Analyst Information Acquisition and Communication
ABSTRACT: We examine a communication game between an analyst and a decision-maker and investigate how the presence of public information affects the precision of the information the analyst gathers and communicates to the decision-maker. We characterize conditions under which public information causes the analyst to underinvest or overinvest in the information gathered relative to the case where analyst credibility is not an issue. We then discuss when the presence of public information causes the analyst to reduce the depth of coverage of the firm, suggesting that the introduction of public information can make the decision-maker strictly worse off.
2014 ◽
Vol 04
(03)
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pp. 1450009
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2006 ◽
Vol 19
(1)
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pp. 43-60
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Keyword(s):
2016 ◽
Vol 8
(3)
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pp. 119-155
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2008 ◽
Vol 100
(2)
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pp. 196-199
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Keyword(s):