Constitutional Law in 1920–1921. I: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1920

1922 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Edward S. Corwin
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Scientist ◽  
Final Solution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Eighteenth Amendment ◽  
National Power ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Preceding Term

The work of the court last term is chiefly notable for its amplification of certain important results of the preceding term. Thus, the final objection to the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was refuted; the last great question touching the meaning of the word “income” in the Sixteenth Amendment was answered; the emergency powers of government in war time were brought into contact with more usual sources of public authority—this in the rent law cases; and some minor phases of the problem of freedom of speech and press were disposed of. However, in two cases, both of much interest to the political scientist, somewhat novel questions of national power were raised; and in neither was a certainly final solution offered. Questions of state power were again of decidedly subordinate significance and interest.

Constitutional Law in 1921–1922: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1921

1922 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 612-639
Author(s):  
Edward S. Corwin
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
The Past ◽  
Point Of Interest ◽  
Commerce Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
National Power ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Construction

The central point of interest in the work of the court the past term is supplied by the large attention given to the question of the rights and duties of labor under the law. The problem is approached repeatedly, both from the side of the state's police power and that of national power, and in the field of statutory as well as that of constitutional construction. Important results were also reached in interpretation of the “commerce” clause, both in its aspect as a source of national power and in its aspect—because of the doctrine of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress—as a restriction on the states; but especially in the latter aspect. However, the most interesting single decision of the term for students of constitutional theory and of government was one dealing with the national power of taxation.

Constitutional Law in 1925–1926: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1925

1927 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-94
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Rate Importance ◽  
Preceding Term

The Supreme Court of the United States during its 1925 term seems to have taken a vacation from the solution of major constitutional problems. Its activities provided very little newspaper copy. Most of the more important decisions could have been pretty accurately forecast upon the basis of previous adjudications, while the constitutional questions raised which could be deemed in any sense novel related to more or less technical or trivial matters. A considerable number of the more interesting cases dealt merely with matters of statutory construction and did not present constitutional issues at all. This comparative dullness of the judicial year's work is in sharp contrast with the achievements of the preceding term of 1924, in which at least six cases of genuinely first-rate importance were decided; while the Court has begun its 1926 term by handing down its epoch-making decision in the Myers case relating to the President's power of removal, and has followed it by the far-reaching ruling in the municipal zoning law case. This absence of judicial fireworks in the 1925 term may well serve to emphasize two facts sometimes overlooked in an appraisal of the work of the Supreme Court. The first is that in any judicial year an overwhelming proportion of the work of that tribunal is and must necessarily be of a humdrum and inconspicuous variety; useful and important in the sense that technical, detailed, and even trivial questions need to be answered authoritatively, but certainly not spectacular.

Constitutional Law in 1926-1927: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1926

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-107
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
First Time ◽  
Preceding Term

The most conspicuous constitutional decision rendered by the Supreme Court during its 1926 term, or for many a preceding term, was in the case of Myers v. United States. It is here held that the power of the President to remove executive officers appointed by him with the consent of the Senate cannot be restricted by Congress. On the question of the removal of such officers the Constitution is entirely silent. It is an interesting commentary on the process by which we make constitutional law that a problem as important as this, a problem which was debated at length in 1789, upon which presidents have acted and congresses have passed statutes, should now, after 137 years, be definitely settled for the first time, and be settled now only because the late Mr. Myers saw fit to sue the government in the Court of Claims for his salary.The facts in the case are simple. In 1917 President Wilson appointed Myers to a first-class postmastership at Portland, Oregon, for a term of four years. In 1920, by direction of the President, he was removed from office. A statute passed in 1876 and still in force provides that “postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.” The removal of Myers was never referred to the Senate for its consent.

Constitutional Law in 1919–1920. I: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1919

1920 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-658
Author(s):  
Edward S. Corwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
First Impression ◽  
National Power ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
To Come

The work of the Supreme Court during the term concluded last June was quite unusual both in the nature of the problems involved and the importance of certain of the results achieved. The center of interest in constitutional interpretation has swung, for the time being at least, decidedly from questions of state power to those of national power. This is partly the aftermath of the war, partly the corollary of recent amendments to the Constitution. By the same sign, the court has been confronted in recent months with not a few problems of considerable novelty—some indeed being questions of first impression—with the result that it has been called upon to enunciate principles which must guide its interpretation of important provisions of the Constitution for years to come. In preparing this review, the unique quality of the court's work during the period under consideration ought to determine the procedure. Accordingly the greater part of the space is devoted to a few outstanding cases, all of which involve questions of national power, while less striking results have received much briefer consideration, often only cursory mention.

Constitutional Law in 1917–1918. II: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1917

1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-250
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Eminent Domain ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process Of Law ◽  
Pennsylvania Hospital ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Proper Interpretation

There is little or no homogeneity to the questions to be considered under the head of retroactive legislation. A dispute whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligation of contracts may turn on a question as to the proper interpretation or application of language, or on opposing views of what is sufficient consideration or what agreements are against public policy. It was under the obligation-of-contracts clause that the Pennsylvania Hospital case decided that the power of governmental authorities to exercise eminent domain could not be bargained away. The crucial question is more often whether alleged rights existed than whether undoubted rights have been impaired. The Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of vested rights combine to make the obligation-of-contracts clause almost superfluous, as it is difficult to think of any impairment of the obligation of contracts which that clause inhibits which could not equally well be held deprivations of liberty or property without due process of law.This is apparent from the fact that retroactive legislation by Congress is questioned under the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, a contract being regarded as a property right that can be interfered with only when there is sufficient justification for what is done.

Constitutional Law in 1936–37: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1936

1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political History ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The 1936 term of the Supreme Court will probably be rated a notable one. This is due both to the Court's own work, and to certain extraneous occurrences which could hardly fail to have some impact upon it. In any attempt to evaluate the work of this term, one should bear in mind the following facts: First, a month after the Court convened President Roosevelt was reëlected by one of the most impressive popular and electoral majorities in our political history. Second, in February the President submitted to Congress his proposal for the reorganization of the Supreme Court, including the enlargement of its membership by the addition, up to fifteen, of a new justice for every one remaining on the Court beyond the age of seventy. This proposal aroused violent opposition, the debates on it continued for many months, and ultimately the plan was defeated largely through the efforts of the President's own party. The discussions on this proposal were going on during much of the time in which the Court was sitting. Third, in every case in which New Deal laws were attacked, they were held valid. These results were accomplished in many instances by five-to-four margins, and in the Minimum Wage Case by a five-to-four reversal of a previous five-to-three decision.

Constitutional Law in 1947–48: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1947

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308
Author(s):  
David Fellman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court during the 1947 term. The former Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, Avho had retired from the Court on July 1, 1941, died on August 27, 1948. Justice Hughes had served on the Court from May 2, 1910, to June 10, 1916, and was appointed Chief Justice on February 13,1930, succeeding William Howard Taft. In characteristic fashion, the justices filed during the 1947 term a very large number of dissenting and concurring opinions liberally salted with spirited and often bitter judicial invective.

scholarly journals OD DEMOKRACJI PRZEDSTAWICIELSKIEJ DO DEMOKRACJI PRAWNICZEJ: KONSTYTUCJA STANÓW ZJEDNOCZONYCH A EWOLUCJA USTROJOWA PAŃSTWA

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Lewicki
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Political System ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Colonial Rule ◽  
Founding Fathers ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Elected Representatives ◽  
The U.S

FROM REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY TO JUDICIAL DEMOCRACY: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM Summary The article discusses the process in which the judiciary branch has claimed and maintains its supremacy over the other two branches by practicing the extra-constitutional process of judicial review. Prior precedences under the British or colonial rule can hardly be claimed as they were established in a markedly different system in which the tripartite division of power was not as pronounced as it is under the U.S. Constitution. The real culprit is the U.S. Congress which refrains from making clear rules in controversial matters, such as abortion. The Supreme Court swiftly moved into the void to the point where the beliefs of nine nominated Justices outweigh the views of over five hundred elected representatives of the people, to wit: the flag burning controversy. While the learned opinions of nine learned and respected specialists should not be dismissed lightly, it is a far cry from the Founding Fathers’ intention if one person’s preferences can sway the nation’s political system, as is the case when the Court is divided between four liberals and four conservatives. However, lawyers are unlikely to give up the power they have usurped over time.

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