Introduction

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-166
Author(s):  
Fred L. Morrison

The opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case will be of interest primarily because of its general pronouncements on questions of international law. Its impact on the immediate controversy appears slight; the United States Government has strongly indicated its view that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, has vetoed subsequent proposed Security Council resolutions on the subject, and is appropriating additional funds for the contested activities, without apparent reference to the Court’s decision. This Comment is limited to the general theoretical and legal issues and will not treat the underlying factual issues, the Court’s disposition of the immediate case or the implications of the opinion for the evolution of the dispute.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis A. Boyle

The only significant point of disagreement this author might have with the June 27, 1986 decision on the merits by the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America concerns its failure to hold the United States Government fully responsible for the violations of the laws and customs of warfare committed by the contra forces in Nicaragua. The Court carefully premised this result on the finding that it had insufficient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion on such a delicate matter. Nevertheless, the Court held it established that the U.S. Government largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras. Somewhat questionably, in the Court’s estimation, it remained to be proven that the Reagan administration actually exercised operational control over the contra forces.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 720-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Preuss

It has been remarked that the Government of the United States “seldom loses an opportunity to profess its loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract. … The expression of this sentiment has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the actual policy of the United States.” This ambivalent attitude is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in a memorandum addressed by Mr. John Foster Dulles on July 10, 1946, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “The United States, since its formation,” Mr. Dulles states, “has led in promoting a reign of law and justice as between nations. In order to continue that leadership, we should now accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If the United States, which has the material power to impose its will widely in the world, agrees instead to submit to the impartial adjudication of its legal controversies, that will inaugurate a new and profoundly significant international advance.” Although the initial step of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would in itself be “of profound moral significance,” it would, Mr. Dulles continues, “assume greatly increased practical significance” only when “limiting factors” have been removed, for the “path is as yet so untried that it would be reckless to proceed precipitately,” the Court “has yet to win the confidence of the world community,” and “international law has not yet developed the scope and definiteness necessary to permit international disputes generally to be resolved by judicial rather than political tests.”


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 578-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davis R. Robinson ◽  
David A. Colson ◽  
Bruce C. Rashkow

On October 12, 1984, a five-member Chamber of the International Court of Justice rendered its decision in the maritime boundary dispute between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine area. The Chamber delimited the continental shelves and 200-nautical-mile fisheries zones by setting one line between the two countries off the East Coast of North America. The Chamber’s Judgment, which under Article 27 of the Statute of the Court is considered as if it were rendered by the full 15-member Court, is likely to attract considerable comment. We will resist the temptation to add our views to that substantive commentary, leaving analysis for the time being to others not so closely associated with the case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle ◽  
Evan Fox-Decent

AbstractThis Article challenges the conventional wisdom that states are always free to choose whether to participate in multilateral regimes. International law often mandates multilateralism to ensure that state laws and practices are compatible with sovereign equality and joint stewardship. The Article maps mandatory multilateralism's domain, defines its requirements, and examines its application to three controversies: the South China Sea dispute, the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, and Bolivia's case against Chile in the International Court of Justice.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Scott ◽  
Craig L. Carr

The refusal of the United States to consider itself bound by the recent decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, coupled with the earlier termination of its adherence to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has sparked a small storm of controversy and concern. Part of this concern involves how the United States, presumably a law-abiding and law-respecting nation, could possibly bring itself to snub the International Court of Justice and, by extension, the ideal of international law. Another part of this concern involves the likely consequences of the United States move on the vitality of the Court as the focal institution of a slowly evolving system of international law. A less obvious concern, but arguably one of paramount importance, calls into question the wisdom of insisting that the ICJ retain its optional compulsory jurisdiction. It is this less obvious concern that we propose to discuss here.


2003 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon de Smet

AbstractThis article investigates the law of Head of State immunity in the United States in light of the recent decision by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case (DRC v. Belgium). It does so by analyzing the U.S. law and comparing it with the customary international law on Head of State immunity as laid out by the world court. The article demonstrates that there are two competing strands in the recent jurisprudence of U.S. courts, neither of which is in conformity with international law. The reasons for this discrepancy are examined and explained in light of the underlying debate about the role of customary international law in the U.S. constitutional system. In conclusion, the author suggests that the best solution to the current dilemma is for the U.S. courts to apply the rules on Head of State immunity as explained by the world court and avoid as much as possible interference by the executive.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm D. Evans ◽  
Martin Mennecke ◽  
Christian J. Tams

In the LaGrand case, the United States found themselves for the second time within three years before the International Court of Justice dealing with the death penalty imposed on foreign nationals in the United States.1 In contrast to the earlier case filed by Paraguay, the German-sponsored LaGrand case survived the provisional measures phase and went on to the merits stage. In its judgment of 27 June 2001, the Court largely affirmed all four German submissions and ruled that the United States had violated international law.


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