Steven Orey. Formal development of ordinal number theory. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 20 (1955), pp. 95–104. - Steven Orey. On the relative consistency of set theory. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 21 (1956), pp. 280–290.

1958 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-42
Author(s):  
Václav Edvard Beneš
1967 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-161
Author(s):  
Mariko Yasugi

In [3], Takeuti developed the theory of ordinal numbers (ON) and constructed a model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), using the primitive recursive relation ∈ of ordinal numbers. He proved:(1) If A is a ZF-provable formula, then its interpretation A0 in ON is ON-provable;(2) Let B be a sentence of ordinal number theory. Then B is a theorem of ON if and only if the natural translation B* of B in set theory is a theorem of ZF;(3) (V = L)° holds in ON.


1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (62) ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
José Alfredo Amor

The so called Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is the sentence: "If A is an infinile set whose cardinal number is K and 2K denotes the cardinal number of the set P(A) of subsets of A (the power set of A), and K + denotes the succesor cardinal of K, then 2K = K +". The Continuum Hypothesis (CH) asserts the particular case K = o. It is clear that GCH implies CH. Another equivalent version of GCH, is the sentence: 'Any subset of the set of subsets of a given infinite set is or of cardinality less or equal than the cardinality of the given set, or of the cardinality of all the set of subsets". Gödel in 1939, and Cohen in 1963, settled the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and of its negation not-AC, respectively, with respecllo the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). On the other hand, Gödel in 1939, and Cohen in 1963 settled too, the relative consistency of GCH , CH and of its negations not-GCH, not-CH, respectively, with respect to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZF + AC or ZFC). From these results we know that GCH and AC are undecidable sentences in ZF set theory and indeed, the most famous undecidable sentences in ZF; but, which is the relation between them? From the above results, in the theory ZF + AC is not demonstrated GCH; it is clear then that AC doesn't imply GCH in ZF theory, Bul does GCH implies AC in ZF theory? The answer is yes! or equivalently, there is no model of ZF +GCH + not-AC. A very easy proof can be given if we have an adecuate definition of cardinal number of a set, that doesn't depend of AC but depending from the Regularity Axiom, which asserls that aIl sets have a range, which is an ordinal number associated with its constructive complexity. We define the cardinal number of A, denoted |A|, as foIlows: |A|= { The least ordinal number equipotent with A, if A is well orderable The set of all sets equipotent with A and of minimum range, in other case. It is clear that without AC, may be not ordinal cardinals and all cardinals are ordinal cardinals if all sets are well orderable (AC). Now we formulate: GCH*: For all ordinal cardinal I<, 2K = I< + In the paper is demonstrated that this formulation GCH* is implied by the traditional one, and indeed equivalent to it. Lemma, The power set of any well orderable set is well orderable if and only if AC. This is one of the many equivalents of AC in ZF,due lo Rubin, 1960. Proposition. In ZF is a theorem: GCH* implies AC. Supose GCH*. Let A be a well orderable set; then |A| = K an ordinal cardinal, so A is equipotent with K and then P~A) is equipotent with P(K); therefore |P(A)I|= |P(K)| = 2K = K+. But then |P(A)|= K+ and P(A) 'is equipotent with K+ and K+ is an ordinal cardinal; therefore P(A) is well orderable with the well order induced by means of the bijection, from the well order of K+. Corolary: In ZF are theorems: GCH impIies AC and GCH is equivalent to GCH*. We see from this proof, that GCH asserts that the cardinal number of the power set of a well orderable set A is an ordinal, which is equivalent to AC, but GCH asserts also that that ordinal cardinal is |A|+ , the ordinal cardinal succesor of the ordinal cardinal of the well orderable set A.


1942 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays

The foundation of analysis does not require the full generality of set theory but can be accomplished within a more restricted frame. Just as for number theory we need not introduce a set of all finite ordinals but only a class of all finite ordinals, all sets which occur being finite, so likewise for analysis we need not have a set of all real numbers but only a class of them, and the sets with which we have to deal are either finite or enumerable.We begin with the definitions of infinity and enumerability and with some consideration of these concepts on the basis of the axioms I—III, IV, V a, V b, which, as we shall see later, are sufficient for general set theory. Let us recall that the axioms I—III and V a suffice for establishing number theory, in particular for the iteration theorem, and for the theorems on finiteness.


2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis

AbstractWe establish the following results:1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent:(a) The Tychonoff product of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact.(b) The union of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable.2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1]Iwhich consists offunctions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory.3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0 (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity).4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ0-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ0many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0.


Author(s):  
Colin McLarty

A ‘category’, in the mathematical sense, is a universe of structures and transformations. Category theory treats such a universe simply in terms of the network of transformations. For example, categorical set theory deals with the universe of sets and functions without saying what is in any set, or what any function ‘does to’ anything in its domain; it only talks about the patterns of functions that occur between sets. This stress on patterns of functions originally served to clarify certain working techniques in topology. Grothendieck extended those techniques to number theory, in part by defining a kind of category which could itself represent a space. He called such a category a ‘topos’. It turned out that a topos could also be seen as a category rich enough to do all the usual constructions of set-theoretic mathematics, but that may get very different results from standard set theory.


1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang

It is known that we can introduce in number theory (for example, the system Z of Hilbert-Bernays) by induction schemata certain predicates of natural numbers which cannot be expressed explicitly within the framework of number theory. The question arises how we can define these predicates in some richer system, without employing induction schemata. In this paper a general notion of definability by induction (relative to number theory), which seems to apply to all the known predicates of this kind, is introduced; and it is proved that in a system L1 which forms an extension of number theory all predicates which are definable by induction (hereafter to be abbreviated d.i.) according to the definition are explicitly expressible.In order to define such predicates and prove theorems answering to their induction schemata, we have to allow certain impredicative classes in L1. However, if we want merely to prove that for each constant number the special case of the induction schema for a predicate d.i. is provable, we do not have to assume the existence of impredicative classes. A certain weaker system L2, in which only predicative classes of natural numbers are allowed, is sufficient for the purpose. It is noted that a truth definition for number theory can be obtained in L2. Consistency proofs for number theory do not seem to be formalizable in L2, although they can, it is observed, be formalized in L1.In general, given any ordinary formal system (say Zermelo set theory), it is possible to define by induction schemata, in the same manner as in number theory, certain predicates which are not explicitly definable in the system. Here again, by extending the system in an analogous fashion, these predicates become expressible in the resulting system. The crucial predicate instrumental to obtaining a truth definition for a given system is taken as an example.


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