Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada

1988 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constance B. Backhouse

English common-law rules that transferred the property of women to their husbands upon marriage were part of the larger package of laws emigrants from England brought to Canada. These harsh rules left Canadian women in a most unenviable position—the equitable precedents that had evolved in England to prevent the most glaring instances of abuse had less impact in Canada where courts of equity developed slowly and sporadically, and many individuals had no practical access to their jurisdiction. The need for reform of married women's property law was made even more pressing because of an apparently high rate of wife abandonment, which left women without the benefit of matrimonial support, yet still subject to the disabilities of coverture.

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Getzler

In the early nineteenth century, authoritative treatise writers such as James Kent and Joseph Story represented Anglo-American trust law as a seamless web. But the transplantation of trust law from England to America was not a simple process of adherence. Rather, American courts and legislatures came to discard fundamental English trust doctrines. Restraints on anticipation and on alienation were embraced, and in key state jurisdictions bare trusts were abolished, or else displaced from the core of trust law. Irreducible settlor power over beneficiaries and the strong protection of beneficiaries from creditors under spendthrift trusts were two strikingly original American creations, which flowed from these basic doctrinal choices. The changes made to American trust doctrine yield a paradox for the legal, social and economic historian, namely that republican America ended up with a more dynastic property law, more wedded to dead hand control and more hostile to commercial creditors, than did aristocratic England with its unreformed system of common law and equity rooted in the feudal property system. The American abandonment of free alienability of beneficial interests and the corresponding reduction of the beneficiary’s powers over trust assets may have been rooted in the volatility of credit in America and the desire of the wealthy to escape from the pressures of the market, though disparities between jurisdictions remain to be explained.


1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-78
Author(s):  
Richard H. Chused

Almost every state and territory adopted a married women's property act between 1835 and 1850. These acts generally exempted married women's property from attachment by creditors of their husbands, effecting a slight change in the battery of common-law coverture rules that gave husbands management of their wives' real property and ownership of their personal property. Alterations in the roles of women in the family, increases in education of women and growth in the importance of women's public service groups provided an environment sympathetic to initial reforms in married women's property law. In addition, economic panics and depressions affected the family economy, providing an incentive for adoption of rules exempting married women's property from the claims of their husbands' creditors.


1976 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. Burchell

Studies of the Massachusetts communities of Newburyport and Boston have revealed a high rate of geographical mobility for their populations, in excess of what had been previously thought. Because of the difficulty in tracing out-migrants these works have concentrated on persisters, though to do so is to give an incomplete picture of communal progress. Peter R. Knights in his study of Boston between 1830 and 1860 attempted to follow his out-migrants but was only able to trace some 27 per cent of them. The problem of out-migration is generally regarded as being too large for solution through human effort, but important enough now to engage the computer. What follows bears on the subject of out-migration, for it is an analysis of where part of the migrating populations of the east went in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, namely to San Francisco.


Prawo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 328 ◽  
pp. 97-108
Author(s):  
Dorota Wiśniewska

Remarks on the problems associated with the inculturation of the Napoleonic Code in the Kingdom of Poland — doubts concerning Article 530A serious problem can arise when a society has to deal with regulations not adapted to its internal relations, regulations that have been imposed on that society. Such a situation occurred in Poland in the early nineteenth century in connection with the introduction of the Napoleonic Code within the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw. This generated a lot of controversy, not only among members of the Council of State, but also among wealthy and lesser nobility as well as Catholic clergy. The state was characterised by numerous remnants of feudalism. The conditions, when it came to both social and economic relations, were different than those in France. Consequently, the provisions of the Code referring to property were not fully applicable in practice. After the fall of the Duchy of Warsaw the Napoleonic Code remained in force in the Kingdom of Poland and the Free City of Kraków. However, it still had many opponents in the Kingdom of Poland. In the end there emerged a concept of reform of property law, with one of its points being a change in the provisions guaranteeing inferior owners a possibility of redeeming their obligations. Such a right was guaranteed by Article 530 of the Code, which could lead to dominium utile or inferior ownership being transformed into dominium plenum or full ownership. A draft amendment was prepared by the Legislative Deputation and then adopted by the parliament on 13 June 1825. The inculturation of the Code in the Kingdom of Poland, a country on a lower level of socio-economic development than France, was doomed to failure. While in the Duchy of Warsaw the Napoleonic Code was fictitiously used in practice, as it were, in the Kingdom of Poland legislative work was undertaken to change civil law and adapt it to the conditions in the country. Bemerkungen zu den Problemen der Inkulturation des Code Napoléon im Königreich Polen — Fragen vor dem Hintergrund des Art. 530Das Aufzwingen der Gesellschaft der Vorschriften, die den dort herrschenden Verhältnissen nicht entsprechen, kann ein wesentliches Problem darstellen. Gerade mit dieser Situation hatte man auf polnischen Gebieten am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts im Zusammenhang mit der Einführung des Code Napoléon im Warschauer Herzogtum zu tun. Diese Maßnahmen weckten viele Kontroversen nicht nur unter den Mitgliedern des Standesrates, sondern auch des vermögenden und mittleren Adels sowie der katholischen Geistlichkeit. Den Staat charakterisierten zahlreiche feudale Überreste. Es herrschten dort andere als in Frankreich sowohl soziale, wie auch wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse. In der Folge fanden die Vorschriften des Gesetzbuches betreffend das Sachenrecht keine vollständige Anwendung in der Praxis.Nach dem Fall des Warschauer Herzogtums bewahrte das Code Napoléon die Kraft auf den Gebieten des Königreiches Polen und der Freistadt Krakau. Im Königreich Polen hatte es jedoch weiterhin viele Gegner. Letztendlich klärte sich die Konzeption einer Reform des Vermögensrechtes und ein ihrer Punkte war die Änderung der Vorschriften, die die Möglichkeit des Rückkaufs der Obliegenheiten durch die unterliegenden Eigentümer garantierten. Dieses Recht sicherte Art. 530 des Code Napoléon zu, dessen Geltung zur Umwandlung des unterstellten Eigentums in ein volles Eigentum führen könnte. Der Entwurf der Novellierung wurde von der Rechtsgebenden Deputation vorbereitet und dann durch das Parlament am 13. Juni 1825 beschlossen.Der Inkulturationsprozess des Gesetzbuches im Königreich Polen, einem Staat, der auf einer niedrigeren Ebene der sozial-wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung als Frankreich stand, war zu einer Niederlage verurteilt. Obwohl im Warschauer Herzogtum eine Fiktion der Anwendung des Code Napoléon in der Praxis angenommen wurde, so unternahm man im Königreich Polen legislatorische Arbeiten mit dem Ziel der Änderung des Zivilrechtes und seiner Anpassung an die im Lande herrschenden Verhältnisse.


Author(s):  
Richard Calnan

This book explains how a creditor of an insolvent debtor can take priority over other creditors by claiming a proprietary interest in assets held by the debtor, and concentrates on the circumstances in which proprietary interests are created by operation of law or are implied from the arrangements between the parties. This is a subject of particular importance and difficulty in common law systems because of the changeable nature of equitable proprietary interests, and this book provides a clear and structured explanation of the current state of the law, with detailed reference to case law from England and Wales as well as Commonwealth jurisprudence, and suggests how it might be clarified and simplified by returning to first principles. The new edition considers a number of important developments which pertain to proprietary rights and insolvency. It evaluates the key decision of the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners. Although this has settled the question of whether constructive trusts extend to bribes, it has raised more general issues regarding the approach of the courts to the imposition of proprietary remedies, which the book explores. It also covers recent Privy Council and Court of Appeal decisions concerning constructive notice (Credit Agricole v Papadimitrou, Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp, and SFO v Lexi), as well as interesting issues concerning the new status of intangibles (Armstrong v Winnington) and the status of the anti-deprivation rule (Belmont Park v BNY). Proprietary Rights and Insolvency is a lucid and practical reference source on insolvency and property law.


Author(s):  
John Baker

This chapter examines the history of case-law, legislation, and equity, with particular reference to legal change. The common law was evidenced by judicial precedent, but single decisions were not binding until the nineteenth century. It was also rooted in professional understanding, the ‘common learning’ acquired in the inns of court. It was based on ‘reason’, operating within a rigid procedural framework. Legal change could be effected by fictions, equity, and legislation, but (except during the Interregnum) there was little systematic reform before the nineteenth century. Legislation was external to the common law, but it had to be interpreted by common-law judges and so there was a symbiotic relationship between statute-law and case-law. Codification has sometimes been proposed, but with limited effect.


Author(s):  
Janet McLean

The authority claims of the administration have undergone radical change with consequences for the shape and content of administrative law. In the seventeenth century, authority was claimed in office, as a means to limit the imposition of the King’s will and to secure the independence of officials, especially the judges. In the eighteenth century, virtue, property, and independence became the basis for office, and the common law sought to enhance such authority through notions of public trust. After the nineteenth-century transition to more centralised and bureaucratic hierarchy, democracy became the new source of authority for the administration, reinforced by the ultra vires doctrine. In each era, the authority claims of the administration have been reflected in the frameworks for judicial supervision. In this way the common law has simultaneously constituted and controlled authority. In the present day we are in the process of rethinking whence administrators derive their legitimate authority and the theoretical foundations of judicial review. Beginning with the authority claims of the administration and framing a juridical response which reflects and tests such claims would be a good place to start.


Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Intellectual property law remains a body of private law, but for reasons that transcend its reliance on ideas and concepts from the common law of property and tort. This essay argues that the connection between forms of intellectual property law and private law is rooted in a form of autonomy that characterizes private law regimes—known as “redressive autonomy.” It shows how a strong commitment to redressive autonomy undergirds the unique right–duty structure of intellectual property, informs intellectual property’s central doctrines, and injects an additional layer of normative complexity into its functioning.


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