Certain predicates defined by induction schemata

1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang

It is known that we can introduce in number theory (for example, the system Z of Hilbert-Bernays) by induction schemata certain predicates of natural numbers which cannot be expressed explicitly within the framework of number theory. The question arises how we can define these predicates in some richer system, without employing induction schemata. In this paper a general notion of definability by induction (relative to number theory), which seems to apply to all the known predicates of this kind, is introduced; and it is proved that in a system L1 which forms an extension of number theory all predicates which are definable by induction (hereafter to be abbreviated d.i.) according to the definition are explicitly expressible.In order to define such predicates and prove theorems answering to their induction schemata, we have to allow certain impredicative classes in L1. However, if we want merely to prove that for each constant number the special case of the induction schema for a predicate d.i. is provable, we do not have to assume the existence of impredicative classes. A certain weaker system L2, in which only predicative classes of natural numbers are allowed, is sufficient for the purpose. It is noted that a truth definition for number theory can be obtained in L2. Consistency proofs for number theory do not seem to be formalizable in L2, although they can, it is observed, be formalized in L1.In general, given any ordinary formal system (say Zermelo set theory), it is possible to define by induction schemata, in the same manner as in number theory, certain predicates which are not explicitly definable in the system. Here again, by extending the system in an analogous fashion, these predicates become expressible in the resulting system. The crucial predicate instrumental to obtaining a truth definition for a given system is taken as an example.

1939 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Tarski

It is my intention in this paper to add somewhat to the observations already made in my earlier publications on the existence of undecidable statements in systems of logic possessing rules of inference of a “non-finitary” (“non-constructive”) character (§§1–4).I also wish to emphasize once more the part played by the concept of truth in relation to problems of this nature (§§5–8).At the end of this paper I shall give a result which was not touched upon in my earlier publications. It seems to be of interest for the reason (among others) that it is an example of a result obtained by a fruitful combination of the method of constructing undecidable statements (due to K. Gödel) with the results obtained in the theory of truth.1. Let us consider a formalized logical system L. Without giving a detailed description of the system we shall assume that it possesses the usual “finitary” (“constructive”) rules of inference, such as the rule of substitution and the rule of detachment (modus ponens), and that among the laws of the system are included all the postulates of the calculus of statements, and finally that the laws of the system suffice for the construction of the arithmetic of natural numbers. Moreover, the system L may be based upon the theory of types and so be the result of some formalization of Principia mathematica. It may also be a system which is independent of any theory of types and resembles Zermelo's set theory.


Author(s):  
Charles Sayward

<p>Russell held that the theory of natural numbers could be derived from three primitive concepts: number, successor and zero. This leaves out multiplication and addition. Russell introduces these concepts by recursive definition. It is argued that this does not render addition or multiplication any less primitive than the other three. To this it might be replied that any recursive definition can be transformed into a complete or explicit definition with the help of a little set theory. But that is a point about set theory, not number theory. We have learned more about the distinction between logic and set theory than was known in Russell's day, especially as this affects logicist aspirations.</p>


Author(s):  
Mary Tiles

The ‘continuum hypothesis’ (CH) asserts that there is no set intermediate in cardinality (‘size’) between the set of real numbers (the ‘continuum’) and the set of natural numbers. Since the continuum can be shown to have the same cardinality as the power set (that is, the set of subsets) of the natural numbers, CH is a special case of the ‘generalized continuum hypothesis’ (GCH), which says that for any infinite set, there is no set intermediate in cardinality between it and its power set. Cantor first proposed CH believing it to be true, but, despite persistent efforts, failed to prove it. König proved that the cardinality of the continuum cannot be the sum of denumerably many smaller cardinals, and it has been shown that this is the only restriction the accepted axioms of set theory place on its cardinality. Gödel showed that CH was consistent with these axioms and Cohen that its negation was. Together these results prove the independence of CH from the accepted axioms. Cantor proposed CH in the context of seeking to answer the question ‘What is the identifying nature of continuity?’. These independence results show that, whatever else has been gained from the introduction of transfinite set theory – including greater insight into the import of CH – it has not provided a basis for finally answering this question. This remains the case even when the axioms are supplemented in various plausible ways.


1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 396-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Mansfield

It is well known that the hypothesis that all real numbers are constructible in the sense of Gödel [1] implies the existence of a Σ21well-ordering of the Baire space [1, p. 67]. We are concerned with the converse to this theorem. From the assumption of the existence of a Σ21well-ordering with total domain, we derive various consequences which in the presence of a nonconstructible real seem highly pathological. However, while several of these consequences are obviously absurd, none have as yet been disproven. Indeed some of the stranger consistency proofs of Jensen seem to indicate that there is a possibility that they may be consistent. I am referring to such results as existence of a model for ZF set theory in which the degrees of constructibility form a sequence of typeω+ 1 with the (ω+ 1)st degree being the only one which contains a nonconstructible real, and that degree being the degree of a Δ31nonconstructible real.In what follows we shall use the small Greek lettersα, β, γto range over the Baire spaceNNwhereNis the set of natural numbers. We assume that the reader is familiar with the use of trees to encode closed subsets of this space. The class Σ21is the collection of all those subsets of the Baire space which can be defined by a formula which is Σ21in a constructible parameter. Correspondingly Π21will be taken to mean Π11in a constructible parameter. The proof of the first lemma is left as an exercise. It involves nothing more than coding perfect sets by trees and then counting quantifiers.


1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas D. Goodman

In this paper we introduce a new notion of realizability for intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types. The notion seems to us to capture some of the intuition underlying both the recursive realizability of Kjeene [5] and the semantics of Kripke [7]. After some preliminaries of a syntactic and recursion-theoretic character in §1, we motivate and define our notion of realizability in §2. In §3 we prove a soundness theorem, and in §4 we apply that theorem to obtain new information about provability in some extensions of intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types. In §5 we consider a special case of our general notion and prove a kind of reflection theorem for it. Finally, in §6, we consider a formalized version of our realizability notion and use it to give a new proof of the conservative extension theorem discussed in Goodman and Myhill [4] and proved in our [3]. (Apparently, a form of this result is also proved in Mine [13]. We have not seen this paper, but are relying on [12].) As a corollary, we obtain the following somewhat strengthened result: Let Σ be any extension of first-order intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) formalized in the language of HA. Let Σω be the theory obtained from Σ by adding functionals of finite type with intuitionistic logic, intensional identity, and axioms of choice and dependent choice at all types. Then Σω is a conservative extension of Σ. An interesting example of this theorem is obtained by taking Σ to be classical first-order arithmetic.


2004 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLIVER JENKINSON

Given a non-empty finite subset A of the natural numbers, let EA denote the set of irrationals x∈[0,1] whose continued fraction digits lie in A. In general, EA is a Cantor set whose Hausdorff dimension dim (EA) is between 0 and 1. It is shown that the set [Formula: see text] intersects [0,1/2] densely. We then describe a method for accurately computing dimensions dim (EA), and employ it to investigate numerically the way in which [Formula: see text] intersects [1/2,1]. These computations tend to support the conjecture, first formulated independently by Hensley, and by Mauldin & Urbański, that [Formula: see text] is dense in [0,1]. In the important special case A={1,2}, we use our computational method to give an accurate approximation of dim (E{1,2}), improving on the one given in [18].


1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaisi Takeuti

In this paper, by a function of ordinals we understand a function which is defined for all ordinals and each of whose value is an ordinal. In [7] (also cf. [8] or [9]) we defined recursive functions and predicates of ordinals, following Kleene's definition on natural numbers. A predicate will be called arithmetical, if it is obtained from a recursive predicate by prefixing a sequence of alternating quantifiers. A function will be called arithmetical, if its representing predicate is arithmetical.The cardinals are identified with those ordinals a which have larger power than all smaller ordinals than a. For any given ordinal a, we denote by the cardinal of a and by 2a the cardinal which is of the same power as the power set of a. Let χ be the function such that χ(a) is the least cardinal which is greater than a.Now there are functions of ordinals such that they are easily defined in set theory, but it seems impossible to define them as arithmetical ones; χ is such a function. If we define χ in making use of only the language on ordinals, it seems necessary to use the notion of all the functions from ordinals, e.g., as in [6].


2004 ◽  
Vol 89 (516) ◽  
pp. 403-408
Author(s):  
P. G. Brown

In many of the basic courses in Number Theory, Finite Mathematics and Cryptography we come across the so-called arithmetic functions such as ϕn), σ(n), τ(n), μ(n), etc, whose domain is the set of natural numbers. These functions are well known and evaluated through the prime factor decomposition of n. It is less well known that these functions possess inverses (with respect to Dirichlet multiplication) which have interesting properties and applications.


1992 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 1108-1119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Jäger ◽  
Barbara Primo

AbstractThis paper presents several proof-theoretic results concerning weak fixed point theories over second order number theory with arithmetic comprehension and full or restricted induction on the natural numbers. It is also shown that there are natural second order theories which are proof-theoretically equivalent but have different proof-theoretic ordinals.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Enos Masheija Rwantale Kiremire

<p>A matrix table of valence electron content of carbonyl clusters has been created using the 14n-based series. The numbers so generated form an array of series which conform precisely with valence electron contents of carbonyl clusters. The renowned 18 electron rule is a special case of 14n+4 series. Similarly, the 16 electron rule is another special case of the 14n+2 series. Categorization of the carbonyl clusters using the matrix table of series has been demonstrated. The table is so organized that clusters numerically represented can easily be compared and analyzed. The numbers that are diagonally arranged from right to left represent capping series. The row from right to left represents a decrease in valence electron content with increase in cluster linkages. The variation of cluster shapes of constant number of skeletal elements especially four or more may be monitored or compared with the variation with the valence electron content.</p>


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