No decision-maker is an Island: integrating expert advice with information acquisition

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunnar E. Schrah ◽  
Reeshad S. Dalal ◽  
Janet A. Sniezek
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Expert Advice

scholarly journals The Study of a Mathematical Model in Information Acquisition and Disclosure

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Ce Huang
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Disclosure Strategy ◽  
Withholding Information

A mathematical model involving a decision maker and an expert is investigated. Through analyzing the model, we obtain several results on the expert’s information acquisition and disclosure strategy. When withholding information is costly to the expert, in equilibrium, an expert with a higher withholding cost acquires less information but discloses more acquired information. We also examine which expert is optimal to the decision maker among a group of experts with different costs of withholding information.

scholarly journals Bias and Negligence with Freedom of Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (624) ◽  
pp. 2979-2998
Author(s):  
Rossella Argenziano ◽  
Helen Weeds
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Policy Action ◽  
Costly Information ◽  
The Cost

Abstract We analyse decision-making in the presence of Freedom of Information (FOI) rules. A decision-maker chooses whether to acquire costly information to inform his decision regarding a policy action. If information is not disclosed voluntarily a monitor may open a costly investigation, using FOI to access the information. A finding of biased decision-making or negligence in information acquisition generates a reward to the monitor and a penalty to the decision-maker. We find that strengthening FOI to reduce the cost of investigation may increase negligence without necessarily reducing bias. Moreover, increasing the reward for discovering negligence can paradoxically increase negligence in equilibrium.

Analyst Information Acquisition and Communication

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1985-2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul E. Fischer ◽  
Phillip C. Stocken
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Public Information

ABSTRACT: We examine a communication game between an analyst and a decision-maker and investigate how the presence of public information affects the precision of the information the analyst gathers and communicates to the decision-maker. We characterize conditions under which public information causes the analyst to underinvest or overinvest in the information gathered relative to the case where analyst credibility is not an issue. We then discuss when the presence of public information causes the analyst to reduce the depth of coverage of the firm, suggesting that the introduction of public information can make the decision-maker strictly worse off.

scholarly journals Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 119-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rossella Argenziano ◽  
Sergei Severinov ◽  
Francesco Squintani
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Organization Design ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Costly Information ◽  
Design Communication

This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegation of the decision-making authority to the expert, as well as centralization by the decision maker of both information acquisition and decision-making authority. (JEL C72, D23, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Strategic Private Experimentation

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 74-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Felgenhauer ◽  
Elisabeth Schulte
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Information Acquisition

We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high. (JEL D82, D83)

The (Mis-)measure of the Risky Decision Maker?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck ◽  
Thorsten Pachur ◽  
Ryan O. Murphy ◽  
Ralph Hertwig
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Risky Decision

Expert advice on NCCHC standards for health services

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith A. Stanley ◽  
R. Scott Chavez
Keyword(s):  
Health Services ◽  
Expert Advice
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