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Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

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Microlanguages, Vagueness, and Paradox

10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0006 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Peter Ludlow ◽

Bradley Armour-Garb

Keyword(s):

Recent Work ◽

Dynamic Theory ◽

Liar Paradox ◽

Context Sensitivity ◽

Static Picture ◽

The Liar ◽

The Liar Paradox

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.

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Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Bradley Armour-Garb ◽

Bradley Armour-Garb

Keyword(s):

Liar Paradox ◽

The Liar ◽

The Liar Paradox

In this chapter, after introducing a few versions of the liar paradox and identifying the pathology that the versions of the paradox appear to present, the author considers some proposals for how to understand ‘paradox’ and goes on to offer a particular reading of that notion. He then identifies a number of projects the completion of which would contribute to our understanding—or, in some cases, our resolution—of the liar paradox and, after considering certain “treatments” of the paradox, highlights certain “revenge” problems that arise for such treatments. In the concluding section, the author summarizes each of the chapters that are contained in the volume.

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The Liar Without Relativism

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-020-00350-0 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Poppy Mankowitz

Keyword(s):

Natural Language ◽

Recent Literature ◽

Liar Paradox ◽

Full Understanding ◽

Truth Values ◽

The Liar ◽

The Liar Paradox ◽

Semantic Relativism

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.

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