Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Issue Linkages

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.

The Breakdown of International Negotiations: Social Conflicts, Audience Costs, and Reputation in Two-Level Games

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Janusch
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Social Conflicts ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Conflict Intensity ◽  
Goal Conflicts ◽  
Classical Hypothesis ◽  
Issue Linkages

This article examines whether the two-level game can theoretically explain negotiation breakdowns without referring to uncertainty alone. For this purpose, social conflicts are integrated in the two-level game. In this light, the classical hypothesis that smaller win-sets increase the risk of a negotiation breakdown can no longer be maintained. Instead, conflict intensity – and thereby the risk of breakdown – correlates with the intersection of the win-sets in the form of an inverted U-curve. It follows that negotiations are most likely to break down when the intersection of the win-sets is perceived as medium-sized, because the bargaining space and thereby the potential of conflict intensity is largest/highest. Furthermore, the insertion of social conflicts into the equation runs counter to the hypothesis that issue linkages facilitate international cooperation. On the contrary, issue linkages increase the risk that goal conflicts, in particular, intensify each other by spreading from one issue to another.

"Learning and living democracy for all". Council of Europe Programme promoting Citizenship and Human Rights Education

CADMO ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 47-54
Author(s):  
Yulia Pererva
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Democratic Citizenship ◽  
Human Rights Education ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Member States ◽  
Close Cooperation

- Since 1997, the Council of Europe has supported a Project on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights (EDC/HRE) with the aim of complimenting its treaty related activities in the fields of Human and Social Rights. The article presents the programmes and the initiatives supported and developed by the Council of Europe both at an international and at the national levels as well as the most important adopted texts and publications. It outlines the principles on which partnership and networking are built by the Council of Europe in close cooperation with member states and other regional and international institutions.Keywords human rights education, education for democratic citizenship, international cooperation.

scholarly journals Book Review: Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need It Most. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 694-699
Author(s):  
Oliver Stuenkel
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Economic Linkages

In Gridlock, Thomas Hale, David Held and Kevin Young argue that the previous successes of international cooperation, by facilitating peace and fostering economic linkages, have deepened interdependence to the point where international cooperation is now more difficult. That suggests that global governance successfully dealt with problems it was initially designed to address, but failed to address problems which have emerged from their very existence. Put differently, interdependence not only creates a demand for international institutions, but effective international institutions also create a structure that, in turn, generates an even stronger interdependence.DOI: 10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n3p694-699

Producing European armaments: Policymaking preferences and processes

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc R DeVore
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Scale Economies ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Policy Tools ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Industrial Base ◽  
Security Actor

Nothing is more important to Europe’s future as a security actor than supplying its armed forces with modern weaponry. Because individual states lack the research and development budgets and scale economies to remain autarkic, the survival of Europe’s defence-industrial base depends on international cooperation. As in other areas of international affairs, the ability of states to cooperate ‘under anarchy’ is inextricably tied to the existence of international institutions. However, the nature of arms production renders the design of institutions particularly challenging. Problems lie in both the multiplicity of potential cooperative outcomes and the variety of policy tools available. Ultimately, the choice of policies and policy tools can generate friction between the key groups of actors involved in defence-industrial policymaking. This study systematically explores how variations in the structure of international armaments institutions have shaped both the influence of different groups of actors and the nature of collaborative weapons projects. To preview my conclusions, three broad trends can be observed in the evolution of armaments institutions. These are as follows: (1) the gradual incorporation of a larger number of actors into the arms cooperation process; (2) the incremental exclusion of military professionals from armaments institutions; and (3) the growing influence of corporate actors.

International Cooperation Theory and International Institutions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinyuan Dai ◽  
Duncan Snidal ◽  
Michael Sampson
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
21St Century ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Past ◽  
Game Theoretic

The study of international cooperation has emerged and evolved over the past few decades as a cornerstone of international relations research. The strategy here for reviewing such a large literature is to focus primarily on the rational choice and game theoretic approaches that instigated it and have subsequently guided its advance. Without these theoretical efforts, the study of international cooperation could not have made nearly as much progress—and it certainly would not have taken the form it does in the 21st century. Through this lens, we can identify major themes in this literature and highlight key challenges for future research

International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization

2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINA L. DAVIS
Keyword(s):  
Policy Process ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Agricultural Trade ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Agricultural Trade Liberalization ◽  
Group Mobilization ◽  
And Shifts ◽  
The Eu

This article explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the agricultural sector, which has been among the most difficult sectors for governments to liberalize. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues encourages agricultural liberalization in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of key negotiations, I first examine why countries choose to link issues, then show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to promote liberalization.

scholarly journals Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations: Theoretical Contributions of the Debate between New Realism and Neoliberalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 659-670
Author(s):  
Omran Ali
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Main Issue ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
New Realism ◽  
Conflict And Cooperation

This paper deals with the debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism within the field of international relations and highlights the most important propositions of the two theories, especially regarding their views on the structure of international relations and whether it is characterized by anarchy and conflict or cooperation. The study of conflict and cooperation in international relations has been one of the main tasks of research and analysis for theorists and researchers of international relations, and this conflict-cooperation nexus has become the main issue in the debate between the two prevailing theories in international relations. Neorealism and neoliberalism are the most influential theories on international relations, and the debate between them has considered one of the most important one in the field of international relations. This research seeks to clarify and explain the theoretical contributions of each of the two theories regarding conflict and cooperation in international relations, and the extent to which neoliberal assumptions, especially with regard to the role of international institutions in increasing international cooperation, has contributed to reducing the dominance of the realistic vision in international relations, especially with regard to conflict and anarchy. It argues that the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism did not significantly contribute to developing the theory of international relations, as this debate did not contribute significantly to reducing the dominance of power politics in international relations and solving the international problems resulting from it.

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