Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 881-899 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry W. Chappell ◽  
William R. Keech

We present a model of party competition that produces more realistic patterns of results than those often emphasized in the literature. Reversing Downs (1957), we assume that parties win elections in order to formulate policies, rather than formulate policies in order to win elections. Voters are modeled first as having perfect information about candidate positions, and then under conditions of uncertainty. In simulation experiments we show that policy motivation and voter uncertainty can bring about persistent and predictable party differences in sequential majority rule elections. As the degree of voter certainty decreases, parties diverge towards their optima, whereas increases in voter certainty draw parties towards cycles in which party positions vary, but predictable issue stances are maintained on the average.

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim McConalogue

The evidence from parliamentary and legal processes flowing from the European Union referendum in June 2016 and the vote to leave – including invoking Article 50 and subsequent Withdrawal Bill votes, nuancing of party positions in Parliament, adopting parliamentary scrutiny through ongoing party competition and subsequent legislation – suggests a strong resettling of Parliament’s sovereignty based on a potentially new, enhanced constitutional settlement. Two significant precedented, historical constitutional forms, strongly dependent upon Burke’s and Dicey’s view of government by consent, prove central to the further resettling of parliamentary sovereignty following the European Union referendum. This approach contrasts with theories asserting that sovereignty is being challenged by unwieldy executive authority, popular sovereignty, or democratic nostalgia. When the United Kingdom’s present day, post-1973 constitutional form is in conflict with a new feature, as in the case of the European Union referendum, a contemporary resettling of parliamentary sovereignty occurs.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton ◽  
Aiji Tanaka

The alignment of parties within a party system shapes the nature of electoral competition, the process of representation, and potentially the legitimacy of the system. This article describes the distribution of parties and the levels of party polarization in the party systems of East Asian democracies. We examine the public's perceptions of party positions on a left-right scale to map the pattern of party competition. The evidence is based on two waves of surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. We describe considerable variation in the polarization of Asian party systems, which has direct implications for the clarity of party choice and the behavior of voters. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.


Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

The Electoral College governing America today was adopted by Thomas Jefferson’s supporters, after the 1800 election almost derailed his presidency. The Jeffersonians were motivated by majority rule. Given the emergence of two-party competition between Federalists and themselves, the Jeffersonians intended the Electoral College to award the presidency to the majority party. Given the federal structure of the United States, they envisioned the Electoral College as implementing a compound form of majority rule: a candidate would win by amassing a majority of electoral votes from states where the candidate’s party was in the majority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 530-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. BAUDAINS ◽  
H.M. FRY ◽  
T.P. DAVIES ◽  
A.G. WILSON ◽  
S.R. BISHOP

In both historical and modern conflicts, space plays a critical role in how interactions occur over time. Despite its importance, the spatial distribution of adversaries has often been neglected in mathematical models of conflict. In this paper, we propose an entropy-maximising spatial interaction method for disaggregating the impact of space, employing a general notion of ‘threat’ between two adversaries. This approach addresses a number of limitations that are associated with partial differential equation approaches to spatial disaggregation. We use this method to spatially disaggregate the Richardson model of conflict escalation, and then explore the resulting model with both analytical and numerical treatments. A bifurcation is identified that dramatically influences the resulting spatial distribution of conflict and is shown to persist under a range of model specifications. Implications of this finding for real-world conflicts are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Andreadis ◽  
Heiko Giebler

AbstractLocating political parties correctly regarding different policy issues is not just crucial for research on parties, party competition, and many similar fields but also for the electorate. For the latter, it has become more and more important as the relevance of voting advice applications (VAA) has increased and as their main usage is to compare citizens’ policy preferences to the offer of political parties. However, if party positions are not adequately assigned, citizens are provided with suboptimal information which decreases the citizens’ capacities to make rational electoral decision. VAA designers follow different approaches to determining party positions. In this paper, we look beyond most common sources like electoral manifestos and expert judgments by using surveys of electoral candidates to validate and improve VAAs. We argue that by using positions derived from candidate surveys we get the information by the source itself, but at the same time we overcome most of the disadvantages of the other methods. Using data for the 2014 European Parliament election both in Greece and Germany, we show that while positions taken from the VAAs and from the candidate surveys do match more often than not, we also find substantive differences and even opposing positions. Moreover, these occasional differences have already rather severe consequences looking at calculated overlaps between citizens and parties as well as representations of the political competition space and party system polarization. These differences seem to be more pronounced in Greece. We conclude that candidate surveys are indeed a valid additional source to validate and improve VAAs.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Crémer ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey

This article extends the spatial model of voting to study the implications of different institutional structures of federalism along two dimensions: degree of centralization and mode of representation. The representation dimension varies the weight between unit representation (one state, one vote) and population-proportional representation (one person, one vote). Voters have incomplete information and can reduce policy risk by increasing the degree of centralization or increasing the weight on unit representation. We derive induced preferences over the degree of centralization and the relative weights of the two modes of representation, and we study the properties of majority rule voting over these two basic dimensions of federalism. Moderates prefer more centralization than extremists, and voters in large states generally have different preferences from voters in small states. This implies two main axes of conflict in decisions concerning political confederation: moderates versus extremists and large versus small states.


1995 ◽  
Vol 79 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 179-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter T. Gilruth ◽  
Stuart E. Marsh ◽  
Robert Itami

Cities ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 214-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiwei Yin ◽  
Fanhua Kong ◽  
Xiaojun Yang ◽  
Philip James ◽  
Iryna Dronova

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