scholarly journals A system of axiomatic set theory. Part III. Infinity and enumerability. Analysis

1942 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
Full Generality ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory

The foundation of analysis does not require the full generality of set theory but can be accomplished within a more restricted frame. Just as for number theory we need not introduce a set of all finite ordinals but only a class of all finite ordinals, all sets which occur being finite, so likewise for analysis we need not have a set of all real numbers but only a class of them, and the sets with which we have to deal are either finite or enumerable.We begin with the definitions of infinity and enumerability and with some consideration of these concepts on the basis of the axioms I—III, IV, V a, V b, which, as we shall see later, are sufficient for general set theory. Let us recall that the axioms I—III and V a suffice for establishing number theory, in particular for the iteration theorem, and for the theorems on finiteness.

Towards a consistent set-theory

1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Myhill
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Real Number ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Small Fragment ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
The Real ◽  
Classical Construction

In a previous paper, I proved the consistency of a non-finitary system of logic based on the theory of types, which was shown to contain the axiom of reducibility in a form which seemed not to interfere with the classical construction of real numbers. A form of the system containing a strong axiom of choice was also proved consistent.It seems to me now that the real-number approach used in that paper, though valid, was not the most fruitful one. We can, on the lines therein suggested, prove the consistency of axioms closely resembling Tarski's twenty axioms for the real numbers; but this, from the standpoint of mathematical practice, is a pitifully small fragment of analysis. The consistency of a fairly strong set-theory can be proved, using the results of my previous paper, with little more difficulty than that of the Tarski axioms; this being the case, it would seem a saving in effort to derive the consistency of such a theory first, then to strengthen that theory (if possible) in such ways as can be shown to preserve consistency; and finally to derive from the system thus strengthened, if need be, a more usable real-number theory. The present paper is meant to achieve the first part of this program. The paragraphs of this paper are numbered consecutively with those of my previous paper, of which it is to be regarded as a continuation.

Inconsistency of uncountable infinite sets under ZFC framework

Kybernetes ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wujia Zhu ◽  
Yi Lin ◽  
Guoping Du ◽  
Ningsheng Gong
Keyword(s):  
Natural Number ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Infinite Sets ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory ◽  
First Time

PurposeThe purpose is to show that all uncountable infinite sets are self‐contradictory non‐sets.Design/methodology/approachA conceptual approach is taken in the paper.FindingsGiven the fact that the set N={x|n(x)} of all natural numbers, where n(x)=df “x is a natural number” is a self‐contradicting non‐set in this paper, the authors prove that in the framework of modern axiomatic set theory ZFC, various uncountable infinite sets are either non‐existent or self‐contradicting non‐sets. Therefore, it can be astonishingly concluded that in both the naive set theory or the modern axiomatic set theory, if any of the actual infinite sets exists, it must be a self‐contradicting non‐set.Originality/valueThe first time in history, it is shown that such convenient notion as the set of all real numbers needs to be reconsidered.

scholarly journals A system of axiomatic set theory. Part V. General set theory (continued)

1943 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Recursive Definition ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory

We have still to consider the extension of the methods of number theory to infinite ordinals—or to transfinite numbers as they may also, as usual, be called.The means for establishing number theory are, as we know, recursive definition, complete induction, and the “principle of the least number.” The last of these applies to arbitrary ordinals as well as to finite ordinals, since every nonempty class of ordinals has a lowest element. Hence immediately results also the following generalization of complete induction, called transfinite induction: If A is a class of ordinals such that (1) ΟηA, and (2) αηA → α′ηA, and (3) for every limiting number l, (x)(xεl → xηA) → lηA, then every ordinal belongs to A.

A system of axiomatic set theory—Part VI

1948 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory ◽  
Present Section

Comparability of classes. Till now we tried to get along without the axioms Vc and Vd. We found that this is possible in number theory and analysis as well as in general set theory, even keeping in the main to the usual way of procedure.For the considerations of the present section application of the axioms Vc, Vd is essential. Our axiomatic basis here consists of the axioms I—III, V*, Vc, and Vd. From V*, as we know, Va and Vb are derivable. We here take axiom V* in order to separate the arguments requiring the axiom of choice from the others. Instead of the two axioms V* and Vc, as was observed in Part II, V** may be taken as well.

scholarly journals Dedekind’s Mathematical Structuralism: From Galois Theory to Numbers, Sets, and Functions

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-87
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós ◽  
Erich H. Reck
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Galois Theory ◽  
Algebraic Number Theory ◽  
Logical Framework ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
Methodological Choices ◽  
Infinite Systems ◽  
Early Adoption ◽  
Mathematical Structuralism

This essay concerns Dedekind’s “mathematical structuralism,”by which we mean methodological features characteristic for the approach to mathematics in his mature writings. The discussion starts with some background on forerunners, especially Gauss, Dirichlet, and Riemann, whose “conceptual” style of work influenced him strongly. But Dedekind went further than them, by making methodological choices that are more distinctly and fully “structuralist”. This includes his resolute acceptance of actually infinite systems, understood within a “logical” framework, and studied not just axiomatically, but also in terms of isomorphisms and related notions (since 1871). As an illustration, the essay discusses his early adoption and strikingly modern transformation of Galois theory, together with his contributions to algebraic number theory. After that, the essayturns to Dedekind’s more “foundational” contributions, i.e., his writings on the real numbers, the natural numbers, and set theory. It shows that the same methodological choices inform them. Yet his approach kept evolving in subtle ways too, especially in terms of the centrality of functions (Abbildungen, mappings).

scholarly journals A system of axiomatic set theory - Part VII

1954 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Basic Set ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory

The reader of Part VI will have noticed that among the set-theoretic models considered there some models were missing which were announced in Part II for certain proofs of independence. These models will be supplied now.Mainly two models have to be constructed: one with the property that there exists a set which is its own only element, and another in which the axioms I–III and VII, but not Va, are satisfied. In either case we need not satisfy the axiom of infinity. Thereby it becomes possible to set up the models on the basis of only I–III, and either VII or Va, a basis from which number theory can be obtained as we saw in Part II.On both these bases the Π0-system of Part VI, which satisfies the axioms I–V and VII, but not VI, can be constructed, as we stated there. An isomorphic model can also be obtained on that basis, by first setting up number theory as in Part II, and then proceeding as Ackermann did.Let us recall the main points of this procedure.For the sake of clarity in the discussion of this and the subsequent models, it will be necessary to distinguish precisely between the concepts which are relative to the basic set-theoretic system, and those which are relative to the model to be defined.

The General Idea Behind Gödel’s Proof

1992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond M. Smullyan
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Idea ◽  
Original Proof ◽  
Extensive Class ◽  
The One ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory ◽  
Gödel’S Theorem ◽  
Mathematical Systems

In the next several chapters we will be studying incompleteness proofs for various axiomatizations of arithmetic. Gödel, 1931, carried out his original proof for axiomatic set theory, but the method is equally applicable to axiomatic number theory. The incompleteness of axiomatic number theory is actually a stronger result since it easily yields the incompleteness of axiomatic set theory. Gödel begins his memorable paper with the following startling words. . . . “The development of mathematics in the direction of greater precision has led to large areas of it being formalized, so that proofs can be carried out according to a few mechanical rules. The most comprehensive formal systems to date are, on the one hand, the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell and, on the other hand, the Zermelo-Fraenkel system of axiomatic set theory. Both systems are so extensive that all methods of proof used in mathematics today can be formalized in them—i.e. can be reduced to a few axioms and rules of inference. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to surmise that these axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide all mathematical questions which can be formulated in the system concerned. In what follows it will be shown that this is not the case, but rather that, in both of the cited systems, there exist relatively simple problems of the theory of ordinary whole numbers which cannot be decided on the basis of the axioms.” . . . Gödel then goes on to explain that the situation does not depend on the special nature of the two systems under consideration but holds for an extensive class of mathematical systems. Just what is this “extensive class” of mathematical systems? Various interpretations of this phrase have been given, and Gödel’s theorem has accordingly been generalized in several ways. We will consider many such generalizations in the course of this volume. Curiously enough, one of the generalizations that is most direct and most easily accessible to the general reader is also the one that appears to be the least well known.

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