scholarly journals The Formation of the North Korea-China’s Military Cooperative relationships and the Border of ‘Revolution’after the Liberation - Focusing on North Korea’s Assistance to the Chinese Civil War and the Establishment of the Army -

2017 ◽  
Vol null (102) ◽  
pp. 115-150
Author(s):  
김선호
2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-306
Author(s):  
Sunwoo Lee

Abstract Chi Ki-ch’ŏl’s story reveals a man not driven by ideology, but buffeted by it. He began adulthood as a Korean exile in Manchuria, where the Japanese occupation army conscripted him. After Japan’s defeat in August 1945, he joined a Korean contingent of the Chinese Communist Army and fought in the Chinese Civil War. His unit later repatriated to North Korea, where it joined the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. When U.S.-led forces of the United Nations shattered that invasion in September, he quickly arranged to surrender to U.S. troops. While in custody, Chi worked with Republic of Korea (rok) intelligence to organize prisoner of war (pow) resistance to their being returned to North Korea after the impending armistice. He enjoyed privileges as an anti-Communist in the pow camps, and hoped it would continue. Although an active anti-Communist, Chi judged that he would not be able to live in South Korea as an ex-pow. After refusing repatriation to North Korea, he also rejected staying in South Korea. But Chi would survive elsewhere. He relocated to India, where he thrived as a businessman. He chose the space of neutrality to succeed as an anti-Communist, where life nevertheless reflected the contentious energy of the Cold War. Chi’s decision demonstrated how ideology, despite its importance to him, was not sufficient to translate his rejection of Communist North Korea into a commitment to South Korea.


2019 ◽  
Vol 241 ◽  
pp. 214-235
Author(s):  
Enze Han

AbstractFew studies on the legacies of the Chinese Civil War have examined its effects on state consolidation in the borderland area between China and mainland South-East Asia. This paper empirically examines the impact of the intrusion of the defeated Kuomingtang (KMT) into the borderland area between China, Burma and Thailand. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), the presence of the US-supported KMT across its Yunnan border increased the new communist government's threat perceptions. In response, Beijing used a carrot-and-stick approach towards consolidating its control by co-opting local elites while ruthlessly eliminating any opposition deemed to be in collusion with the KMT. In the case of Burma, the KMT presence posed a significant challenge to Burmese national territorial integrity and effectively led to the fragmentation of the Burmese Shan State. Finally, in Thailand, Bangkok collaborated with the Americans in support of the KMT to solidify its alliance relations. Later, Thailand used the KMT as a buffer force for its own border defence purposes against a perceived communist infiltration from the north. This paper contextualizes the spill-over effects of the Chinese Civil War in terms of the literature on how external threats can potentially facilitate state consolidation.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Andrew Jackson

One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.


Author(s):  
Martin Weiser

The position of law in North Korean politics and society has been a long concern of scholars as well as politicians and activists. Some argue it would be more important to understand the extra-legal rules that run North Korea like the Ten Principles on the leadership cult as they supersede any formal laws or the constitution.1 But the actual legal developments in North Korea, which eventually also mediate those leading principles and might even limit their reach, has so far been insufficiently explored. It is easy to point to North Korean secrecy as a main reason for this lacuna. But the numerous available materials and references on North Korean legislation available today have, however, not been fully explored yet, which has severely impeded progress in the field. Even publications officially released by North Korea to foreigners offer surprisingly detailed information on legal changes and the evolution of the law-making institutions. This larger picture of legal developments already draws a more detailed picture of the institutional developments in North Korean law and the broad policy fields that had been regulated from early on in contrast to the often-assumed absence of legislation in important fields like copyright, civil law or investment. It also shows that different to a monolithic system, various law-making institutions exist and fulfil discernably different legal responsibilities. Next to this limitation in content, scholars in the field currently also have not used all approaches legal developments in the North Korea could be analysed and interpreted with. Going beyond the reading of legal texts or speculating about known titles of still unavailable legislation, quantitative approaches can be applied ranging from the simple counting of laws to more sophisticated analysis of legislative numbering often provided with legislation. Understanding the various institutions as flexible in their roles and hence adoptable to shifts in leadership and policy agendas can also provide a more realistic picture of legal practices in North Korea.


1984 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-52
Author(s):  
Mahmud A. Faksh

I.Since the end of World War 11, approximately eighty new states havebeen established. Only two, Pakistan and Cyprus, have undergone theagony of dismemberment when Bangladesh broke off in 1973 and theTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared in 1983. The worldmay now be witnessing the possible breakup of yet a third state:Lebanon, whose disintegration has been accelerated since the June 1982Israeli invasion.Shortly after the invasion began, Henry Kissinger assessed itsconsequence for Lebanon’s future, concluding, “It is neither desirablenor possible to return to the status quo ante in Lebanon.” One possibleoutcome was that some Syrian and Israeli forces would remain in thenorthern and southern ends, respectively, and the central government’sauthority would ostensibly cover the rest of the country. Implicit in theKissinger diagnosis is the possibility of eventual partition.Though the gloomy assessment by the “wizard” of US. foreign policyshould by no means be construed as a portent of an official shift awayfrom the publicly stated US. support of “Lebanon’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity,” a shadow was cast on the country’s prospects.Subsequent developments have seemed to indicate that Lebanon’sdemise looms larger than at any time since the beginning of the civil warin 1975-76.For over a year and a half national fragmentation has proceededinexorably. What many people once could imagine only with difficulty,they now acknowledge: in reality, Lebanon is facing possible death. TheSouth (35 percent of the land area) is occupied by Israel; the North andthe Biqa’ (45 percent) are controlled by Syria; Kasrawan (15 percent) iscontrolled by the Christian Maronite forces (the Lebanese Front forces),which are not subject to the government’s authority. The rest of thecountry-beleaguered Beirut and environs-was until the February1984 breakdown under the government’s shaky control supported bysymbolic US., French, Italian, and British units. The Multi-NationalForce (MNF) was subject to increasing attacks by Muslim leftist factions,as witnessed in the October 23 bombing of the quarters of U.S.Marines and French troops. Thus, instead of keeping peace, the MNFbecame ,a partisan force trying to protect itself. The US. and Frenchforces in particular seemed to have outlived their usefulness as“peacekeepers.” Recurrent fighting in southern Beirut and in theadjacent Chouf mountains, that pitted Christian Maronites and armyunits against Shi‘ite and Druse Muslims constantly threatened theexistence of President Amin Gemayel’s government and consequently arenewal of the civil war. This situation culminated in February 1984 inthe resignation of the Shafiq al-Wazzan’s cabinet, the loss ofgovernment’s control of West Beirut to Muslim-leftist militias, and theimminent collapse of Amin Gemayel’s presidency ...


2019 ◽  
pp. 4-15
Author(s):  
I. A. Korgun ◽  
G. D. Toloraya

The presented study analyzes the opportunities for North Korea to capitalize on its competitive advantages in foreign trade in the context of sanctions.Aim. The study aims to identify mechanisms that allow North Korea to engage in foreign trade in circumvention of UN sanctions and to analyze their impact on the national economy.Tasks. The authors analyze the structure of North Korea’s national economy, its initial competitive advantage, identify the specific features of North Korea’s foreign trade in the context of sanctions, and determine the consequences of illicit trade in circumvention of sanctions for the national economy.Methods. This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that combines the classical theory of competitive advantage with the concept of rent seeking, with the concept of rent seeking and analysis of trade flows.Results. The study shows that, despite the restrictions imposed by sanctions, North Korea strives to make the most of its advantages, such as resource availability and cheap labor, in global trade. The country builds its own export-import chains in circumvention of sanctions. These chains are rather mobile, flexible, and controlled by the elite. As a result, benefits from trade that could be evenly distributed among the population are concentrated in the hands of a narrow segment of society. ‘Rent seeking’ makes it possible to formulate the negative consequences of these processes for the North Korean economy and the international community.Conclusions. Solving the North Korean issue requires an economic transformation in the country through the replacement of restrictive sanctions with more constructive ones. The exclusion of North Korea from open global trade leads to the country’s marginalization and impairs the transparency of international commodity flows.


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