said that just from a regional matter, the geopolitics of East Sea has become a global one. This paper will clarify that geopolitical change.

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (Fall 2021) ◽  
pp. 231-258
Author(s):  
Kemal İnat ◽  
Melih Yıldız

In this article, the rise of China is discussed in the light of economic and military data, and what the challenge from China means for the global leadership of the U.S. is analyzed. Changes in the indicators of the U.S. and China’s economic and military power over the last 30-40 years are examined and an answer is sought for the following question: What will the consequences of China’s rise be in terms of the international political system? To answer this question, similar ‘rise and challenge’ precedents are discussed to contextualize and analyze and the present challenge China poses. This article concludes that while improving its global status, China has been taking the previous cases’ failed challenges into consideration. China, which does not want to repeat the mistakes made by Germany and the Soviet Union, is hesitant to pursue an aggressive military policy and tries to limit its rivalry with the U.S. in the economic area. While Chinese policy of avoiding direct conflict and focusing on economic development has made it the biggest economic rival of the U.S, the rise of China initiates the discussions about the end of the U.S. and West-led international system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-96
Author(s):  
Thong Dinh Nguyen

The complicated issues the East Sea relate to the strategies of major powers. The process of establishing Sino - U.S. in the 1970s and the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam War could be seen as an opportunity for China to expand its power in the East Sea. The crisis of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the U.S. bogged down in the War on Terrorin later years created a favorable condition for China to enhance its status and foster conflicts in the East Sea. The Asia - Pacific region, with the increasingly and dynamic development, has attracted concerns of all major powers. The success of China’s economic reform and opening-up policy, along with the arms race and its publicdeclaration to monopolize the East Sea have driven China to be the central concern of the countries in the Asia – Pacific region. Thus, major powers have been forced to adjust their strategies for this region. Fully understanding the great powers’ strategic adjustmentswill help Vietnam response appropriately, combine internal strength with diplomatic struggle to build East Sea into a sea of peace, security and cooperation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 189 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongying Wang

The rise of China as a major power in the world is an indisputable reality of world politics today. Less clear is whether China will abide by the prevailing international rules as it becomes more powerful. This article attempts to gauge China's evolving attitude toward international norms pertinent to domestic governance by studying a popular Chinese slogan – “link up with the international track” (yu guoji jiegui). It examines the rise of the slogan at different levels of the Chinese public discourse, analyses its meanings and applications in the Chinese discourse, and assesses the major controversies over the slogan. This study shows that Chinese thinking about international norms varies across time, secots and issue areas. It suggests the need for greater nuance in our understanding of current and future Chinese attitudes towards international rules.


2021 ◽  
pp. 65-107
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter examines the Vietnam War. Prior to President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to commit the United States to war in Indochina, the United States was avowedly committed to “pay any price, bear any burden,” in the famous words of President Kennedy’s inaugural address, to stop the spread of Communism around the world. Practically, this commitment required military capabilities that spanned the conflict spectrum, from enhanced counterinsurgency to flexible nuclear options, to check Communist aggression wherever it might occur. Yet warfighting in Vietnam revealed the unsustainability of this approach, prompting a far more limited international role for the U.S. military as local partners were expected to more equitably share the burdens of their own defense and Washington pursued détente with the Soviet Union alongside rapprochement with China.


Author(s):  
I. Danilin

The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Cheek ◽  
David Ownby ◽  
Joshua Fogel

The papers in this research dialogue section are the product of a project that examines intellectual life in China since the 1990s – chiefly the efforts by academic public intellectuals to rethink China’s past, present, and future in light of the excesses of Mao’s revolution, the challenges emerging from reform, and the rise of China to the status of world economic power. Chinese scholars, having benefited from China’s openness to the world and the relative relaxation of political pressure in China (until recently), have much to say about China and the world that merits our attention. Through creative collaboration between Chinese and international scholars, the articles collected here explore that intellectual public sphere since the late 1990s. The articles were written in Chinese by young PRC scholars and rendered into English through ‘collaborative translation’ teams that pair these Chinese with non-Chinese scholars based in Canadian universities. The net result, grounded on repeated conversations and revisions, is not a simple translation but a co-production of knowledge about China that aims to capture the discourse of Chinese scholarship in a way to make it meaningful to anglophone readers. The articles themselves are not traditional surveys of academic scholarship. Rather they map significant areas of an intellectual world and the arguments within it. Three widely accepted intellectual streams of thought ( sichao 思潮) organize these soundings: liberals, New Left, and New Confucian. These reports explore connections between and diversity within and beyond each.


Author(s):  
Kyle Burke

In the late 1970s, a new set of Americans took up the dream of a global anticommunist revolution. Many were high-ranking CIA and military officers who had been forced from their jobs by the Ford and Carter administrations in the wake of the Vietnam War. As Congress passed new laws constraining the United States’ clandestine services, these ex-soldiers and spies argued that the state’s deteriorating covert war-making abilities signaled a broader decline in U.S. power. To remedy that, retired covert warriors such as U.S. Army General John Singlaub, a thirty-year veteran of special operations, entered the world of conservative activism, which promised both steady pay and power in retirement. Working in the shadow of the state, they sought to revitalize a form of combat to which they had dedicated their lives. Some even started private military firms to fill in for the U.S. government. Meanwhile, hundreds of American men, mostly disgruntled Vietnam veterans, sought new lives as mercenaries, first in Southeast Asia and then in Rhodesia and Angola. In the late 1970s, these two camps of revanchist Americans—retired covert warriors and aspiring mercenaries—established patterns of paramilitarism that would transform the anticommunist international in the Reagan era.


Author(s):  
Kal Raustiala

The single most important feature of American history after 1945 was the United States’s assumption of hegemonic leadership. Europeans had noted America’s enormous potential since at least the nineteenth century. After the Civil War the United States had one of the largest economies in the world, but, as noted earlier in this book, in geopolitical terms it remained a surprisingly minor player. By 1900 the United States was playing a more significant political role. But it was only after 1945 that the nation’s potential on the world stage was fully realized. Victory in the Second World War left the United States in an enviable position. Unlike the Soviet Union, which endured devastating fighting on its territory and lost tens of millions of citizens, the United States had experienced only one major attack on its soil. Thanks to its actions in the war America had great influence in Europe. And the national economy emerged surprisingly vibrant from the years of conflagration, easily dominant over any conceivable rival or set of rivals. When the First World War ended the United States ultimately chose to return to its hemispheric perch. It declined to join the new League of Nations, and rather than maintaining engagement with the great powers of the day, America generally turned inward. The years following the Second World War were quite different. In addition to championing—and hosting—the new United Nations, the United States quickly established a panoply of important institutions aimed at maintaining and organizing international cooperation in both economic and security affairs. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union, apparent to many shortly after the war’s end, led the United States to remain militarily active in both Europe and Asia. The intensifying Cold War cemented this unprecedented approach to world politics. The prolonged occupations of Germany and Japan were straightforward examples of this newly active global role. In both cases the United States refashioned a conquered enemy into a democratic, free-market ally—a significant feat. The United States did not, however, seek a formal empire in the wake of its victory.


1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Franz

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.


Worldview ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 8-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lester R. Brown

Each day two 20,000-ton freighters loaded with grain leave the United States for the Soviet Union. This flow of grain between two major adversaries is influenced by economic considerations such as the size of the Soviet grain deficit, the U.S. capacity to supply, and the Soviet ability to pay. Political considerations include the risk to both trading partners of such a heavy interdependence, whether as supplier or market.Never before has a country dominated the world grain trade as the United States does today. Its 55 per cent share of world grain exports in 1981 easily overshadows Saudi Arabia's 24 per cent share of world oil exports in 1978. And while the amount of oil traded internationally has been falling since 1979, grain shipments are continuing to grow.


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