Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions

This article looks at the known foundational results on spatial models of elections. The issues of equilibrium existence, the characterization of equilibria (in terms of their social welfare properties), and the distance between equilibrium policy and positions of the candidates are examined. It then discusses the results of the case where candidates are able to give precise predictions of voters' behaviour precisely; the article also introduces the ‘Downsian model’. The article looks at two models of probabilistic voting, before finally moving on to consider the most common objective functions that are used to model the electoral incentives of different types of candidates.

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The Logic of Party Coalitions with Political Activism

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice ◽

10.1332/251569211x15665367493715 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 29 (1) ◽

pp. 199-208

Author(s):

Michele G. Giuranno

Keyword(s):

Political Activism ◽

Policy Position ◽

Ideal Policy ◽

Marginal Rates Of Substitution ◽

Electoral Equilibrium

Abstract This paper considers an electoral equilibrium between two party coalitions. Each coalition is composed of two factions called activists and opportunists. Activists are interested in announcing a policy as close as possible to their ideal policy and are ready to contribute with vital electoral resources to die one’s own party coalition. Opportunists are interested only in winning elections and need the activists’ contributions to enhance their party valence. Thus, the two factions of each coalition negotiate on both policy platform and activists' contributions. Results show that, in equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution between policy position and activists’ contributions must be the same for the two negotiating factions inside party coalitions. Furthermore, greater activism inside parties leads to policy divergence.

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Electoral equilibrium in double member districts

Public Choice ◽

10.1007/bf00119692 ◽

1984 ◽

Vol 44 (3) ◽

pp. 443-451 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Gary W. Cox

Keyword(s):

Electoral Equilibrium

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Realignment and Macropartisanship

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055400400122 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 95 (4) ◽

pp. 953-962 ◽

Cited By ~ 18

Author(s):

Michael F. Meffert ◽

Helmut Norpoth ◽

Anirudh V. S. Ruhil

Keyword(s):

New Deal ◽

Time Series Data ◽

Party Identification ◽

Series Data ◽

Presidential Approval ◽

Short Term ◽

Partisan Realignment ◽

Electoral Equilibrium ◽

The New Deal ◽

The U.S

Aggregate party identification (macropartisanship) has exhibited substantial movement in the U.S. electorate over the last half century. We contend that a major key to that movement is a rare, massive, and enduring shift of the electoral equilibrium commonly known as a partisan realignment. The research, which is based on time-series data that employ the classic measurement of party identification, shows that the 1980 election triggered a systematic growth of Republican identification that cut deeply into the overwhelming Democratic lead dating back to the New Deal realignment. Although short-term fluctuations in macropartisanship are responsive to the elements of everyday politics, neither presidential approval nor consumer sentiment is found responsible for the 1980 shift.

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The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness

Journal of Economic Literature ◽

10.1257/jel.20150927 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 55 (3) ◽

pp. 916-984 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

John Duggan ◽

César Martinelli

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Dynamic Models ◽

Rent Seeking ◽

Term Limits ◽

Future Research ◽

The Political ◽

Imperfect Monitoring ◽

Electoral Equilibrium ◽

Commitment Problems ◽

General Conditions

We survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians. We define stationary electoral equilibrium, which encompasses notions used by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Banks and Sundaram (1998), and others. We show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters, and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions. Term limits, however, attenuate the responsiveness finding. We also touch on related applied work, and we point to areas for fruitful future research, including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics. ( JEL D72, D82, D83)

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