scholarly journals Political Confederation

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Crémer ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Small States ◽  
Representation Dimension ◽  
Modes Of Representation ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Policy Risk ◽  
Spatial Model Of Voting

This article extends the spatial model of voting to study the implications of different institutional structures of federalism along two dimensions: degree of centralization and mode of representation. The representation dimension varies the weight between unit representation (one state, one vote) and population-proportional representation (one person, one vote). Voters have incomplete information and can reduce policy risk by increasing the degree of centralization or increasing the weight on unit representation. We derive induced preferences over the degree of centralization and the relative weights of the two modes of representation, and we study the properties of majority rule voting over these two basic dimensions of federalism. Moderates prefer more centralization than extremists, and voters in large states generally have different preferences from voters in small states. This implies two main axes of conflict in decisions concerning political confederation: moderates versus extremists and large versus small states.

scholarly journals HOW POLITICAL PARTIES ADJUST TO FIXED VOTER OPINIONS

2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. 1587-1595
Author(s):  
KRZYSZTOF KUŁAKOWSKI
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Symmetric State ◽  
Gaussian Peak ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Spatial Model Of Voting

We propose a new version of the spatial model of voting. Platforms of five parties were allowed to evolve in a two-dimensional landscape of political issues so as to get maximal numbers of voters. For a Gaussian landscape the evolution leads to a spatially symmetric state, where the platform centers form a pentagon around the Gaussian peak. For a bimodal landscape the platforms located at different peaks get different numbers of voters.

Spatial phenomenology requires potential illumination

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-426
Author(s):  
James A. Schirillo
Keyword(s):  
Visual System ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Color Constancy ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Three Dimensional Space

Collapsing three-dimensional space into two violates Lehar's “volumetric mapping” constraint and can cause the visual system to construct illusory transparent regions to replace voxels that would have contained illumination. This may underlie why color constancy is worse in two dimensions, and argues for Lehar to revise his phenomenal spatial model by putting “potential illumination” in empty space.

Financialization, Technological Change, and Trade Union Decline

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Technological Change ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Union Density ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Market Development ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Biased Technological Change ◽  
Negative Effect

Abstract Recent research finds that financialization and technological change have had a variety of negative effects on labor, including reducing low-skill workers’ wages and increasing income inequality. In this article, I examine the effect on trade unions of one type of financialization, equity market development and one type of technological change, routine-biased technological change. I argue that we should conceptualize trade union strength in two dimensions: (a) the strength of their institutional structures, such as the degree of wage bargaining coordination and the degree to which firms can deviate from collective agreements; (b) the strength of their membership. Using data for 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2010, I find a negative effect of equity market development on unions’ institutional structures, but not on union membership. Contrarily, I find that routine-biased technological change has a negative effect on union density, but an inconsistent relationship with the strength of unions’ institutional structures.

A spatial model of range-dependent succession

2000 ◽  
Vol 37 (04) ◽  
pp. 1044-1060
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Krone ◽  
Claudia Neuhauser
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Particle System ◽  
Infected Plant ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Saturation Level ◽  
Healthy Plant ◽  
Vacant Site ◽  
Plant Populations ◽  
Interacting Particle ◽  
Constant Rate

We consider an interacting particle system in which each site of the d-dimensional integer lattice can be in state 0, 1, or 2. Our aim is to model the spread of disease in plant populations, so think of 0 = vacant, 1 = healthy plant, 2 = infected plant. A vacant site becomes occupied by a plant at a rate which increases linearly with the number of plants within range R, up to some saturation level, F 1, above which the rate is constant. Similarly, a plant becomes infected at a rate which increases linearly with the number of infected plants within range M, up to some saturation level, F 2. An infected plant dies (and the site becomes vacant) at constant rate δ. We discuss coexistence results in one and two dimensions. These results depend on the relative dispersal ranges for plants and disease.

Cleavages in World Politics

2019 ◽  
pp. 345-367
Author(s):  
Martin Binder ◽  
Autumn Lockwood Payton
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
International System ◽  
World Politics ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Voting Behaviour ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
United Nations General ◽  
United Nations General Assembly ◽  
Spatial Model Of Voting

This chapter systematically examines the potential cleavages that run between the rising and the established powers in international politics. To that end, it analyses and compares the voting behaviour of the BRICS, IBSA, and G7 states in the United Nations General Assembly (GA). GA voting is particularly suited to identify the potential conflict lines between ‘new’ and ‘old’ powers as it runs the gambit of issues confronted in the international system and provides a forum where states can express their preferences relatively freely. Using a spatial model of voting (W-NOMINATE), this chapter analyses more than 500 roll-call votes in the GA over the period 2002–11.

Does Bicameralism Matter?

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cutrone ◽  
Nolan McCarty
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Multilateral Bargaining ◽  
Institutional Features

This article reviews and analyzes many arguments that are made on behalf of bicameralism. The tools used to make these arguments are the spatial model, the multilateral bargaining theory, and a game of incomplete information. The article attempts to distinguish the effects of bicameralism from the effects of other institutional features that often accompany it, such as differing terms of office and super-majoritarian requirements.

The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Fendius Elman
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Small States ◽  
Institutional Formation ◽  
Us Military ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
The Us ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Distribution Of Power

The received wisdom in international relations suggests that we can best account for the foreign policies of small states by examining structural/systemic rather than domestic level factors. This article challenges this scholarly consensus. The distribution of power and the balance of threat do influence domestic institutional formation and change in emerging states. However, the subsequent military strategies of these weak states are likely to reflect such domestic institutional choices in a number of important and predictable ways. The article tests this argument against pre-1900 US domestic regime change and foreign security policy. The historical evidence suggests that while international preconditions were critically linked to constitutional reform, the institutional structures and rules of democratic presidentialism affected both the timing and substance of US military strategies in later periods. The US case study provides a springboard for speculating on the international context of democratization in Eastern Europe and the long-term foreign-policy consequences of this domestic regime choice.

How does ideology matter in the spatial model of voting?

Public Choice ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 135 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 109-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett R. Beeler Asay
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Spatial Model Of Voting

scholarly journals Sophisticated Voting on Competing Ballot Measures: Spatial Theory and Evidence

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hugh-Jones
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Spatial Theory ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Voting Behaviour ◽  
Ballot Measures ◽  
Democratic Elections ◽  
Rational Choice Theories ◽  
Spatial Model Of Voting

Are voters sophisticated? Rational choice theories of voting assume they are. Students of voting behaviour are more doubtful. This article examines voting in a particularly demanding setting: direct democratic elections in which two competing proposals are on the ballot. It develops a spatial model of voting and proposal qualification with competing proposals. If voters are naïve, then competing proposals can be used to block the direct democratic route to change, but, if voters vote strategically, competing proposals can bring outcomes closer to the median voter. Voting intention data from California polls provide evidence that some votes are cast strategically even in these demanding circumstances. However, the level of strategic voting appears to be affected by the nature of the election campaign.

scholarly journals Veto players, policy change, and institutional design

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801772270
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Hannah K. Simpson
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Ideal Policy ◽  
The Status

What institutional arrangements allow veto players to secure maximal welfare when all agree on both the need for and the direction of policy change? To answer this question, we conduct a mechanism design analysis. We focus on a system with two veto players, each with incomplete information about the other’s policy preferences. We show that the unique welfare-maximizing mechanism is the mechanism that implements the preferred policy of the player whose ideal policy is closer to the status quo. We provide examples of institutional structures under which the unique equilibrium outcome of this two-player incomplete information game is the policy outcome implemented by this mechanism, and argue that our result can be used as a normative benchmark to assess the optimality of veto player institutions.

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