Electoral Equilibrium under Approval Voting

1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary W. Cox
Keyword(s):  
Approval Voting ◽  
Electoral Equilibrium

Infinite-population approval voting: A proposal

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susumu Cato ◽  
Eric Rémila ◽  
Philippe Solal
Keyword(s):  
Approval Voting ◽  
Infinite Population

scholarly journals Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Basteck
Keyword(s):  
Monotonicity Property ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
The Other ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Property A ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Direct Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Choice Correspondence

AbstractWe characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies unanimity (U) (i.e., elects a candidate whenever it is unanimously preferred) and is majoritarian after eliminating a worst candidate (MEW)(i.e., if there is a unanimously disliked candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected). In a larger class of rules, Approval Voting is characterized by a single axiom that implies both U and MEW but is weaker than Condorcet-consistency (CON)—it is the only direct mechanism scoring rule that is majoritarian after eliminating a Pareto-dominated candidate (MEPD)(i.e., if there is a Pareto-dominated candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected); among all finite scoring rules that satisfy MEPD, Approval Voting is the most decisive. However, it fails a desirable monotonicity property: a candidate that is elected for some preference profile, may lose the election once she gains further in popularity. In contrast, the Borda Rule is the unique direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies U, MEW and monotonicity (MON). There exists no direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies both MEPD and MON and no finite scoring rule satisfying CON.

A Map of Approval Voting Equilibra Outcomes

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastien Courtin ◽  
Matias Nuñez
Keyword(s):  
Approval Voting

A Debut for Approval Voting

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 62-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Approval Voting

An Approval-Voting Polytope for Linear Orders

1997 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Doignon ◽  
Michel Regenwetter
Keyword(s):  
Linear Orders ◽  
Approval Voting

scholarly journals Dis&approval voting: a characterization

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Carlos R. Alcantud ◽  
Annick Laruelle
Keyword(s):  
Approval Voting

scholarly journals Democratising forest management: Applying multiwinner approval voting to tree selection

2020 ◽  
Vol 478 ◽  
pp. 118509
Author(s):  
Arne Pommerening ◽  
Markus Brill ◽  
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin ◽  
Jens Haufe
Keyword(s):  
Forest Management ◽  
Approval Voting

scholarly journals The Basic Approval Voting Game

2010 ◽  
pp. 153-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Laslier ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver
Keyword(s):  
Approval Voting ◽  
Voting Game
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document