Constitutional Law in 1957–1958

1959 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-180
Author(s):  
David Fellman

There was no change in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1957 Term. Nor was there any let-up in attacks upon the Court arising from its recent decisions regarding such touchy subjects as racial segregation in public schools, loyalty programs, the powers of legislative investigating committees, and subversive persons and activities. A great deal of this criticism travelled a pretty low road, but some came from high and responsible sources, such as Learned Hand. Of great weight was a resolution adopted by the annual Conference of (State) Chief Justices on August 24, 1958, by a vote of 36 to 8, which affirmed its faith in traditional federalism and urged the Supreme Court to “exercise one of the greatest of all judicial powers—the power of judicial selfrestraint—by recognizing and giving effect to the difference between that which on the one hand, the Constitution may prescribe or permit, and that which, on the other, a majority of the Supreme Court, as from time to time constituted, may deem desirable or undesirable ….”

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Koussens

The difference in attitudes towards the wearing of religious symbols in schools in France and Canada is symptomatic of the respective legal and political definitions of the official neutrality of the school institution and thus of way in which laicism is used to regulate religious pluralism and the “socio-cultural” integration of immigrant populations. In what ways is state neutrality put into practice, in Quebec and in France, as regards the judicial and political treatment of the wearing of religious symbols in public schools? The author proposes to examine the implementation of the liberal principle of neutrality by the French law dated 15 March 2004 on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada of 2 March 2006 to allow a young Sikh to wear his ritual kirpan at school.


Author(s):  
G. Edward White

Equal protection arguments were once described by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as the “last resort” of persons making constitutional claims. The court’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause was slight until the 1950s, in part because “equal protection” was understood only to implicate legislature classifications that were “partial” rather than general.” After the use of the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate racial segregation in public schools in Brown v. Board of Education, equal protection arguments became a staple of cases involving racial, gender, and sexual-preference discrimination.


Author(s):  
Christopher W. Schmidt

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down as unconstitutional state-mandated racial segregation in public schools, which at the time was policy in seventeen states. Brown v. Board of Education marked the culmination of a decades-long litigation campaign by the NAACP. White-controlled states across the South responded by launching a “massive resistance” campaign of defiance against Brown, which was followed by decades of struggles, inside and outside the courts, to desegregate the nation’s schools. Brown also signaled the new and often controversial direction the Supreme Court would take under leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren—one that read the rights protections of the Constitution more broadly than its predecessors and was more aggressive in using these rights to protect vulnerable minorities. Brown is nearly universally celebrated today, yet the terms of its celebration remain contested. Some see the case as a call for ambitious litigation strategies and judicial boldness, whereas others use it to demonstrate the limited power of the courts to effect social change. Some find in Brown a commitment to a principle of a “colorblind” Constitution, others a commitment to expunging practices that oppress racial minorities (often requiring race-conscious policies). Brown thus remains what it was in 1954: a bold statement of the principle of racial equality whose meaning the nation is still struggling to work out.


Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This book examines the impact of Supreme Court cases from Texas on the entire nation. It argues that the most important Supreme Court cases have originated in Texas, which help explain why it is Texas and not California that provides breadth and depth to constitutional adjudication. Texas litigants, lawyers, politicians, and judges all play important roles in the underlying interplay of law and politics at the local, state, and national levels. In all its facets, Texas offers a window to all constitutional law and the Supreme Court. The book shows that Texas's impact literally started at the beginning by precipitating a debate over national powers and then a war with Mexico, and that the fraught relationship between Texas, the nation, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court in the century and a half since Texas v. White has produced more constitutional law than any other state.


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