scholarly journals Research on The Dispatch of United States Marines to North China in the Second Chinese Civil War and The Development of Sino - North Korea Military Alliance

SA-CHONG(sa) ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol null (92) ◽  
pp. 313-360
Author(s):  
Jin Yeonggi
2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-306
Author(s):  
Sunwoo Lee

Abstract Chi Ki-ch’ŏl’s story reveals a man not driven by ideology, but buffeted by it. He began adulthood as a Korean exile in Manchuria, where the Japanese occupation army conscripted him. After Japan’s defeat in August 1945, he joined a Korean contingent of the Chinese Communist Army and fought in the Chinese Civil War. His unit later repatriated to North Korea, where it joined the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. When U.S.-led forces of the United Nations shattered that invasion in September, he quickly arranged to surrender to U.S. troops. While in custody, Chi worked with Republic of Korea (rok) intelligence to organize prisoner of war (pow) resistance to their being returned to North Korea after the impending armistice. He enjoyed privileges as an anti-Communist in the pow camps, and hoped it would continue. Although an active anti-Communist, Chi judged that he would not be able to live in South Korea as an ex-pow. After refusing repatriation to North Korea, he also rejected staying in South Korea. But Chi would survive elsewhere. He relocated to India, where he thrived as a businessman. He chose the space of neutrality to succeed as an anti-Communist, where life nevertheless reflected the contentious energy of the Cold War. Chi’s decision demonstrated how ideology, despite its importance to him, was not sufficient to translate his rejection of Communist North Korea into a commitment to South Korea.


2019 ◽  
pp. 55-71
Author(s):  
Enze Han

Chapter 4 analyzes the legacy of the KMT in the borderland area, after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, in terms of its impact on state building in the three countries. It analyzes how the KMT incursion in Burma played a sizable role in the fragmentation of Burma in the peripheries and also indirectly set in motion the militarized confrontation between the Burmese army and many of the estranged ethnic groups. In Thailand’s case, KMT remnant troops proved instrumental in Thai counter-insurgency campaigns within the context of its broader security relations with the United States during the Cold War. For China, the communist government carried out ruthless counterinsurgencies against the KMT remnants as well as other ethnic and local rebellions in mountainous areas that resisted the communist regime’s consolidation of power. Campaigns were also carried out to subdue the population in the name of suppressing counter-revolutionaries.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Wolff

This article begins by showing that Japan was central to Iosif Stalin's postwar policy in Northeast Asia. The article then examines how the emphasis on Japan led to actions in and with North Korea (and China), first to try to block and then to try to compensate for the separate peace and military alliance between the United States and Japan. The penultimate section recounts meetings between Stalin and leaders of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in the spring and summer of 1951. The article concludes by explaining how Stalin's meetings with the JCP fit into his policies in Northeast Asia as they evolved largely in step with U.S.-Soviet relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 224-229
Author(s):  
Sergey O. Buranok ◽  
Dmitriy A. Nesterov

In this paper the authors consider the materials of one of the leading American analytical magazines Foreign Affairs, devoted to the Chinese Civil War in 19291950. The novelty of this study lies in the analysis of assessments of key actors and assessments of the situation in the country as well as a possible outcome of the conflict which were made by American journalists. The authors provide the results of the analysis of Foreign Affairs articles for the formation of Mao Zedong image in connection with the events of that time. The authors reviewed the main arguments of the American press, which revealed that the problem of the civil war was one of the components of the complex problem of planning a post-war reconstruction of the world. The United States was primarily interested in changes in the balance of power in the Far East, tried to assess the possible outcomes of the conflict and how they would affect the United States itself (mainly in the economic sphere). But as the victory of the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Mao Zedong, approached the Kuomintang support from American experts weakened. The study of this information phenomenon will allow researchers to understand what impact on Sino-American relations was made by an influential American analytical magazine through the formation of ideas about China, the Chinese people and their political elites.


Author(s):  
A.O. Buranok ◽  
◽  
D.A. Nesterov ◽  

The authors of the article use prosopographic methods to analyze the materials of the journal «Foreign Affairs» devoted to the Chinese civil war of 1929-1950, in order to create «collective biographies» of the American expert community. They reveal the national, professional and age composition of the observers of the journal «Foreign Affairs» and reconstruct their ideological imperatives. The authors drew conclusions about the state of Chinese researches in the American expert community in the 1930-1940s and the functioning of the leading political science journal in the United States.


1972 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 654-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Leary

“The United States Government,” President Harry S. Truman announced on 5 January 1950, “will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” Historians generally agree that President Truman meant what he said. American policy after the summer of 1949, writes Tang Tsou, was “to avoid, as far as possible, any further involvement in the Chinese civil war and to allow events in China to unfold themselves.” The Truman administration ruled out the use of force to prevent the fall of Formosa; non-recognition of the Communist government was adopted as “a temporary measure,” due to Republican pressure and the hope of gaining concessions from Peking. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, observes Lyman P. Van Slyke, “brought to a sudden end the policy that the administration had followed for two years, and committed us once again to involvement in the Chinese civil war.” The United States assumed a protective role towards the remnants of the Nationalists on Formosa and became the implacable foe of Peking. This article, a study of a commercial airline's participation in a major diplomatic and legal controversy during the last phase of the Chinese civil war, will suggest that there is reason to doubt, or at least to modify, the traditional interpretation of American policy towards China between late 1949 and June 1950.


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