A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved

2006 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Duggan
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Electoral Equilibrium

scholarly journals The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study

2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
ENRIQUETA ARAGONES ◽  
THOMAS R. PALFREY
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Electoral Equilibrium ◽  
Main Effects

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one-dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they can be explained by quantal response equilibrium.

Public Opinion, Party Politics, and the Welfare State

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Lindvall ◽  
David Rueda
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Party System ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Welfare State

This chapter examines the long-run relationship between public opinion, party politics, and the welfare state. It argues that when large parties receive a clear signal concerning the median voter’s position on the welfare state, vote-seeking motivations dominate and the large parties in the party system converge on the position of the median voter. When the position of the median voter is more difficult to discern, however, policy-seeking motivations dominate, and party positions diverge. This argument implies that the effects of government partisanship on welfare state policy are more ambiguous than generally understood. The countries covered in the chapter are Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom (going back to the 1960s). The number of observations is (necessarily) limited, but the diverse cases illustrate a common electoral dynamic centered around the position of the median voter.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekrem Karakoç
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
System Stability ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Electoral Volatility ◽  
Large N ◽  
Multimethod Approach ◽  
Median Voter Theory ◽  
Nondemocratic Regimes

This chapter opens by providing empirical evidence that income inequality persists or increases in many new democracies after their transition. Then it gives a brief overview of studies that expect reduced inequality because of democratization and questions their three assumptions regarding median voters, party system stability, and the authoritarian legacy on citizen–party linkage. It offers a revision to the median voter theory, emphasizes high electoral volatility in new democracies, and reexamines the legacy of previous nondemocratic regimes on citizen–party linkage. Having offered its argument in a nutshell, it turns to research methodology and case selection. It offers the rationale behind employing a multimethod approach to test its arguments. It tests its argument through large-N analysis in new and longstanding democracies in Europe as well as two paired case studies: Poland and the Czech Republic in postcommunist Europe and Turkey and Spain in Southern Europe.

Direct Democracy and Public Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 362-379
Author(s):  
John Matsusaka
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
American States ◽  
Conservative Policy ◽  
Initiative Process ◽  
Swiss Cantons

An extensive literature seeks to measure the effect of the initiative and referendum on public policies. Several conclusions emerge: The initiative and referendum have different effects on policy. Requiring popular approval of fiscal policies (mandatory referendums) results in lower expenditure, taxes, and debt. The initiative process gives voters more power and results in policies closer to the median voter preference; this often has reduced spending (American states, Swiss cantons), but sometimes has increased spending (cities). The initiative is associated with more socially conservative policy choices. Spurious correlation is a concern in many studies, and more research on causality is needed.

Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEOK-JU CHO
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Robust Equilibrium

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

Public Debt in South Africa

2021 ◽  
pp. 955-973
Author(s):  
Manoel Bittencourt
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Public Expenditure ◽  
Government Debt ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Party ◽  
Human Capital Formation ◽  
Macroeconomic Performance ◽  
Racial Democracy

After four decades of racial segregation, South Africa transitioned to a non-racial democracy in 1994. Inevitably for a country with segregationist labour market policies for so long, South Africa is also one of the most unequal countries in the world. In order to take an overview of government debt in South Africa, this chapter looks at macroeconomic performance but also at how the political regime characteristics and inequality have interplayed with government debt during the 1970–2016 period. The data suggest that economic growth correlates negatively with debt and that democracy correlates positively with debt. In addition, the data do not suggest that democratic maturity is already associated with lower debt nor that the outgoing apartheid-era National Party bequeathed the young democracy with high debt. Encouragingly, the data do suggest that inequality and public expenditure on education correlate positively with debt, which suggests that the democratic government has the median voter in mind when creating debt and also that part of the debt is being invested in human capital formation.

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