The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Scott ◽  
Craig L. Carr

The refusal of the United States to consider itself bound by the recent decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, coupled with the earlier termination of its adherence to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has sparked a small storm of controversy and concern. Part of this concern involves how the United States, presumably a law-abiding and law-respecting nation, could possibly bring itself to snub the International Court of Justice and, by extension, the ideal of international law. Another part of this concern involves the likely consequences of the United States move on the vitality of the Court as the focal institution of a slowly evolving system of international law. A less obvious concern, but arguably one of paramount importance, calls into question the wisdom of insisting that the ICJ retain its optional compulsory jurisdiction. It is this less obvious concern that we propose to discuss here.

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-182

In the wake of President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reimpose sanctions, Iran instituted proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In its application, filed on July 16, 2018, Iran alleged that the re-imposition of sanctions constituted a violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Treaty of Amity) between Iran and the United States. In order to prevent “irreparable damages” to the Iranian economy, Iran simultaneously filed a request for provisional measures. After the ICJ issued an order unanimously granting limited provisional measures on October 3, 2018, the United States announced its intention to terminate the Treaty of Amity. The United States issued its first phase of sanctions on August 7, 2018, and the remaining sanctions took effect on November 5, 2018.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis A. Boyle

The only significant point of disagreement this author might have with the June 27, 1986 decision on the merits by the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America concerns its failure to hold the United States Government fully responsible for the violations of the laws and customs of warfare committed by the contra forces in Nicaragua. The Court carefully premised this result on the finding that it had insufficient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion on such a delicate matter. Nevertheless, the Court held it established that the U.S. Government largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras. Somewhat questionably, in the Court’s estimation, it remained to be proven that the Reagan administration actually exercised operational control over the contra forces.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-166
Author(s):  
Fred L. Morrison

The opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case will be of interest primarily because of its general pronouncements on questions of international law. Its impact on the immediate controversy appears slight; the United States Government has strongly indicated its view that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, has vetoed subsequent proposed Security Council resolutions on the subject, and is appropriating additional funds for the contested activities, without apparent reference to the Court’s decision. This Comment is limited to the general theoretical and legal issues and will not treat the underlying factual issues, the Court’s disposition of the immediate case or the implications of the opinion for the evolution of the dispute.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle ◽  
Evan Fox-Decent

AbstractThis Article challenges the conventional wisdom that states are always free to choose whether to participate in multilateral regimes. International law often mandates multilateralism to ensure that state laws and practices are compatible with sovereign equality and joint stewardship. The Article maps mandatory multilateralism's domain, defines its requirements, and examines its application to three controversies: the South China Sea dispute, the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, and Bolivia's case against Chile in the International Court of Justice.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. LE MON

Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case, US courts have had a mixed record in applying the decision domestically. In this article, I examine the treatment by US courts of claims by criminal defendants alleging Vienna Convention violations, subsequent to the Avena judgment. First, I discuss the two limited decisions so far taken by the US Supreme Court regarding the Vienna Convention, and briefly explain several of the judicially-created rules that have prevented most US courts from reaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims. Next, I analyse the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, and provide an overview of the reception of that case by the US courts. After a summary of the Avena decision, I turn to the latest cases in which Vienna Convention claims based on Avena have been raised in US courts, focusing on the two most important decisions, and examining their contradictory rulings. As the US Supreme Court has now decided to hear an appeal in one of these cases, I conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to elucidate the role of the International Court of Justice in US law when the United States has consented to binding treaty interpretation by that court.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm D. Evans ◽  
Martin Mennecke ◽  
Christian J. Tams

In the LaGrand case, the United States found themselves for the second time within three years before the International Court of Justice dealing with the death penalty imposed on foreign nationals in the United States.1 In contrast to the earlier case filed by Paraguay, the German-sponsored LaGrand case survived the provisional measures phase and went on to the merits stage. In its judgment of 27 June 2001, the Court largely affirmed all four German submissions and ruled that the United States had violated international law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 913-928 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Jamar ◽  
Mary Katherine Vigness

When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released its advisory opinion regarding the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on 22 July 2010, Serbia was not the only State to express its dissatisfaction with the outcome. The broader significance of the ICJ's finding that Kosovo's UDI in 2008 did not violate international law has profound relevance for other States. The United States and its allies claim that Kosovo's situation is unique and does not serve as precedent, but other nations facing separatist movements within their own borders may have reason to be concerned.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Aust

To public international lawyers “Lockerbie” is more than likely to evoke the cases which Libya brought in the International Court of Justice in 1992 against the United Kingdom1 and the United States under the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971.2 The issues raised by the cases have spawned a huge literature. But, in truth, the ICJ proceedings have never been at the centre of, what might be called, the Lockerbie affair. Although they raise important constitutional issues for the United Nations, in terms of the crime committed—the sabotage of the Boeing 747 airliner on flight PA103 which exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland on 21 December 1988 killing 270 people—the ICJ proceedings have never been more than a sideshow; or as that word was once, aptly for the present case, denned in The Times crossword, an incidental skirmish. The real story is how international action, and in particular the ingenious use of international law, was successful in achieving the appearance of the accused for trial before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. This example of what can be achieved in the cause of justice by legal inventiveness, imaginative diplomacy and sheer persistence, should be properly recorded.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-173
Author(s):  
W. Michael Reisman

In the wake of the 1984 Judgment of the International Court on jurisdiction and admissibility issues in the Nicaragua case, the United States reviewed the utility and desirability of continued participation in the optional jurisdictional regime established by Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Executive concluded essentially that the experiment initiated by the regime neither had succeeded nor was likely to succeed in the future; that its subscription was ragged and asymmetrical in terms of world politics; that the Court, the custodian of this mode of jurisdiction, had adopted new theories of interpretation that were inconsistent, in the U.S. view, with the thrust of the provision; that the Court itself had changed; and that, in sum, continued United States participation would discriminate against United States interests while contributing nothing to world order. Accordingly, on October 7, 1985, the Secretary of State informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the United States was terminating, in accord with the terms of its Declaration and the provisions of the Statute, its adherence to the optional regime under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document