On the possibility of a Σ21well-ordering of the Baire space

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 396-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Mansfield

It is well known that the hypothesis that all real numbers are constructible in the sense of Gödel [1] implies the existence of a Σ21well-ordering of the Baire space [1, p. 67]. We are concerned with the converse to this theorem. From the assumption of the existence of a Σ21well-ordering with total domain, we derive various consequences which in the presence of a nonconstructible real seem highly pathological. However, while several of these consequences are obviously absurd, none have as yet been disproven. Indeed some of the stranger consistency proofs of Jensen seem to indicate that there is a possibility that they may be consistent. I am referring to such results as existence of a model for ZF set theory in which the degrees of constructibility form a sequence of typeω+ 1 with the (ω+ 1)st degree being the only one which contains a nonconstructible real, and that degree being the degree of a Δ31nonconstructible real.In what follows we shall use the small Greek lettersα, β, γto range over the Baire spaceNNwhereNis the set of natural numbers. We assume that the reader is familiar with the use of trees to encode closed subsets of this space. The class Σ21is the collection of all those subsets of the Baire space which can be defined by a formula which is Σ21in a constructible parameter. Correspondingly Π21will be taken to mean Π11in a constructible parameter. The proof of the first lemma is left as an exercise. It involves nothing more than coding perfect sets by trees and then counting quantifiers.

1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang

It is known that we can introduce in number theory (for example, the system Z of Hilbert-Bernays) by induction schemata certain predicates of natural numbers which cannot be expressed explicitly within the framework of number theory. The question arises how we can define these predicates in some richer system, without employing induction schemata. In this paper a general notion of definability by induction (relative to number theory), which seems to apply to all the known predicates of this kind, is introduced; and it is proved that in a system L1 which forms an extension of number theory all predicates which are definable by induction (hereafter to be abbreviated d.i.) according to the definition are explicitly expressible.In order to define such predicates and prove theorems answering to their induction schemata, we have to allow certain impredicative classes in L1. However, if we want merely to prove that for each constant number the special case of the induction schema for a predicate d.i. is provable, we do not have to assume the existence of impredicative classes. A certain weaker system L2, in which only predicative classes of natural numbers are allowed, is sufficient for the purpose. It is noted that a truth definition for number theory can be obtained in L2. Consistency proofs for number theory do not seem to be formalizable in L2, although they can, it is observed, be formalized in L1.In general, given any ordinary formal system (say Zermelo set theory), it is possible to define by induction schemata, in the same manner as in number theory, certain predicates which are not explicitly definable in the system. Here again, by extending the system in an analogous fashion, these predicates become expressible in the resulting system. The crucial predicate instrumental to obtaining a truth definition for a given system is taken as an example.


Kybernetes ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 453-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wujia Zhu ◽  
Yi Lin ◽  
Guoping Du ◽  
Ningsheng Gong

PurposeThe purpose is to show that all uncountable infinite sets are self‐contradictory non‐sets.Design/methodology/approachA conceptual approach is taken in the paper.FindingsGiven the fact that the set N={x|n(x)} of all natural numbers, where n(x)=df “x is a natural number” is a self‐contradicting non‐set in this paper, the authors prove that in the framework of modern axiomatic set theory ZFC, various uncountable infinite sets are either non‐existent or self‐contradicting non‐sets. Therefore, it can be astonishingly concluded that in both the naive set theory or the modern axiomatic set theory, if any of the actual infinite sets exists, it must be a self‐contradicting non‐set.Originality/valueThe first time in history, it is shown that such convenient notion as the set of all real numbers needs to be reconsidered.


1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaisi Takeuti

In this paper, by a function of ordinals we understand a function which is defined for all ordinals and each of whose value is an ordinal. In [7] (also cf. [8] or [9]) we defined recursive functions and predicates of ordinals, following Kleene's definition on natural numbers. A predicate will be called arithmetical, if it is obtained from a recursive predicate by prefixing a sequence of alternating quantifiers. A function will be called arithmetical, if its representing predicate is arithmetical.The cardinals are identified with those ordinals a which have larger power than all smaller ordinals than a. For any given ordinal a, we denote by the cardinal of a and by 2a the cardinal which is of the same power as the power set of a. Let χ be the function such that χ(a) is the least cardinal which is greater than a.Now there are functions of ordinals such that they are easily defined in set theory, but it seems impossible to define them as arithmetical ones; χ is such a function. If we define χ in making use of only the language on ordinals, it seems necessary to use the notion of all the functions from ordinals, e.g., as in [6].


1942 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays

The foundation of analysis does not require the full generality of set theory but can be accomplished within a more restricted frame. Just as for number theory we need not introduce a set of all finite ordinals but only a class of all finite ordinals, all sets which occur being finite, so likewise for analysis we need not have a set of all real numbers but only a class of them, and the sets with which we have to deal are either finite or enumerable.We begin with the definitions of infinity and enumerability and with some consideration of these concepts on the basis of the axioms I—III, IV, V a, V b, which, as we shall see later, are sufficient for general set theory. Let us recall that the axioms I—III and V a suffice for establishing number theory, in particular for the iteration theorem, and for the theorems on finiteness.


Author(s):  
Susan D'Agostino

“Proceed with care, because some infinities are larger than others” explains in detail why the infinite set of real numbers—all of the numbers on the number line—represents a far larger infinity than the infinite set of natural numbers—the counting numbers. Readers learn to distinguish between countable infinity and uncountable infinity by way of a method known as a “one-to-one correspondence.” Mathematics students and enthusiasts are encouraged to proceed with care in both mathematics and life, lest they confuse countable infinity with uncountable infinity, large with unfathomably large, or order with disorder. At the chapter’s end, readers may check their understanding by working on a problem. A solution is provided.


1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1379-1428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan Bagaria ◽  
W. Hugh Woodin

Some of the most striking results in modern set theory have emerged from the study of simply-definable sets of real numbers. Indeed, simple questions like: what are the posible cardinalities?, are they measurable?, do they have the property of Baire?, etc., cannot be answered in ZFC.When one restricts the attention to the analytic sets, i.e., the continuous images of Borel sets, then ZFC does provide an answer to these questions. But this is no longer true for the projective sets, i.e., all the sets of reals that can be obtained from the Borel sets by taking continuous images and complements. In this paper we shall concentrate on particular projective classes, the , and using forcing constructions we will produce models of ZFC where, for some n, all , sets have some specified property. For the definition and basic facts about the projective classes , and , as well as the Kleene (or lightface) classes , and , we refer the reader to Moschovakis [19].The first part of the paper is about measure and category. Early in this century, Luzin [16] and Luzin-Sierpiński [17] showed that all analytic (i.e., ) sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable and have the property of Baire.


1939 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Tarski

It is my intention in this paper to add somewhat to the observations already made in my earlier publications on the existence of undecidable statements in systems of logic possessing rules of inference of a “non-finitary” (“non-constructive”) character (§§1–4).I also wish to emphasize once more the part played by the concept of truth in relation to problems of this nature (§§5–8).At the end of this paper I shall give a result which was not touched upon in my earlier publications. It seems to be of interest for the reason (among others) that it is an example of a result obtained by a fruitful combination of the method of constructing undecidable statements (due to K. Gödel) with the results obtained in the theory of truth.1. Let us consider a formalized logical system L. Without giving a detailed description of the system we shall assume that it possesses the usual “finitary” (“constructive”) rules of inference, such as the rule of substitution and the rule of detachment (modus ponens), and that among the laws of the system are included all the postulates of the calculus of statements, and finally that the laws of the system suffice for the construction of the arithmetic of natural numbers. Moreover, the system L may be based upon the theory of types and so be the result of some formalization of Principia mathematica. It may also be a system which is independent of any theory of types and resembles Zermelo's set theory.


Author(s):  
Radim Bělohlávek ◽  
Joseph W. Dauben ◽  
George J. Klir

The chapter begins by introducing the important and useful distinction between the research agendas of fuzzy logic in the narrow and the broad senses. The chapter deals with the latter agenda, whose ultimate goal is to employ intuitive fuzzy set theory for emulating commonsense human reasoning in natural language and other unique capabilities of human beings. Restricting to standard fuzzy sets, whose membership degrees are real numbers in the unit interval [0,1], the chapter describes how this broad agenda has become increasingly specific via the gradual development of standard fuzzy set theory and the associated fuzzy logic. An overview of currently recognized nonstandard fuzzy sets, which open various new directions in fuzzy logic, is presented in the last section of this chapter.


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