Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era: A Study of the McKinley Houses and a Comparison to the Modern House of Representatives. By David W. Brady. (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1973. Pp. 273. $10.00.)

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 1323-1324
Author(s):  
Charles M. Tidmarch
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
The University ◽  
Modern House

A Research Note on the Impact of Interparty Competition on Congressional Voting in a Competitive Era

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Brady
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Predictive Ability ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Party Support ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
Modern House ◽  
The Impact

In the modern House of Representatives party competition for seats is not strongly correlated with or predictive of party voting behavior. The most plausible explanation for this weak relationship is that less than 20 per cent of House seats are competitive from one census to the next. In this study the Hasbrouck-Jones Fluidity Index was applied to House elections in the 1890—1900 period, and almost 50 per cent of House seats in this era were found to have been competitive at that time.From the 1892—1900 period the 55th and 56th U.S. Houses were selected for analysis. A varimax factor analysis was run on the party votes in these Congresses, and the resultant factor scores formed a unidimensional measure of the number of times a member voted with a party majority. A multiple regression analysis was run, with these party support scores used as the dependent variable and with party competition and occupational composition of the district used as the independent variables. The results showed that in both houses party competition was strongly correlated with and predictive of party support scores. The same analysis on the 89th House yielded much weaker correlations and showed little predictive ability.

Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACS

ILR Review ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Saltzman
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Action Committee ◽  
Labor Issues ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Significant Direct Effect

This study measures the impact of labor and corporate political action committee (PAC) contributions on the voting of members of the House of Representatives on labor issues during 1979–80. It also analyzes the allocation of labor PAC contributions among House candidates. PAC contributions were found to have a significant direct effect on roll-call voting, even controlling for the Representative's political party and characteristics of the constituency. Since PAC money also affects roll-call voting indirectly (by influencing which party wins elections), the overall impact of PAC money on Congressional voting is probably substantial. The author also finds that labor PACs have focused more on influencing the outcome of elections than on currying favor with powerful members of the House who are likely to be re-elected anyway.

The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives

1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Donald Niemi
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Considerable Degree ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Do So

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

“A Great Religious Octopus”: Church and State at Virginia's Constitutional Convention, 1901–1902

2003 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Buckley
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Church And State ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Legislature ◽  
University Of Virginia ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
The North ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
The University ◽  
The Universe

A hundred years ago Virginia drafted a new state constitution designed to disfranchise African American voters. That objective was transparent from the outset of the convention. As John Goode, the presiding officer, assumed his seat, he called black suffrage “a great crime against civilization and Christianity.” At the age of seventy-two, Goode was the grand old man of the convention. A graduate of the University of Virginia and life-long Democrat, he had served in the state legislature, the Secession Convention of 1861, the Confederate legislature, and the U.S. House of Representatives before his appointment as Solicitor General of the United States in 1885. Goode reflected the mentality of the vast majority of convention delegates when he stated that African Americans were incapable of education or citizenship. “The omniscient Ruler of the Universe … made [them] inferior,” he proclaimed, and sometime in the future, when the North knew better, the Fifteenth Amendment would be repealed.

Southern Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives. By Stanley P. Berard. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. 250p. $22.95.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 819-820
Author(s):  
Nicol C. Rae
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Institutional Rule ◽  
University Of Oklahoma ◽  
Rule Changes ◽  
Conservative Coalition ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
The U.S

The rise of partisanship in Congress has been one of the most conspicuous features of American politics during the 1990s. David Rohde's (1991) Parties and Leaders in the PostReform House demonstrated that much of this rise in partisanship could be attributed to the convergence in congressional voting between Northern and Southern Democrats. Since the New Deal, the latter had traditionally allied with Republicans on many issues in a bipartisan conservative coalition that generally dominated both Houses of Congress and constrained liberal legislative outcomes. While Rohde and Barbara Sinclair (Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking, 1995) have emphasized how institutional rule changes in the 1970s created a much greater incentive for party loyalty among member of Congress, relatively little attention has been paid to the extent to which enhanced partisanship in Congress has been driven by “bottom-up” electoral imperatives. Stanley Berard's new book on Southern Democrats in the House convincingly shows that major changes in the southern electoral environment were equally important in promoting convergence in the voting records of Northern and Southern Democrats, leading to a more partisan House overall.

Going metric in Hawaii

1973 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 258-260
Author(s):  
Irv King ◽  
Nancy Whitman
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
College Of Education ◽  
The State ◽  
Primary Language ◽  
Pilot Program ◽  
The University ◽  
Regular Session

Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the Sixth Legislature of the State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 1972, that the College of Education of the University of Hawaii be requested to develop a pilot program for teaching metric in the schools of Hawaii as the primary language of measurement.

The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives

1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1023-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Truman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Minor Significance ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
The Individual ◽  
State Delegations

Recent controversies over the degree of responsibility displayed by American parties have underscored at least one feature of voting in the Congress. Whatever the merits of the contending interpretations and demands, the facts adduced on both sides suggest relatively fluid, unstructured voting patterns, especially in the House of Representatives. Although the party label is clearly the single most reliable indicator of congressional voting behavior, it is admittedly somewhat less than perfect. The individual Representative may fairly often dissent from the views of most of his party colleagues, not only on matters of local or minor significance but also on issues of national or even global import.The Representative's “independence” is most commonly, and in a good many instances accurately, ascribed to peculiarities of his constituency which generate demands for a non-conforming vote or, perhaps more frequently, are expected to be the source of recriminations and penalities if he does not display independence of his party colleagues on certain types of issues. But the Member of Congress is by no means always able to predict the electoral consequences of his choices even though he is sure that they may produce repercussions in his district.

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