“Secret Wars,” Self-Defense and the Charter—A Reply to Professor Moore

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 568-583
Author(s):  
James P. Rowles

In a recent article entitled The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, Professor John Norton Moore, a staunch defender of United States actions toward Nicaragua, sets forth a comprehensive array of factual assertions and legal arguments to support his conclusions that support by the United States of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries or “contras” and its own actions against Nicaragua are justified as collective self-defense under international law. He also presents arguments to support his conclusion that the International Court of Justice has so exceeded its authority in exercising jurisdiction in the case of Nicaragua v. United States that its decisions are void, and consequently may be ignored by the United States—or, for that matter, Nicaragua. Professor Moore’s analysis and conclusions differ sharply from those of the present writer. It should therefore be useful to identify the main points of disagreement, and to suggest the policy implications of the different legal arguments and conclusions.

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Highet

The decision in the Nicaragua case is one of the most important judgments ever delivered by the International Court. It is by far the “heaviest” case, in the parlance of the English barrister, ever decided by the Court in the absence of a party. It has broken new ground for the application of Article 53 of the Statute. It deals in detail with the multilateral treaty reservation of the United States (the “Vandenberg amendment”). It contains provocative reasoning about the genesis and maintenance of rules of customary international law, separate from treaties such as the United Nations Charter. It contains seminal findings on the use of force and the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. It presents fresh and doubtless controversial interpretations of the principle of nonintervention. It prescribes limits to “collective counter-measures” in response to conduct not deemed to amount to “armed attacks.”


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis A. Boyle

The only significant point of disagreement this author might have with the June 27, 1986 decision on the merits by the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America concerns its failure to hold the United States Government fully responsible for the violations of the laws and customs of warfare committed by the contra forces in Nicaragua. The Court carefully premised this result on the finding that it had insufficient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion on such a delicate matter. Nevertheless, the Court held it established that the U.S. Government largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras. Somewhat questionably, in the Court’s estimation, it remained to be proven that the Reagan administration actually exercised operational control over the contra forces.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-166
Author(s):  
Fred L. Morrison

The opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case will be of interest primarily because of its general pronouncements on questions of international law. Its impact on the immediate controversy appears slight; the United States Government has strongly indicated its view that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, has vetoed subsequent proposed Security Council resolutions on the subject, and is appropriating additional funds for the contested activities, without apparent reference to the Court’s decision. This Comment is limited to the general theoretical and legal issues and will not treat the underlying factual issues, the Court’s disposition of the immediate case or the implications of the opinion for the evolution of the dispute.


2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Matheson ◽  
Sara Bickler

The International Law Commission held its fifty-fifth session in Geneva from May 5 to June 6, and from July 7 to August 8, 2003, under the chairmanship of Enrique Candioti of Argentina. The Commission elected Roman Kolodkin of the Russian Federation, Constantin Economides of Greece, Teodor Melescanu of Romania, and Michael Matheson of the United States to fill the vacancies resulting from the death of Valery Kuznetsov of the Russian Federation, the election of Bruno Simma of Germany and Peter Tomka of Slovakia to the International Court of Justice, and the resignation of Robert Rosenstock of the United States.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Michael Reisman ◽  
Andrea Armstrong

The claim by the United States to a right of what has come to be known as “preemptive selfdefense” has provoked deep anxiety and soul-searching among the members of the college of international lawyers. Some have feared that the claim signaled a demand for the prospective legitimation of “Pearl Harbor” types of actions, that is, sudden, massive, and destructive military actions “out of the blue,” by one state against another in the absence of a state of war, with the objective of militarily neutralizing or even eliminating a latent or potential adversary. Since some public intellectuals within the American political system had recommended such a strategy with respect to the People’s Republic of China in the midst of the Cold War, the anxiety could not be dismissed as entirely unfounded or even hysterical. Nor could it be ignored as if it were some sort of exclusively American aberration that could be tolerated as the idiosyncrasy of one state. From the earliest unilateral claims to a continental shelf, a copycat or mimetic dynamic in modern international law has taken shape whenever an enhancement of state power has become available, so that the possibility of similar claims to an expanded notion of preemptive self-defense by many other states could not be excluded. Indeed, while the United States may now have retreated somewhat from its 2002 broad claim to preemption, various other states (including some with nuclear weapons) have adopted the preemptive self-defense claim as their own. If the U.S. claim posed potentially destabilizing consequences for world order, how much more so would proliferation of the claim?


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle ◽  
Evan Fox-Decent

AbstractThis Article challenges the conventional wisdom that states are always free to choose whether to participate in multilateral regimes. International law often mandates multilateralism to ensure that state laws and practices are compatible with sovereign equality and joint stewardship. The Article maps mandatory multilateralism's domain, defines its requirements, and examines its application to three controversies: the South China Sea dispute, the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, and Bolivia's case against Chile in the International Court of Justice.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Scott ◽  
Craig L. Carr

The refusal of the United States to consider itself bound by the recent decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, coupled with the earlier termination of its adherence to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has sparked a small storm of controversy and concern. Part of this concern involves how the United States, presumably a law-abiding and law-respecting nation, could possibly bring itself to snub the International Court of Justice and, by extension, the ideal of international law. Another part of this concern involves the likely consequences of the United States move on the vitality of the Court as the focal institution of a slowly evolving system of international law. A less obvious concern, but arguably one of paramount importance, calls into question the wisdom of insisting that the ICJ retain its optional compulsory jurisdiction. It is this less obvious concern that we propose to discuss here.


Author(s):  
John B. Nann ◽  
Morris L. Cohen

This chapter discusses sources of information about international law and civil law in the United States. In beginning to look at U.S. practice in international law, a researcher needs to consider the sources of the law. The most important sources that may impose requirements or restrictions are treaties, which are agreements entered into between states. When approaching treaty research, researchers must consider three major steps. First, they must identify and locate the treaty; second, they must determine whether the treaty is “in force” and against whom; and third, they must consider how the terms of the treaty will be interpreted. In addition to treaties, the main sources of international law included in the Statute of the International Court of Justice are customary law, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the writings of scholars or other publicists. The chapter then considers the place civil law had in the historical development of American law.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm D. Evans ◽  
Martin Mennecke ◽  
Christian J. Tams

In the LaGrand case, the United States found themselves for the second time within three years before the International Court of Justice dealing with the death penalty imposed on foreign nationals in the United States.1 In contrast to the earlier case filed by Paraguay, the German-sponsored LaGrand case survived the provisional measures phase and went on to the merits stage. In its judgment of 27 June 2001, the Court largely affirmed all four German submissions and ruled that the United States had violated international law.


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