Robert L. Martin. Toward a solution to the liar paradox. The philosophical review, vol. 76(1967), pp. 279–311. - Robert L. Martin. On Grelling's paradox. The philosophical review, vol. 77 (1968), pp. 321–331. - Bas C. van Fraassen. Presupposition, implication, and self-reference. The journal of philosophy, vol. 65 (1968), pp. 136–152. - Brian Skyrms. Return of the liar: three-valued logic and the concept of truth. American philosophical quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), pp. 153–161. - Robert L. Martin. Preface. The paradox of the liar, edited by Robert L. Martin, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1970, p. vii.

1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 584-587
Author(s):  
James Cargile
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
New Haven ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Yale University ◽  
Philosophical Review ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Self Reference

Tarski on the Concept of Truth

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Ray
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
What Is Said ◽  
Truth Definition ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Alfred Tarski’s work on truth has been so central to the discourse on truth that most coming to it for the first time have probably already heard a great deal about what is said there. Unfortunately, since the work is largely technical and Tarski was only tangentially philosophical, a certain incautious assimilation dominates many philosophical discussions of Tarski’s ideas, and so, examining Tarski on the concept of truth is in many ways an act of unlearning. This chapter will focus on key ideas in Tarski’s work that have had a lasting impact: T-sentence, Convention T, Tarskian truth definition, and Tarski’s general limiting theses on the expressibility and definability of truth. Though these ideas are familiar in name, the chapter seeks to uncover and remove certain widespread misunderstandings. Tarski’s name also features prominently in discussions of the liar paradox, so we will discuss Tarski’s misunderstood connection to this ancient puzzle.

scholarly journals Gestalt Shifts in the Liar orWhy KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Bobzien ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Truth Predicate ◽  
Free Solution ◽  
Formal Representation ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Truth Operator

This chapter offers a revenge-free solution to the liar paradox and presents a formal representation of truth in, or for, a natural language like English, which proposes to show both why (and how) truth is coherent and how it appears to be incoherent, while preserving classical logic and most principles that some philosophers have taken to be central to the concept of truth and our use of that notion. The chapter argues that, by using a truth operator rather than truth predicate, it is possible to provide a coherent, model-theoretic representation of truth with various desirable features. After investigating what features of liar sentences are responsible for their paradoxicality, the chapter identifies the logic as the normal modal logic KT4M. Drawing on the structure of KT4M, the author proposes that, pace deflationism, truth has content, that the content of truth is bivalence, and that the notions of both truth and bivalence are semideterminable.

Dialetheism and the Problem of the Missing Difference

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Gregory Scott Moss
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Classical Model ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Liar ◽  
Philosophical Community ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Self Reference ◽  
Graham Priest

Abstract During the past few decades, Graham Priest has advocated for Dialetheism, the controversial position that some contradictions are true. Dialetheism entails that the Law of Non-Contradiction fails. In recent decades the philosophical community has begun to recognize the significant challenge posed by Priest’s arguments. Priest has primarily appealed to paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar Paradox, to support his position. Following Priest’s approach, I offer another argument for Dialetheism, which appeals to a self-referential paradox that has been more or less ignored in the philosophical literature on the subject: the paradox of the missing difference. When we reflect on the question ‘what is a concept?’ from the perspective of a classical model of conceptual analysis, we arrive at the paradox of the missing difference. Although contradictions may be improbable, when we reflect on the question ‘how is the domain of concepts possible?’ we are led to a startling principle: without dialetheia any theory concerning concept formation (from a classical perspective on concepts) would be impossible. Dialetheism is a necessary condition for the existence of a domain of concepts in general. As a result, Dialetheism may even be more central to philosophical reflection than even dialetheists themselves have recognized.

scholarly journals Not Wanted: On Scharp’s Solution to the Liar

Erkenntnis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Pinder
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Liar Sentence ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Resultant Theory ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

AbstractKevin Scharp argues that the concept of truth is defective, and is therefore unable to play its intended role in natural language truth-conditional semantics. As such, for this theoretical purpose, Scharp constructs two replacements: ascending truth and descending truth. Scharp applies the resultant theory, AD semantics, to the liar sentence, thereby obtaining a novel solution to the liar paradox. The aim of the present paper is fourfold. First, I show that, contrary to Scharp’s claims, AD semantics in fact yields an inconsistency when applied to standard liar sentences. Second, I diagnose the problem: AD semantics mishandles negation. I propose an alternative treatment, resulting in what I call AD* semantics. Third, I show that AD* semantics gives Scharp the resources required to respond to an alleged revenge paradox that has been raised against his view. Finally, I argue that, these consequences notwithstanding, it remains unclear whether AD* semantics provides an adequate account of alethic paradoxes more generally.

scholarly journals Truth-Teller–Liar Puzzles with Self-Reference

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
Laith Alzboon ◽  
Benedek Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Graph Representation ◽  
Commonsense Reasoning ◽  
Truth Teller ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Self Reference

In this paper, we use commonsense reasoning and graph representation to study logical puzzles with three types of people. Strong Truth-Tellers say only true atomic statements, Strong Liars say only false atomic statements, and Strong Crazy people say only self-contradicting statements. Self-contradicting statements are connected to the Liar paradox, i.e., no Truth-Teller or a Liar could say “I am a Liar”. A puzzle is clear if it only contains its given statements to solve it, and a puzzle is good if it has exactly one solution. It is known that there is no clear and good Strong Truth-Teller–Strong Liar (also called SS) puzzle. However, as we prove here, there are good and clear Strong Truth-Teller, Strong Liar and Strong Crazy puzzles (SSS-puzzles). The newly investigated type ‘Crazy’ drastically changes the scenario. Some properties of the new types of puzzles are analyzed, and some statistics are also given.

Pluralism and the Liar

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory Wright ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

Microlanguages, Vagueness, and Paradox

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Static Picture ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.

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