scholarly journals Defining Judicial Independence and Accountability Post Political Transition

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 294
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara

Indonesian constitutional reform after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, has closed dark memories in the past. This article decides that the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There are some problems that remain, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through different ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what "is" and what "ought", among others. First, by changing political configuration that tends to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. In this context, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, and (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that that may reduce constitutional guarantee. However, there are many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political transition and conceptualize its order to strengthen rule of law in Indonesia

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-404
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara ◽  
Syaiful Bakhri ◽  
Muhammad Ali

AbstractConstitutional Reform after fall of Soeharto’s New Order bring favorable direction for judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, closing dark memories in the past. In addition, in Art 24 (2) of the 1945 Constitution decide the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There some problem which still remains, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through many ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what “is” and what “ought”, among others, First, by changes political configuration that tend to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. But in reality, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation which reduced constitutional guarantee. But in reality, many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence under democratic consolidation after fall of new order and conceptualize its order to strengthening rule of law in IndonesiaKeyword: Judicial Reform, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Democratic Consolidation AbstrakPerubahan UUD 1945 membawa arah yang menguntungkan bagi cabang kekuasaan kehakiman di Indonesia. Penjaminan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 24 (1) UUD 1945 seperti menutup ingatan kelam di masa lalu. Selain itu, dalam Pasal 24 (2) UUD 1945 yang menentukan kekuasaan kehakiman dipegang oleh Mahkamah Agung dan badan-badan peradilan di bawahnya  dan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Dengan dasar ini, tidak ada landasan hukum sedikitpun bagi Presiden atau DPR untuk mengintervensi cabang kekuasaan kehakiman. Tetapi dalam kenyataannya, meskipun dalam sistem politik yang demokratis dan pengaturan konstitusional menegaskan jaminan kemerdekaan namun kenyataannya tidak mewakili situasi aktual. Terdapat beberapa masalah yang masih tersisa, seperti (i) tidak adanya format permanen mengenai hubungan kelembagaan antara Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Komisi Yudisial, (ii) masih banyak upaya untuk melemahkan peradilan melalui banyak cara kriminalisasi hakim. Mengacu pada masalah di atas, maka ada kesenjangan antara apa yang senyatanya dan apa yang seharusnya antara lain, Pertama, perubahan konfigurasi politik yang cenderung lebih demokratis, kekuasaan kehakiman harus lebih otonom. Namun dalam kenyataannya, berbagai masalah muncul seperti (i) ketidakharmonisan dalam mengatur pola hubungan antara aktor kekuasaan Kehakiman, (ii) berbagai upaya untuk mengkriminalkan hakim atas keputusan mereka, (iii) berkembangnya praktek mafia peradilan. Kedua, dengan jaminan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman, seharusnya tidak akan ada undang-undang yang mengurangi jaminan kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman. Namun pada kenyataannya, banyak peraturan perundang-undangan yang masih belum sejalan dengan jaminan konstitusional mengenai kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman. Makalah ini bermaksud menguraikan secara mendalam tentang bagaimana menerapkan jaminan konstitusional atas kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman dalam masa konsolidasi demokrasi pasca jatuhnya orde baru dan mengkonseptualisasikan agenda reformasi peradilan untuk memperkuat supremasi hukum di IndonesiaKeyword: Reformasi peradilan, kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman, reformasi peradilan, konsolidasi reformasi АннотацияКонституционная реформа после падения Нового Порядка (New Order) Сухарто дала благоприятное направление для судебной власти. Конституционная гарантия на независимость судебной власти, регулируемая статьей 24 (1) Конституции 1945 года, позволяет оставить мрачные воспоминания в прошлом. Кроме того, в статье 24 (2) Конституции 1945 года определено, что судебная власть находится в ведении Верховного Суда, нижестоящих судебных органов и Конституционного Суда. Такие строгие нормативные директивы в сочетании с трансформацией политической системы в демократическом направлении должны привести к созданию независимой и автономной судебной власти. Но на самом деле, хотя в демократической политической системе и конституционных механизмах закрепляется гарантия независимости, онa не отражает реальную ситуацию. Существует ряд нерешенных вопросов, таких как (i) отсутствие постоянного формата об институциональных отношениях между Верховным Судом, Конституционным Судом и Судебной Комиссией, и (ii) по-прежнему предпринимаются многочисленные попытки ослабить судебную власть многими средствами, такими как криминализация судей. Ссылаясь на вышеупомянутую проблему, существует разрыв между тем, что «есть» и что «должно быть», среди прочего: во-первых, изменяя политические конфигурации, которые имеют тенденцию быть более демократичными, судебная власть должна быть более автономной. Во-вторых, с конституционной гарантией на независимость судебной власти не будет закона, который ограничивал бы конституционные гарантии. В этой статье рассматривается и подробно объясняется, как реализовать конституционные гарантии независимости судебной власти после политического преобразования и концептуализировать его порядок для укрепления верховенства закона в Индонезии.Ключевые слова: независимость судебной власти, судебная ответственность, судебная реформа


Author(s):  
Rosa María Fernández Riveira

Este trabajo estudia dos reformas concretas de la Ley orgánica del Poder Judicial que se producen en octubre de 2015: la Comisión Permanente, como órgano del Consejo que ve incrementado su número de vocales, sus competencias y que situado bajo la dirección del Presidente del Consejo ha ido creciendo en relevancia; y el Gabinete Técnico del Tribunal Supremo, que se regula también como órgano al servicio del Tribunal pero bajo la obediencia y dirección del Presidente. Un órgano que asume unas competencias muy importantes en un momento en el que se reforma la vieja casación pasando a ser un recurso determinado por el «interés casacional objetivo». Estos dos cambios, como puntas de iceberg, son el aviso de nuevos enfoques sobre planteamientos clásicos acerca de la independencia judicial tales como: las relaciones existentes entre el Consejo General del Poder judicial y el Tribunal Supremo, la presencia del elemento político en el corazón de la independencia judicial, la enorme relevancia de un proceso de selección de nuestros jueces justo, plural y confiable y la necesidad de articular mecanismos de responsabilidad judicial institucional e individual.This paper analyses two reforms about Organic Law of Judiciary which have been made in October 2015: the Permanent Commission as part of Council body that it has seen increasing its competences and it works under careful supervision of the President of the General Council of the Judiciary. It has suffered an augmentation of members on its composition and it has got more relevance as important voice in the General Council and, on the other hand, the Technical office of the Supreme Court, which has been redesigned with new competences working under Instructions of President. And all these changes are been implemented at the same time that it has been adopted the new cassation appeal. Both reforms as iceberg’s tips are performing important reflections about classical principles for example: different manners to understand the judicial independence, the political element within judicial independence, the relevance of appointment judicial processes and of course the accountability discourse as essential part within the judicial independence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-91
Author(s):  
Maskuri Maskuri

In the history of Indonesian, education policy has always been dynamic. Before independence until the reform era of education policy can not be separated from the political system. We know that education policy as part of education policy is a political product. Political configuration in every era of state political leadership has always changed according to the political wind and the configuration of political rulers. However, forces outside the governance system, such as educational community groups, will give color to the education system. When the political system demands the centralization of power, the education system will also concentrate on a centralized government. With the flow of reforms, it has spawned many changes in the education system. Several articles, even the law which, according to the public, lack attention to the aspect of education itself, are sued to the Constitutional Court. Along with the policy of regional autonomy, education policy must be able to adjust to the development of society in autonomous regions. This necessarily requires the creativity of leaders in the region in terms of promoting education in the region in accordance with the aspirations of the community.


2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 705-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
PILAR DOMINGO

This article examines the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the Mexican political system. The judiciary provided an important source of regime legitimation, as it allowed for the consolidation of a state of legality and a claim to constitutional rule of law, at least in discourse. However, the judiciary was in effect politically subordinated to the logic of dominant party rule through both specific constitutional reforms since 1917 that weakened the possibility of judicial independence and a politics of institutional and political co-optation. The constitutional reform of 1994 has significantly altered the nature of the relationship between the executive and the Supreme Court.


Author(s):  
Murdoko Murdoko

AbstractThe collapse of the New Order and the subsequent rise of the Reformation changed the political system, the legal system and the economic system. The political system and legal system almost all agree to change to become more liberal by promoting human rights, but for the economy there is division, which is to change to become liberal as in politics and law, and remain "integralistic" or family that leads to socialism. As a result, the Constitutional Court whose duty is to maintain the interpretation of the constitution by law allows for several models of decisions, namely the legal, attitude, strategic and institutional models.Keywords: Reformation, family, Liberal, legal model, attitude model, strategic model, and institutional model. AbstrakRuntuhnya Orde Baru dan diikuti munculnya Reformasi telah merubah sistem politik, sistem hukum, dan sistem ekonomi. Sistem politik dan sistem hukum hampir seluruhnya menyetujui berubah menjadi lebih liberal dengan mengedepankan HAM, tetapi untuk ekonomi terjadi pembelahan, yaitu ikut berubah menjadi liberal sebagaimana dalam politik dan hukum, serta tetap “integralistik” atau kekeluargaan yang mengarah pada sosialisme. Akibatnya terhadap Mahkamah Konstitusi yang bertugas untuk menjaga interpretasi terhadap konstitusi oleh undang-undang memungkinkan terjadinya beberapa model putusan, yaitu model legal, sikap, strategis, dan institusional.


Significance With an agenda increasingly influenced by Vice-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK), the objectives of judicial reform now appear limited to closing pending investigations against her and her family. Impacts CFK’s increasing influence in judicial policy will reinforce the view that Fernandez lacks the political power to advance his own agenda. The confrontational approach is increasing the influence of hardliners, which is ideologically damaging to other government priorities. Moves to reduce judicial independence will further undermine institutional dialogue between the Supreme Court and the executive.


Author(s):  
Estela Gilbaja Cabrero

El Parlamento catalán aprobó en 2014 una Ley de consultas populares. Anteriormente, en 2013, había aprobado una Declaración de soberanía y del derecho a decidir del pueblo de Cataluña. Basándose en los citados documentos, el Presidente de la Generalitat convocó una «consulta popular no referendaria sobre el futuro político de Cataluña», que tendría lugar el 9 de noviembre de 2014. No se llegó a celebrar porque el Tribunal Constitucional decretó su suspensión, ya que el Gobierno había impugnado ante él la Ley, la Declaración y el Decreto de Convocatoria. La Generalitat, una asociación y dos particulares entendieron que los recursos del Gobierno fueron una intromisión en los derechos de los catalanes y acudieron al Tribunal Supremo. El presente trabajo estudia los Autos del Tribunal Supremo que les dan respuesta.Catalan Parliament approved in 2014 a Popular Enquiry Act. Previously, in 2013, they had approved a Declaration of Sovereignty and the right to decide of the people of Catalonia. Based on these documents, the President of the regional Government called to a «non-referendum popular enquiry about the political future of Catalonia», which would be held on November 9, 2014. It did not get to celebrate because the Constitutional Court ordered its suspension, as the central Government had impugned the Act, the Declaration and the Decree calling for the enquiry. The regional Government, an association and two people thought those impugnations were an intrusion on the Catalans’ rights and went before the Supreme Court. This paper studies the reply of the Supreme Court.


Author(s):  
Glauco Salomão Leite

Resumo:O trabalho analisa o movimento rumo ao ativismo judicial por parte do Supremo Tribunal Federal no julgamento dos mandados de injunção. A partir de uma abordagem neutra, institucional e multidimensional do ativismo judicial, investiga qual tem sido a postura do Tribunal na fiscalização das omissões inconstitucionais. Para tanto, avalia seus precedentes judiciais, identificando que o STF tem realizado uma nova configuração na relação institucional com o Poder Legislativo. Conclui ressaltando que a Corte se reconhece como órgão legítimo para avançar sobre o sistema político quando este negligencia seu dever de legislar.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial; Omissões normativas; Separação dos poderes.Abstract:The paper analyzes the movement toward judicial activism by the Federal Supreme Court in the trial of mandatory of injunction. From a neutral, institutional and multi-dimensional approach to judicial activism, investigates what has been the attitude of the Court in the surveillance of unconstitutional omissions. In order to do so, evaluates its judicial precedents, certifying that the Supreme Court has made a new setting in the institutional relationship with the Legislature power. Concludes pointing that the Court has recognized itself as legitimate branch to move forward on the political system when it neglects its duty to legislate.Keywords: Judicial activism; Legislative omissions; Separation of powers.


Daedalus ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 141 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Linda Greenhouse

The relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion remains ambiguous, despite efforts over many years by scholars both of the Court and of mass behavior to decipher it. Certainly Supreme Court Justices live in the world, and are propelled by the political system to their life-tenured positions. And certainly the Court, over time, appears to align itself with the broadly defined public mood. But the mechanism by which this occurs–the process by which the Court and the public engage one another in a highly attenuated dialogue–remains obscure. The Court's 1973 abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, offers a case in point. As the country began to reconsider the wisdom of the nineteenth-century criminalization of abortion, which voices did the Justices hear and to which did they respond? Probing beneath the surface of the public response to Roe serves to highlight rather than solve the puzzle.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document