Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress.Duncan MacRae, Jr. , Fred H. Goldner

1959 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
pp. 640-641
Author(s):  
David G. Hays
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Statistical Study ◽  
Congressional Voting

Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACS

ILR Review ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Saltzman
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Action Committee ◽  
Labor Issues ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Significant Direct Effect

This study measures the impact of labor and corporate political action committee (PAC) contributions on the voting of members of the House of Representatives on labor issues during 1979–80. It also analyzes the allocation of labor PAC contributions among House candidates. PAC contributions were found to have a significant direct effect on roll-call voting, even controlling for the Representative's political party and characteristics of the constituency. Since PAC money also affects roll-call voting indirectly (by influencing which party wins elections), the overall impact of PAC money on Congressional voting is probably substantial. The author also finds that labor PACs have focused more on influencing the outcome of elections than on currying favor with powerful members of the House who are likely to be re-elected anyway.

The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives

1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Donald Niemi
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Considerable Degree ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Do So

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

Southern Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives. By Stanley P. Berard. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. 250p. $22.95.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 819-820
Author(s):  
Nicol C. Rae
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Institutional Rule ◽  
University Of Oklahoma ◽  
Rule Changes ◽  
Conservative Coalition ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
The U.S

The rise of partisanship in Congress has been one of the most conspicuous features of American politics during the 1990s. David Rohde's (1991) Parties and Leaders in the PostReform House demonstrated that much of this rise in partisanship could be attributed to the convergence in congressional voting between Northern and Southern Democrats. Since the New Deal, the latter had traditionally allied with Republicans on many issues in a bipartisan conservative coalition that generally dominated both Houses of Congress and constrained liberal legislative outcomes. While Rohde and Barbara Sinclair (Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking, 1995) have emphasized how institutional rule changes in the 1970s created a much greater incentive for party loyalty among member of Congress, relatively little attention has been paid to the extent to which enhanced partisanship in Congress has been driven by “bottom-up” electoral imperatives. Stanley Berard's new book on Southern Democrats in the House convincingly shows that major changes in the southern electoral environment were equally important in promoting convergence in the voting records of Northern and Southern Democrats, leading to a more partisan House overall.

The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives

1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1023-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Truman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Minor Significance ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
The Individual ◽  
State Delegations

Recent controversies over the degree of responsibility displayed by American parties have underscored at least one feature of voting in the Congress. Whatever the merits of the contending interpretations and demands, the facts adduced on both sides suggest relatively fluid, unstructured voting patterns, especially in the House of Representatives. Although the party label is clearly the single most reliable indicator of congressional voting behavior, it is admittedly somewhat less than perfect. The individual Representative may fairly often dissent from the views of most of his party colleagues, not only on matters of local or minor significance but also on issues of national or even global import.The Representative's “independence” is most commonly, and in a good many instances accurately, ascribed to peculiarities of his constituency which generate demands for a non-conforming vote or, perhaps more frequently, are expected to be the source of recriminations and penalities if he does not display independence of his party colleagues on certain types of issues. But the Member of Congress is by no means always able to predict the electoral consequences of his choices even though he is sure that they may produce repercussions in his district.

Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Stratmann
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Voting Decisions

The proposed model predicts that voting behavior of legislators is more variable early in their career and that junior members are more likely to vote with their party than senior members. The results from the analysis of voting patterns in the House of Representatives and the Senate are consistent with the hypotheses: Party line voting and variability of voting decisions decline with increasing seniority. Changes in voting behavior are also induced by redistricting. The empirical results show that legislators subject to redistricting change their voting behavior to accord better with altered constituency preferences.

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