"Have You Heard the One about the Lesbian Who Goes to the Supreme Court?": Holly Hughes and the Case Against Censorship

2000 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Meyer
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 585-594
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant

The Supreme Court decision commented upon is another important administrative law decision which relates to principles of natural justice, and especially to the nemo judex rule (freedom from bias). Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Laskin states that the function exercised by the National Energy Board under section 44 of the National Energy Board Act is quasi-judicial although it consists in issuing a licence according to an extensive discretionary power. Consequently, principles of natural justice must be applied. The nemo judex rule means that if there is a "reasonable apprehension of bias" due to the past behavior or actions of a member of a quasi-judicial tribunal, that member must be disqualified from acting. Otherwise, the decision rendered by the tribunal must be quashed. Two years before his appointment to the Board, the chairman of the National Energy Board had in fact participated actively in operations and decisions bearing on the very subject-matter subsequently submitted to the Board. That placed the chairman in a situation of conflict of interest, although he had no personal pecuniary interest in the matter involved. The majority of the Supreme Court dissagrees with Mr. Justice de Grandpré's dissent as well as with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. Each expresses a point of view which is worth reading. The majority of the Supreme Court applies to administrative boards or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions the same critérium as the one applied under the common law to any inferior court. Another remarkable judgment of our Supreme Court.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Ladewig ◽  
Seth C. McKee

Ever since the Supreme Court instituted the one person, one vote principle in congressional elections based on its decision in <em>Wesberry v. Sanders</em> (1964), intrastate deviations from equal district populations have become smaller and smaller after each decennial reapportionment. Relying on equal total population as the standard to meet the Court’s principle, though, has raised some constitutional and practical questions stemming from, most basically, not every person has the right to vote. Specifically, there is considerable deviation between the current redistricting practices and a literal interpretation of this constitutional principle. This study systematically analyzes the differences between districts’ total populations and their voting age populations (VAPs). Further, we consider how congressional reapportionments since 1972 would change if, instead of states’ total populations, the standard for reapportioning seats were based on the VAP or the voting eligible population (VEP). Overall, the results indicate that the debate surrounding the appropriate apportionment and redistricting standard is not just normative, it also has notable practical consequences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. OA35-OA48
Author(s):  
James C Fisher

This note discusses the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Singularis Holdings v Daiwa Capital Markets in the context of other recent decisions on corporate attribution and the illegality principle in English law. It particularly considers Daiwa’s implications for the relationship between the illegality doctrine and other legal principles in the wake of Patel v Mirza. The court employed a context-sensitive, teleological approach to attribution, one consequence of which was the conclusive consignment of the House of Lords’ decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens to irrelevance. It nonetheless privileges orthodox, pre-Patelian authority in the disposal of the case. The court’s approach suggests that Patel is perceived as the high-water mark for expansive, policy-sensitive understanding of the illegality principle, and that its disruptive potential is likely to be carefully constrained in future decisions of the Supreme Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Endy Ronaldi ◽  
Dahlan Ali ◽  
Mujibussalim Mujibussalim

Tindak pidana narkotika merupakan kejahatan luar biasa sehingga menjadi prioritas pemerintah untuk diperangi. Penanggulangan tindak pidana narkotika diatur dalam Undang-Undang No. 35 Tahun 2009 tentang Narkotika. Salah satu pengaturan dalam undang-undang tersebut adalah pemberian sanksi di bawah minimum melalui putusan hakim. Sebagaimana kasus yang terjadi dalam Putusan Nomor 64/PID/2012/PN Sigli, Putusan No. 1/pid.sus/2016/PN Cag. (narkotika) dan Putusan No. 14/pid.sus/2016/PN Cag. Adapun permasalahan yang dikaji yaitu faktor penyebab hakim memutuskan sanksi di bawah minimum kepada pelaku narkotika dan implikasinya. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode yuridis normatif dengan mengkaji aspek normatif atas permasalahan yang dikaji. Pendekatan yang dilakukan adalah pendekatan kasuistik dengan menelaah putusan pengadilan. Putusan pengadilan dengan penetapan sanksi di bawah minimum disatu sisi bertentangan dengan asas legalitas dalam hukum pidana. Sehingga hal ini diakomodir dalam Surat Edaran Mahkamah Agung No. 3 tahun 2015. Narcotics crimes are extraordinary crimes so that become government priorities to be minimized. Tackling narcotics crime is regulated in Law No. 35 of 2009 concerning Narcotics. One of the regulations in the law is to impose sanctions below the minimum through a judge's decision. As the case with is the Decision Number 64/PID/2012/PN Sigli. The problems studied are the factors that cause the judge to decide the minimum sanctions for narcotics and their implications. The research method used is a normative juridical method by examining the normative aspects of the problem under study. The approach taken is a casuistic approach by examining court decisions. Court decisions with the determination of sanctions below the minimum on the one hand are contrary to the principle of legality in criminal law. So that accommodated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 3 of 2015.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aparna Chandra ◽  
William Hubbard ◽  
Sital Kalantry

There has been a national debate raging in India about the system of appointments for Supreme Court and High Court judges. At the founding of the Indian Supreme Court, the executive had primary authority over judicial appointments. In 1993, the Supreme Court created a new system of appointments known as the collegium system, whereby the Chief Justice of India and senior judges of the Supreme Court make new appointments to the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. In 2014, Parliament amended the Constitution and passed a bill to create a commission to appoint judges, but the Indian Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.In this article, we ascertain whether the nature of the appointments procedure impacts the biographical and other characteristics of the judges that are eventually selected. We do this by comparing the biographical characteristics of judges appointed by the executive-appointments system (prior to 1993), on the one hand, and the judges appointed by the collegium (on or after 1993) to the Supreme Court of India.We find that both the pre-collegium and the collegium system maintain the geographical and religious diversity of India in the candidates that are appointed. However, both have failed to account for gender diversity. In addition, the path to the Supreme Court appears to have narrowed – typically those who are appointed as judges by the collegium spend longer periods in private practice and on the bench than pre-collegium judges.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Andrea Munyao

Article 181(2) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya instructs Parliament to enact a law highlighting the process of impeachment of a county governor. This has been realised through the County Government Act, Section 33. Section 33 recognises the County Assembly and the Senate as the bodies responsible for this process. However, the County Government Act fails to address at what point the courts can intervene in the impeachment process of governors. This is often a problematic issue as the doctrine of separation of powers requires each arm of government to perform their functions independently. Nonetheless, Kenyan courts have the duty to protect aggrieved parties whenever their rights are threatened. However, the point at which they can intervene is not stated under any law and this creates confusion between the role of courts of law in the impeachment process, on the one hand, and that of the County Assembly and the Senate, on the other. It is not clear which role should be discharged first. This paper, therefore, seeks to address this confusion through a critique of the Wambora case, a case that was appealed up to the Supreme Court. The paper also suggests a complimentary system whereby the Senate, County Assembly and the courts can work in harmony, and, do away with the confusion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 304-319
Author(s):  
Svetlana Ficová

SummaryAfter re-codification of civil law in the Slovak Republic, the rulings of the Supreme Court Special Panel are now binding on all panels of the Supreme Court. The first ruling dealt with a crucial issue of admissibility of appellate review in case of several grounds simultaneously shown in a petition for appellate review. According to the Special Panel’s opinion, cumulative grounds are not admissible either within vertical or horizontal structure. That is, it is not possible to combine the grounds for appellate review defined in the two sections of the Civil Litigation Procedure Code (§ 420 and § 421), or several grounds under the same section (§ 420). Should this occur, the court of appellate review will limit its considerations only to a procedural error specified in § 420, more specifically, the one defined earlier in order of precedence. Within a short period of time, the Supreme Court revised its opinion, and the Special Panel made a contrary ruling by which the cumulative grounds of appellate review were admitted. The purpose of this paper is to consider these two different decisions and to present also some other arguments.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Litman

Senator Orrin Hatch's introduction of the "Induce Act" in the summer of 2004 transformed the ongoing debate over the legality, morality and economics of peer-to-peer file sharing into a debate over Sony v. Universal Studios. Fans of the Sony decision insist that the legal rule announced in the case made the world safe for innovation. Sony's detractors read the decision more narrowly, and insist it has little application to the networked digital environment. The Supreme Court agreed to hear MGM v. Grokster in part to resolve the dispute about the meaning and scope of Sony, and will almost certainly revisit its analysis in the course of deciding Grokster. That has inspired hyperbolic pronouncements from all sides about the importance of the case. If the Supreme Court gets it wrong, we hear, either innovation will be stymied or the copyright law will be eviscerated. This paper examines the historical materials that have become available in the twenty-one years since the Sony decision, and offers an account of what persuaded the Court to resolve the case the way it did. It then assesses the claim that the rule announced in Sony has served as a "Magna Carta for technological innovation." I conclude that Sony has offered only modest protection to innovators, because aggrieved copyright owners have not hesitated to sue new technologies into bankruptcy. Innovators have run out of money before defenses based on Sony could make it into the courtroom. At the same time, the Court has limited options in devising a workable rule to replace Sony. Twenty-one years after the Sony decision, Congress has failed to address the statutory problems that motivated the Court to adopt the staple article of commerce rule, and none of the litigants in Grokster have offered the Court a useful substitute. Ultimately Congress is likely to be asked to rewrite whatever standard the Court articulates in Grokster. Motion picture studios and recording companies will likely insist on a rule imposing liability on any business that profits from infringement. High tech companies will likely insist on limiting any expansion of liability to businesses that profit from unlicensed peer-to-peer file trading. Under pressure from those industries, Congress is unlikely to draw a new line of general application that differs significantly from the one drawn in Sony. Drawing a sensible and robust line of general application would require Congress to revisit copyright remedies at a fundamental level. Industry lobbyists, seeking quick fixes to meet their immediate needs, will have little interest in such a project. Congress, therefore, will probably do what it has done before: enact a narrow rule that purports to fix the problem but proves unhelpful within months of enactment because technology has morphed in unanticipated ways.This paper was published in volume 55 of the Case Western Law Review.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 373
Author(s):  
Dudu Duswara Machmudin

This article aims to provide knowledge and understanding on the functions of the state law enforcement agencies in Indonesia. Differences of powers and functions of law enforcement agencies such as the Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office and the Constitutional Court needs to be understood in depth. Furthermore, given the problems in all courts all over the world which is, among others, the slow settlement of cases, this article describes and analyses the role of Supreme Court Justices in resolving cassation and review cases before and after the issuance of the decree of the Chief Justice Number 119/KMA/SK/VII/2013 regarding the determination of the Day of Deliberation and Pronouncement and Number 214/KMA/SK/XII/2104 concerning Time Period for the Handling of Cases at the Supreme Court. However, when Constitutional Court pronounced Ruling Number 34/PUU-XI/2013 a problem arises in which the products of the two state judicial bodies seem to be inconsistent, especially in the framework for the resolution of criminal cases. On the one hand, the Supreme Court wants the creation of a judicial process that is simple, speedy, and low cost through the strengthening of the two products above, but on the    other hand the Constitutional Court through its award extend the time span of litigation process for the settlement of review cases which can be done repeatedly. Thus, in order to provide legal certainty, the Supreme Court issued Supreme Court Circular Number 7 Year 2014 which essentially affirms that the petition for review in criminal cases is limited only one time based on other legal basis namely Judicial Authority Act and Supreme Court Act.


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